India is investing enormously in its G20 presidency, capped by an extravagant summit. There may be some hope that it will bring the country some political benefits. But it is more likely that the returns on this investment will be far less. Indeed, it may not be entirely far-fetched to suggest that the returns will be negligible.
And this has little to do with two key absentees from the summit. It is understandable that Russian President Vladimir Putin has begged off from attending the summit because of the difficulties caused by Russia’s entirely unjustified and foolish invasion of Ukraine and the potential domestic troubles it has brought upon him. In any case, his attendance would have made New Delhi uncomfortable considering the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for war crimes in Ukraine, even though India is not a member state of the ICC.
The decision of Xi Jinping to skip the summit in New Delhi is more surprising as this is the first G20 summit that will not see the Chinese leader. It might be related both to China’s isolation within the G20 and, more worryingly, a deliberate signal to India regarding bilateral ties and the continuing crisis at the border.
Nevertheless, attendance is not the criteria by which the Indian effort should be judged. The purpose of the party is far more concerning than who attends it. One appears to be to stake leadership of the so-called Global South. As a strategic move, it might be understandable and may even have some benefits. India and China are no doubt competing for leadership of the Global South. Framing the G20 as a way of “mainstreaming the marginalised aspirations of developing countries”, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote, neatly sums up the Indian aspiration. It undercuts China’s efforts in the developing world and forces Beijing to work harder.
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The real anti-West
Ultimately, however, India cannot really match China, either in terms of resources that it can devote to the Global South or in terms of competing as a champion against the West. China’s enormously larger economy, five times or more than India’s, allows it to devote far greater wealth to such pursuits. And though India’s delivery has improved, it still cannot match China in areas such as infrastructure-building. Voicing the Global South’s concerns will ultimately matter less than who can afford to pay the Global South.
Similarly, while India can mouth some vaguely anti-western slogans to curry favour with the Global South, it cannot match the authenticity of China’s rhetoric. China is solidly and authentically anti-West because it seeks to overthrow American power and the Western liberal order. It has its own reasons to do this, of course, but its intentions are clear and its interest unambiguous. There is no doubt that the Indian leadership and its ardent supporters share some of the criticism of the US, the West, and Liberalism. Unfortunately, India also needs the West, and not just as another point on the compass in a tous azimuts diplomatic strategy of multi-alignment.
For all the rhetoric about multipolarity, Indian leaders know that India is no equal to China or the US, the two primary global powers today. India has become increasingly closer to the US and its allies for the obvious reason that if the pushing and shoving at the LAC becomes a fire-fight, New Delhi will need their support. The necessity of maintaining the US partnership means that India’s anti-western protests are going to sound hypocritical, especially in comparison to China’s.
The other stated purpose of the G20 summit, of promoting ‘one earth, one family, one future’, is even more questionable. This rhetoric is reminiscent of Jawaharlal Nehru’s original ‘one world’ dream. When Nehru proposed it, the Cold War was just beginning, and it intensified throughout the 1950s. His complete failure to understand the international political ground realities made the effort, at best, quixotic.
As it was then, the world today is one in which international tension and conflict is ratcheting up, making such propositions about as useful as a candle in a cyclone. A new Cold War has started, pitting the US and its allies and partners against China and Russia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine intensified this, but so has China’s relentless pressure on its neighbours in the Indo-Pacific. China’s warnings against a new Cold War is one piece of evidence of the situation the world faces. If the G20 ends without a joint statement, as seems likely, it would be further evidence of the growing confrontation between the West on one side and Russia and China on the other.
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New Cold War
If Nehru’s ‘One World’ effort sounded quixotic, the current effort may be even worse because at least Nehru’s India was not a literal frontline state in the Cold War, sharing borders with one of the two protagonists. He could still have hoped to play a ‘non-aligned’ role because it was not a party to the conflict. Today, India is an interested party because not only does it share a border with China, but it is a hot border with an active, continuing dispute. There is no way to separate the China-India border fight from the broader cold war, because India and the US are partners against China.
Multilateral efforts like the G20 are not completely useless. But their limitations should also be understood. It is not going to give India leadership of the Global South because New Delhi does not have the resources to compete with China. It is not going to prevent a new Cold War either. New Delhi’s exaggeration of what is a routine, rotational presidency of the G20 suggests that these limitations are not being understood. If India’s leaders actually believe in all the rhetoric they are mouthing, it could be dangerous.
Nehru thought that India’s importance to both sides in the Cold War guaranteed security. Any attack on India, he thought, would lead to a world war. Such misperception about India’s popularity, importance and indispensability was a recipe for overconfidence and subsequent disaster. It does not appear as if the many intervening decades have taught India any lessons in the necessity of having a foreign policy grounded in international political realities.
The author is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)