Former RBI Governor Urjit Patel paid a heavy price for his unseemly power grab
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Former RBI Governor Urjit Patel paid a heavy price for his unseemly power grab

RBI has now acquired far more monetary policy independence than it had during the UPA years.

   
Former RBI Governor Urjit Patel | Olivier Douliery/Bloomberg

Former RBI Governor Urjit Patel | Olivier Douliery/Bloomberg

RBI has now acquired far more monetary policy independence than it had during the UPA years.

The political obituaries for outgoing RBI Governor Urjit Patel will be long on rhetoric about “institutional independence”, but he is actually a victim of his own burlesque game of seeking ever more power.

The RBI does not have statutory independence, but has been granted an enormous amount through the mechanism of its monetary policy committee (MPC). Sadly, the MPC itself overplayed its hand, making several policy errors – including in its inflation forecasts and rate hikes over the past half year.

The RBI has consistently over-estimated inflation since mid-2014. This year, when raising its policy rate by 25 basis points (bp) in June, the monetary policy committee forecast that inflation would be 4.8-4.9 per cent in the first half of the fiscal year (Apr-Sep 2018), and 4.7 per cent in the second half (Oct 2018-March 2019) “with risks tilted to the upside. This was the MPC’s justification for raising interest rates, not just that once but a second time in August as well.


Also read: Urjit Patel, RBI, institutional autonomy and the Power of One


In reality, consumer price index (CPI) inflation averaged 4.3 per cent even in the first half of FY2018/19 – so the MPC’s forecast (made halfway through that 6-month period) was wrong even on that count. In October 2018, CPI inflation subsided to 3.3 per cent YoY. Thus, at its 5 December meeting, the RBI’s MPC acknowledged that its inflation forecast from six months earlier was hopelessly wrong and revised that forecast down to “2.7-3.2 per cent” for the October 2018 – March 2019 period.

But loath to do a full mea culpa, the MPC retained its “calibrated tightening” stance in last week’s meeting. As an explicitly inflation-targeting central bank, this was a bizarre act of grandstanding at a time when inflation has clearly subsided to levels that call not merely for a neutral stance (as dovish MPC member R.H. Dholakia wanted), but a move towards easing.

The contrast with the recent past is extraordinarily jarring. In April 2012, the RBI lowered its policy rate by 50 bp (from 8.5 per cent to 8 per cent) in response to reported wholesale price inflation of 7.6 per cent and consumer price inflation of 9.1 per cent for February 2012. This proved to be a temporary reprieve, because CPI inflation was back above 10 per cent by April 2012 (when that number was released a few weeks later).

But the RBI (then headed by Manmohan Singh/P. Chidambaram appointee Duvvuri Subbarao) did not raise its policy rate for the next nine months, despite CPI inflation staying stubbornly above 10 per cent – and then lowered the policy rate by 25 bp in January 2013 when CPI inflation was above 11 per cent. There were no howls of protest about this utter debasement of the RBI’s role as a central bank, which rendered hollow the slightest remaining notion of monetary independence.


Also read: Urjit Patel quits: Cry for RBI autonomy or inability to work with Modi govt on economy?


It is easily forgotten now that Raghuram Rajan’s RBI had in 2014 set an inflation target of 6 per cent to be achieved by 2016. In reality, actual CPI inflation waned to less than 5 per cent by October 2014 – i.e., the month before global crude oil prices began declining precipitously.

The trajectory of inflation in India is determined primarily by the political choice about how to manage food prices. Look back over the past 27 years, and the most striking feature is rampant food inflation when the Congress is in power – and remarkably tame food inflation when the BJP is running the central government.

During the past five years, India has had two poor monsoons (and a third one, this year, which was barely normal, with rainfall 9 per cent below the long-run average). And yet, food inflation is non-existent. Monsoons were bountiful right through 2009 to 2013, but annual food inflation averaged 12 per cent during the 5-year UPA-II term.

Sensibly, the RBI does not explicitly target ‘core’ inflation (excluding food and energy prices), because food and energy are the main sources of inflationary pressure in India. The European Central Bank (ECB) also targets headline rather than core inflation – unlike the US Fed, which explicitly targets core inflation.

The long period of negative real interest rates during UPA-II (i.e., with the policy interest rate much lower than actual inflation) caused numerous distortions in the economy, including a flight from financial savings to gold, and a sharp deterioration of the trade and current account balances.

Since June 2014, real interest rates have been consistently positive – and among the highest in the world. The contrast illustrates the fact that the RBI has now acquired far more monetary-policy independence than it had during the UPA years of fiscal profligacy, ballooning inflation and consistently negative real interest rates.


Also read: RBI governor Urjit Patel’s exit shows Modi government is prioritising short-term gains


Instead, we have had a burlesque debate about central bank independence, initiated by Deputy Governor Viral Acharya – and now the resignation of RBI Governor Urjit Patel. Although Patel cites “personal reasons” for his abrupt resignation, it is widely perceived that he is unhappy over the treatment/disposal of the RBI’s capital (net worth) – and specifically, the dividend that the RBI should pay the government.

Like any central bank, the RBI regularly makes profits, including the ‘seigniorage’ earned from being the monopoly issuer of currency. Given that net foreign assets constitute one of the RBI’s largest assets (and rupee currency in circulation its largest liability), the RBI makes larger profits when the rupee is depreciating – because the rupee value of foreign assets automatically rises (apart from the interest rate earned from holding US$ and other foreign currency bonds). The RBI pays no interest on its main liability (currency in circulation), enhancing its scope to make a profit.

In 2017, the rupee was appreciating rapidly, so the RBI’s profits would have risen at a slower pace. But this year, there is little doubt that the RBI’s profits have soared.

When any company is deciding how much of its profits it should distribute to its shareholders, the decision is primarily made by its board of directors. The CEO can, at most, have an advisory role in the decision. Never before has the RBI (or any central bank) had a public spat with the government about the amount of the dividend it should pay its only shareholder.

That the issue has entered the public domain reflects very poorly on the RBI’s top management – especially Urjit Patel and Viral Acharya. Not only does the RBI currently have unusual monetary independence – reflected in real interest rates that are among the highest in the world (after having been consistently negative in 2008-2013) – the RBI leadership became arrogant enough to want to control the actions of its owner/shareholder. No management anywhere in the world has ever arrogated such a right to itself.

That P. Chidambaram, who debased the RBI more thoroughly than any finance minister in the past 40 years, should be egging Patel and Acharya on to pursue their folly, is particularly perverse.


Also read: Urjit Patel seen as India’s hero after he martyrs himself


The merits of the case are quite clear: The RBI’s ‘capital-asset ratio’ is about 28 per cent, far higher than the 10-12 per cent recommended for commercial banks. Given that the central bank benefits from a sovereign guarantee, there is no logical reason for it to have such a massive pile of capital. All the evidence suggests that the government is merely asking for more of the RBI’s recent profits to be paid out in the form of a larger dividend – not any massive diminution in its enormous pile of capital, to which much more has been added this year.

The elected government has the sovereign right to decide what dividend the RBI will pay its only shareholder. Neither an unelected former finance minister nor the current management of the RBI has any say in the matter. If Urjit Patel wants to overstep the limits of its statutory authority, he is eminently dispensable.

Prasenjit K. Basu is a former Chief Economist for SE Asia & India at Credit Suisse First Boston, former Chief Asia economist at Daiwa Securities, and the author of the award-winning book, “Asia Reborn”.

The headline has been changed to reflect that Urjit Patel is now the former RBI governor after Shaktikanta Das took office.