The 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in 1992 allowed states to choose between direct and indirect modes of electing the Gram Panchayat president, also known as sarpanch. Of the 36 states and union territories in India today, sarpanches in 28 are elected directly by the voters, whereas in others, they are elected by the directly elected ward members.
Back and forth in Maharashtra
In July 2017, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Maharashtra government amended ‘The Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act 1959’ through an ordinance to adopt the direct mode of electing sarpanches. According to this ordinance, directly elected sarpanches are ex-officio chairpersons of all development committees. Also, sarpanches are prevented from a no-confidence motion for the first two years and the last six months of their term. However, in July 2019, the Maha Vikas Aghadi (MVA) government of Congress, NCP, and Shiv Sena reversed the amendment and returned to the indirect election mode, only for the newly formed government led by Eknath Shinde, in coalition with BJP to return to the direct mode of election in August 2022.
BJP inclined toward direct election
BJP primarily prefers direct elections in local politics for two reasons. First, until 2016, most of the seats of village council sarpanches and municipal council presidents in Maharashtra were captured by Congress and NCP. However, in 2016, the BJP government implemented direct elections at the municipal council level to elect its president. BJP won the maximum number of municipal council president seats in the four-phase local bodies election held thereafter.
The results in urban local bodies prompted the BJP to introduce direct election in village council elections as well. Here too, the party has won the highest number of sarpanch seats. Thus, through direct elections, BJP has been increasing its vote base across rural areas, which were mainly ruled by the NCP and Congress previously.
Second, in indirect elections, sarpanches are elected by the directly elected ward members, and ward members elected from the reserved seats for SCs and STs and women have a major say in the election of sarpanches, which would be a disadvantage for the BJP. However, in direct elections, all the elected ward members from reserved categories don’t have any say in electing Sarpanches.
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Effect on SC/ST development
My research also focused on the effect of the first transition in July 2017 on the development of Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). I used the data of the Gram Panchayat Development Plan (GPDP) and the sarpanches elections to predict the (causal) effect of directly elected sarpanches on spending on development activities for the marginalised communities, weaker sections of the society and other development sectors.
I find that directly elected sarpanches spend less on development activities for SCs and STs than indirectly elected sarpanches. However, if the directly elected sarpanches belong to the reserved SC or ST seats, then the GPDP spending on SC/ST development activities increases by 2 percent per year.
Also, the spending on poverty alleviation programmes decreased significantly during the term of directly elected sarpanches.
Furthermore, GPDP spending on road infrastructure increased, but spending on health, electrification, sanitation, and land improvement fell significantly.
What drives these findings?
The median voter in Maharashtra villages is mostly OBCs, Maratha, and ‘upper’ castes, who together comprise more than 70 percent of the state’s population. Thus, spending on these groups is mostly targeted. On the other hand, since SCs and STs have less say in electing sarpanches, spending on their development is ignored. Thus, during the term of a directly elected sarpanch, the welfare of marginalised groups can be compromised due to the existing social order.
Furthermore, spending on “visible goods” such as road infrastructure increases significantly because it helps sarpanches show villagers the developmental work they have done, which can easily help them win a future election. On the other hand, spending on necessary but less visible goods such as health, sanitation, electrification, and land improvement decreases, suggesting that the “visible effect” is stronger in redistribution policies in directly elected sarpanches.
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Direct election system is incomplete
Many scholars say that direct elections are expensive, which may restrict low-income and marginalised groups from contesting elections, thus affecting their development. Therefore, the current provisions should be modified to encourage them. For instance, as per the notification of the Maharashtra state election commission in 2017, the election spending limit was Rs 50,000 for village councils with 7-9 wards, Rs 1,00,000 for 10-13 wards, and Rs 1,75,000 for 15-17 wards. Many parties and candidates violate the expenditure limits, which increases the cost of contesting elections and demotivates those from lower income groups from contesting. Since Gram Panchayats consist of several villages in close proximity, people often know the candidates. Thus, keeping the expenditure limit to Rs 5,000-7,000 for each ward would decrease the economic burden on poor candidates. The campaign would then be based on connecting with people rather than spending on expensive campaigns.
Furthermore, in Madhya Pradesh during the 1990s, it was observed that the excessive powers given to the sarpanches inhibited village development, and governments during the 1990s made several amendments to curtail the power of sarpanches. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain checks and balances at the local governance similar to the state and central levels.
Moreover, since sarpanches are the ex-officio chairperson of all the development committees, previous studies show that they often allocate more policies to their home villages, which may negatively affect other villages in the village councils.
Recommendations for direct elections
First, I propose to implement direct democracy in the village councils. The voters in Gram Panchayats will vote for the economic development policies. Voters will be allowed to participate in the decision-making process because results show that spending on visible goods has increased during the directly elected sarpanches’ term, and spending on important but less visible sectors decreased.
Second, I find a continuous decrease in the GPDP budget for the SCs/STs and women and child development during directly elected sarpanches’ terms. I propose that the development committees in the Gram Panchayats should be diversified so that the historically marginalised groups get representation in the decision-making process.
Third, an important concern behind moving to direct elections from indirect elections was that the ward members often removed indirectly elected sarpanches from the post using the no-confidence motion. However, the 2017 amendment gave directly elected sarpanches more power by restricting them from bringing the no-confidence motion for the first two years and the last six months of the term. Even if ward members want to bring a no-confidence motion, only the voters should have the right to remove sarpanches by secret ballot in the Gram Sabha (village council meeting). To ensure sarpanches’ accountability to village councils, I propose that votes of at least two-thirds of the ward members should be required to remove a sarpanches through a non-confidence motion and at least 50 percent of the Gram Sabha participants should vote against the sarpanch by ballot at any time during the sarpanch’s term.
Amit Jadhav is a PhD scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He tweets @amit_s_jadhav. Views are personal.
This is an edited extract from the author’s study titled ‘Parliamentary vs. Presidential Democracy: Does it Make Difference at the Local Level Economic Development? Evidence from India’. Read the full paper here.
(Edited by Prashant)