The Modi government refers to the cabinet led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who became the 14th Prime Minister of India in May 2014. The government is headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies within the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of political parties.
Under Modi’s leadership, the government has focused on transformative initiatives aimed at economic growth, infrastructure development, and national security. Some of the landmark policies include the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), demonetisation of high-value currency notes in 2016, and the controversial revocation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, which ended the region’s special status. The Modi government has also emphasized initiatives such as ‘Make in India,’ ‘Digital India,’ ‘Skill India,’ and the ‘Swachh Bharat Abhiyan’ (Clean India Mission).
While it has received praise for boosting economic growth and improving infrastructure, it has also faced significant criticism. Its handling of the anti-CAA protests, the 2020 farmers’ protests, and issues surrounding the delivery of data—such as the absence of a national census and the lack of transparency regarding COVID-19 death tolls—has sparked public debate. The government has also been criticized for its response to social issues, such as the Hathras rape case and the conflict in Manipur.
Despite these challenges, the Modi government, now in its third term, continues to maintain a dominant political presence, securing electoral victories at both state and national levels.
India and China are led by powerful, charismatic premiers, with political capital sufficient to forge a more mutually beneficial relationship, not unduly weighed down by the baggage of history. A slow build up of mutual trust dating from PM Rajiv Gandhi’s successful visit and, since 2000, a more swift enlargement of trade – although the imbalance of $ 63 billion is unsustainable and needs to be reduced substantially – was undone in the last few years, culminating in Dokalam, which was more symptom than disease. Both sides realised a reset was necessary. Some have spoken of the need to forge a new modus vivendi, one which honestly acknowledges how the power differential has widened in the last thirty years. 2. The quad / containment of China represents one school of thought. It may be the more realistic, hard headed, mindful of half a century of distrust, compounded by China’s all weather friendship with Pakistan. Lurking below the surface is the possibility of having to fight a two front war, when nuclear deterrence suggests that even a single front war would be unwelcome. At this stage of our economic development, it does not represent the best possible outcome for Indian diplomacy. 3. Relations between great powers are not crafted and refashioned in summits. The test of where the relationship is headed is not how many times the leaders have met. Today, OBOR / BRI is China’s signature initiative to stamp its imprint on infrastructure creation in Eurasia, with SCO and CPEC at its heart. For India to find a way to join this magnificent series of interconnected projects – with suitable caveats regarding our claim over PoK – would truly mean that a new synergy is being created between the two countries. 4. With or without President Trump, who mentioned India at the G 7 summit, a reset with the US was equally warranted. Important bilateral relationships with Russia, Iran, others were being affected by a monochromatic vision of foreign policy. That recalibration seems to be underway.