A useful principle to follow with most things in life is, worry less about any crisis, for ultimately it turns out less worse than how it seemed to begin with.
Flashback to 1984. Who would have imagined one day the people of Punjab would actually forget that murderous, vicious phase and return to normal politics? Or the plague of 1994 which, as it ultimately turned out, wasn’t plague at all? The Latur and Gujarat earthquakes where the toll was exactly one-fifth of the initial guesswork? Ditto for the twin towers.
But would you dare to apply the same test to the current India-Pakistan stand-off? The western press is certainly taking no such chances. The British government and the press are talking as if a cataclysmic nuclear exchange is inevitable. You can discount the rather prompt dismissal of the Jack Straw visit as a failure — the British media has given up on Blair’s government already. But essentially the British reaction is based on extensive war-gaming exercises in recent weeks. All reach the same conclusion: a massive, all-out nuclear exchange. There are, of course, other alarming presumptions. That both countries have very imperfect nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and that the bombs will be delivered in ground bursts that would contaminate the region for generations rather than the relatively benign(!) air bursts which confine the radiation to a smaller area. Also that leaders, military and political, in both countries somehow do not understand the gravity of a nuclear war, nor is their public opinion informed enough to know.
If, God forbid, a war breaks out, it will be a war with no real political objective on either side. The last time this happened, it was between Iran and Iraq and went on for years Rapidly, the British alarm is now infecting (irradiating?) the Americans as well. There is exasperation, even hopelessness, with the Bush administration’s inability to control the crisis. The New York Times, in an editorial headlined ‘Irresponsible South Asians’ berates both Vajpayee and Musharraf for giving ‘‘new meaning to the concept of misguided leadership’’. It mocks both for their claims made at the time of the 1998 nuclear tests that they were mature enough to handle the ‘‘balance of terror they created’’.
It goes on to argue how while even during the Cuban missile crisis Kennedy and Khrushchev ‘‘searched ardently for face-saving ways out, Indian and Pakistan action show no similar sense of responsibility and restraint’’.
Strong stuff. But this is exactly what you see in the world media and this is exactly what all our (and the Pakistani) diplomats are now hearing in capitals around the world.
Nobody believes any hostilities that begin now could be limited or contained. Unlike Kargil, which at least came wrapped in the soothing alibi that probably Nawaz Sharif was not even aware of the incursion. This time there are no alibis. The mood on both sides is bitter, there is talk of the final, decisive war. And that can only mean a nuclear catastrophe. So goes the argument.
If this war breaks out it will be fundamentally different from our past wars and not only because we are now nuclear weapon states. We had stumbled into a reasonably limited war in 1965.
Also read: It took Pakistan three defeats to understand the flaw in its war strategy against India
All remained quiet on the eastern front during what was later called the 22-day war of attrition. The navies more or less stayed out. Air power was used sparingly and civilians were spared. The 1971 war had a clear Indian objective and ceased on its 13th day with the liberation of Bangladesh.
If this one starts, God forbid, it will be a war with no real political objective on either side. It will be a war of revenge, of teaching the other side a lesson. The last time such a war broke out, between Iraq and Iran, it went on for years. The western nightmare at this moment, is that this won’t be just another war, but a vicious communal riot with tanks, jets, missiles and nukes.
So far, our strategy has worked very well. For it to reach its logical end, we need to control our anger that much longer, particularly if another terrorist strike occurs Will this crisis also pass the test of things ultimately turning out to be less worse than how they seemed to begin with? It is simplistic to say it is ultimately in our hands. Because many other things have to come together to take this to the conclusion we have sought ever since we launched this phase of coercive diplomacy. If the fundamental underpinning of this strategy was that we wanted an end to cross-border terrorism without preferably resorting to all-out war but while being prepared to consider it as a last, but real option, we have come a long way already.
Every foreign government is now speaking the language we want in public. In private they are obviously telling us they accept the logic in our justification for retaliation against terrorist camps but ask if it would help us achieve our objective of ending terrorism.
Also read: Pakistan never ‘surrendered’ in 1971. Kashmir, 26/11, Parliament show why
To build on this sizeable diplomatic toehold we now need the discipline, focus and equanimity to not let the rising rhetoric deflect us from our strategy and objective. The doctrine of nuclear first use (or, more accurately, the doctrine of the threat of nuclear first use) is as old as the Pakistani nuclear dream. But each time they repeat that threat they are only displaying nervousness because the chickens are coming home to roost. They persisted with the strategy of cross-border terrorism for 12 years presuming that India would never even threaten retaliation. That presumption has been rendered outdated and it must be so bitterly disappointing for those who have built their entire careers around it.
Similarly, when Musharraf wags his finger at us, exhorts his people to shed the last drop of their blood to defend Pakistan or to unleash a storm, he too reflects the same nervousness. Please see the video of that speech again. See the nervousness and then put the words in perspective. Then don’t let your anger and irritation blind you to the fact that he said in that speech — five times — that he won’t let his soil be used to export terrorism anywhere.
He surely did not look happy saying so, but did you really expect him to? At least not after his long preamble apologising to his own people for ‘‘unauthorised, overenthusiastic’’ rigging in his own referendum.
So discount some of the rhetoric. And that much abused term, body language. And you will see our strategy has worked marvellously so far. For it to reach its logical conclusion we have to hold our nerve, control our anger that much longer, particularly if another terrorist strike takes place in days to come. Nothing would make the jehadis more nervous than our coercive diplomacy succeeding without war.
Similarly, nothing would make them more desperate to trigger a war. Nothing would justify our throwing away, in a momentary, retaliatory flourish, what is now developing into a decisively winning hand.