New Delhi: A separate exam for the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), allowing a certain percentage of IAS officers to leave with full benefits after 20 years of service, and appointing officers as secretaries to the Government of India at 50 years of age — these are among a slew of suggestions by former finance secretary Arvind Mayaram on how India’s steel-framed bureaucracy can be fixed.
Mayaram, a retired IAS officer himself, who is currently vice-chairman of Rajasthan Economic Transformation Advisory Council and Economic Adviser to the Chief Minister of Rajasthan, has put forth the recommendations in a research paper titled ‘Reforming the Indian Administrative Service’, published on 4 May by the Institute of South Asian Studies, an autonomous research body at National University of Singapore.
In the paper, Mayaram says that it has become necessary to “right-size” the IAS and “declutter the top”, which has “too many senior officers with very little to do”.
He also flags the “increasingly shrinking space” for IAS officers to “exercise their judgment and their right to express their opinion (‘advise’), which may be contrarian to the views of the political executive”.
“Officers who exercise their right to ‘advise’ are transferred repeatedly, subjecting them to mental and financial stress, including harassment for their families. There have been cases of officers being moved around the state every one or two months, like a pawn on the chessboard, while their families struggle to seek some kind of stability by hiring private homes at a considerable cost to themselves,” Mayaram writes.
He adds that such action often breaks the morale of the officers, and they begin to “compromise by acquiescing to unreasonable or, many times, illegal demands of the political masters or even their superiors, who are complicit”.
Mayaram himself was at the receiving end of abrupt transfers while in service.
In October 2014, in a surprise move, the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi transferred Mayaram, who was then the finance secretary, first to the low-profile tourism ministry and then to the minority affairs ministry within the span of a fortnight.
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Allow IAS officers to leave after 20 years
In his research paper, Mayaram suggests that, like in the armed forces, a certain percentage of IAS officers must be allowed to leave after 20 years of service with full benefits.
“…promotions up to the level of director or equivalent, both in the states and central government, should be based on merit and seniority, as it is at present,” he writes, adding that “for the position of joint secretary and its equivalent and above, screening based on objective criteria should be put in place”.
This, he explains, will allow only those who are considered fit to be picked up for the rank of joint-secretary and its equivalent in the states. “Those who do not pass muster should be allowed to retire with full benefits,” Mayaram writes.
Appoint secretaries at 50 years
According to the former finance secretary, an IAS officer should “ideally become secretary to the Government of India at 50 years of age”, unlike the present system where officers are appointed as secretary at the end of their career, giving them a maximum tenure of one to two years at the top.
Mayaram says this gives them very limited time to make any impact in the department they head.
But if such appointments are made at 50 years of age, “he/she would get on an average two five-year stints as a secretary in two departments, which would give him/her ample scope to contribute meaningfully to governance”, he writes.
He further points out that it is important that the “screening process has an arm’s length relationship with the government”.
Mayaram comes down on the 360-degree appraisal process introduced by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 2015 for the central empanelment of IAS officers.
Under it, the government takes feedback not only from an officer’s superiors, but peers and juniors as well, for promotion as additional secretary and secretary.
“This has made the system opaque and more subjective, leaving out many deserving officers while including those politically connected. This has eroded the credibility of the system,” Mayaram says.
Change recruitment process
Mayaram has, in his paper, also called for a drastic change in the process of recruitment for the IAS.
He suggests that examinations for each of the Indian civil services should be differently designed with different eligibility qualifications.
“… the present system of one exam for all services results in those getting the top positions opting for the IAS and the Indian Foreign Service, while those lower in merit get various other services. This results in a lot of heartburn and inter-service rivalries,” he writes.
He further recommends that each of the services be treated as a specialist service — the IAS being a specialist service in “policymaking” — and their recruitment process should be accordingly designed.
“For instance, for revenue services like Income Tax and Customs, a background in law and accountancy, along with others, may be more relevant, and the examination must reflect this requirement. Similarly, for the IAS, assessment of an analytical mind and a universal and cosmopolitan outlook may be the bedrock of examining eligibility,” he writes.
‘IAS officers becoming football between Centre & states’
In the paper, Mayaram highlights how the central and the state political leadership often use IAS officers to settle scores.
He mentions the case of former West Bengal chief secretary Alapan Bandyopadhyay, who had to face the brunt of the tussle between the central government and the state in 2021.
“The chief secretary, who was reportedly accompanying the chief minister (Mamata Banerjee) for her aerial surveys of flood-affected areas in the state, did not receive the prime minister at the airbase on his arrival. In the review meeting, the CM and, under her instructions, the chief secretary did not participate, stating their preoccupation with flood-related work,” Mayaram writes.
He adds that reacting to this “perceived snub”, the central government ordered the transfer of the chief secretary to the central government without the concurrence of the state government, “triggering a constitutional crisis”.
According to Mayaram, it is therefore important to “institutionalise the politician-civil servant relationship” through proper structural arrangement.
The rules, the former bureaucrat explains, must clearly define the role of the civil servant as the one who advises the political executive on policy issues based on the extant laws, rules, policies and his/her work experience.
“The final decision shall be that of the (political executive). However, if, in his/her (civil servant’s) opinion, the decision taken by the political executive (minister) is contrarian to the rule of law, there should be a legal requirement for the civil servant to refer the matter to the prime minister/chief minister with his/her reasons,” says Mayaram.
But if the prime minister/chief minister also wishes to support such an order, the civil servant should be legally absolved of any responsibility in judicial proceedings or in any inquiry, disciplinary or criminal in nature, he adds.
(Edited by Nida Fatima Siddiqui)
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