Gurugram: The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed a nearly nine-year-old FIR registered against actor Rajkumar Yadav and the producers of the 2017 film Behen Hogi Teri, holding that once the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) clears a film, its makers cannot be hauled up for criminal prosecution merely because some individuals find the content offensive.
Justice H.S. Grewal, who heard the matter, pronounced the order on 29 May and quashed an FIR dated 19 April, 2017, registered under Sections 295-A and 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act against the actor and the producers.
The FIR was lodged on the basis of a complaint by one Ishant Sharma to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jalandhar, dated 11 April, 2017. The complainant alleged that a promotional poster of the film, posted on social media by one of the producers, depicted the actor dressed in the attire of the Hindu deity Shiva while riding a motorcycle. The complainant alleged this was deeply disrespectful to Shiva and amounted to outraging the religious sentiments of Hindus.
The FIR named the film’s producers, Nitin Upadhyaya, Amul Vikas Mohan, and Anthony Raymond Philip Dsouza alias Tony, its director Ajay K. Panna Lal, and actor Rajkumar Yadav.
After investigation, a challan was filed before the competent court on 31 January, 2022. A judicial magistrate in Jalandhar issued non-bailable warrants against the accused in July 2025, following which the petitioners moved the High Court.
What the petitioners said
Senior Advocate Puneet Bali, appearing for the petitioners, argued that the entire prosecution was built on a single promotional poster and that the complainant had admittedly not even watched the film at the time of lodging the FIR.
More importantly, he pointed out that the CBFC had already granted the film a ‘UA’ certificate on 30 May, 2017, after scrutinising the very scenes that were the subject of the complaint, including the one showing the actor in the Shiva costume.
He submitted that the CBFC is a statutory authority set up under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, specifically tasked with examining whether films are fit for public exhibition. Once it clears a film, the makers cannot subsequently be subjected to criminal proceedings based on differing perceptions of individual viewers.
Bali also argued that the essential ingredient of Section 295-A IPC, deliberate and malicious intention to outrage religious feelings, was completely absent. Two of the petitioners themselves were Hindus and devotees of Shiva. There was no mens rea, he said, and without that, the provision simply could not be attracted.
On the charge under Section 67 of the IT Act, which deals with publishing obscene material in electronic form, he argued that a film still of an actor dressed as Shiva contains no element of obscenity, sexual suggestion, or moral depravity, and therefore the provision had no application to the facts of this case.
What the State said
The Additional Advocate General for Punjab contested the petitioners’ submissions, arguing that though filmmakers enjoy freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, that right is subject to reasonable restrictions, including censorship, to protect the religious sentiments of the public.
The State argued that the ingredients of Sections 295-A and 120-B IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act were prima facie made out from the allegations in the FIR.
What the High Court Found
Justice Grewal found no merit in the State’s position. Examining the ingredients of Section 295-A IPC, the court found nothing on record to indicate that the petitioners had any deliberate or malicious intention to insult the religious feelings of any community, the essential threshold the provision demands.
Notably, the court pointed out that two of the petitioners themselves were devotees of Shiva, and photographs of them at Hindu temples had been placed on record.
The court drew on a line of Supreme Court precedent establishing that Section 295-A does not penalise every act that someone finds offensive. It punishes only those acts of insult committed with deliberate and malicious intent to outrage religious feelings. Mere objection by an individual or a section of viewers, the court held, cannot by itself be treated as proof of such intent.
On the IT Act charge, the court held that the promotional poster could not by any stretch be termed obscene or lascivious. The grievance in the FIR was entirely about hurt religious sentiments, not obscenity, and therefore Section 67 of the IT Act was simply not attracted.
On the CBFC certification, the High Court held that this was in itself a complete answer to the prosecution. The CBFC had examined the very content which was the subject of the complaint, and granted a UA certificate. That certification, the High Court held, amounts to a determination by a specialised statutory body that the film does not offend public morality or religious sentiments. Once that certification is in place, filmmakers and those associated with the film cannot be prosecuted on the same grounds. Relying on an earlier judgment of the High Court in Sanjay Leela Bhansali v. State of Punjab, Justice Grewal held that the CBFC certificate would protect the petitioners from criminal liability.
It also noted a telling detail: the producer had merely posted the promotional preview on social media on 4 April, 2017, the FIR was registered on 19 April, 2017, and the CBFC granted its certificate on May 30, 2017. The complainant had not even seen the film when he got the FIR registered.
The conspiracy charge under Section 120-B IPC, the court added, could not survive independently once the substantive offences under Section 295-A IPC and Section 67 IT Act were not made out.
The court allowed the petitions and quashed the FIR, the challan, and all consequential proceedings, including the non-bailable warrants issued by the judicial magistrate. It held that continuing the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
(Edited by Amrtansh Arora)