The troops of two nuclear powers, India and China, had a face-off on 9 December in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector at a height of 16,000 feet at sub-zero temperatures. They were carrying weapons but didn’t use them. Perhaps following the orders of their political masters passed down through their military bosses, the troops reportedly restricted themselves to pushing, shoving, and punching. Some used clubs to inflict injuries that weren’t serious but required hospitalisation.
Military force application seemed to be bound within some mutually understood parameters. The encounter was short. Local commanders soon met and blamed each other. Anodyne statements about the need to avoid such incidents in future ensued.
The general pattern of such incidents has remained unchanged for several years, except for the June 2020 Galwan Valley clash in which fatalities resulted on both sides. One could expect more such incidents to follow, though where, when, and how would remain a matter of conjecture even as India’s political will and military capability to retaliate should, hopefully, no longer be in doubt.
There is far too much space along the 3,488 km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) for China to indulge in such activities. But there is a need to differentiate between two types of potential problems. The first is where both sides patrol in spaces considered to lie within the respective claim lines, which are interpreted differently. Patrol presence is normally temporary. Patrols of both could come face to face and have confrontations, only some of which — though rarely — result in physical scrimmages. The second is when patrols occupy currently unoccupied spaces and try to establish permanent presence — which could also inhibit our own patrolling like at Depsang in Ladakh. This is what has been described as ‘salami slicing’. It changes the status quo and alters territorial control.
Also read: Why Yangtse in Tawang sector is the sore point China keeps returning to
Look at the larger picture
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh stated in Parliament that in the Yangtse incident, the Chinese troops transgressed and attempted to change the LAC status quo but were thwarted by the vigilance and timely actions of the Indian Army. Though unsaid, the statement seems to indicate that the Chinese intended to occupy some unoccupied spaces or dislodge our troops from some already-held positions. Considering the nature of the incident, the former is the greater possibility. China has not attacked any Indian border post since Nathu La in 1967 but has, over time, managed to change the status quo regarding territorial control at some places and India has lost it without a fight. The question now is whether India’s military readiness can prevent any such losses in the future. Does the Yangtse incident provide room for optimism?
It certainly does as long as we do not miss the wood for the trees. The trees here are the bites of territory that China seeks; the wood is the strategic objectives of China within the larger framework of confrontation with the US and others, including Japan, which has officially declared that China poses “the greatest strategic challenge ever”. India’s strategic planners must be cognizant of the larger game and shape their strategy accordingly. There must be recognition that military pressure exerted to enlarge control in the guise of territorial disputes has an instrumental role. It is directed to contain India within the subcontinent to weaken its role in the larger US-China power play.
Militarily, China is seeking to contain India by using the northern border and Pakistan as a military pressure point. China’s inroads into India’s neighbourhood through the weaponisation of economic tools and supply of military hardware — apart from buttressing its containment intentions — is also aimed to acquire bases in the Indian Ocean Region. For Beijing, the region can become a strategic vulnerability if it cannot protect the trade routes vital for its economic strength. Military bases in Djibouti, Pakistan, and Myanmar are already underway. Bases in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and some African countries are currently within China’s sight.
Also read: Tawang clash won’t be last. India must revisit 1993 agreement with China, reset strategy
Maritime ability can shift balance of power
India’s strategic planners will always be challenged by limitations on resources to simultaneously develop the country’s ability to defend its borders and strengthen its maritime power. In essence, India’s strategic choices for the development of military power have to be related to the threats China and Pakistan pose on the continent vis-à-vis its ability to pose threats to them in the maritime domain. Importantly, the maritime domain also provides the potential for cooperation with countries with whom India’s interests converge — the US, Japan, and the West.
A strategically defensive posture against China and Pakistan in the continental domain must be counterbalanced by offensive capability in the maritime domain — it could shift the balance of power. This not only calls for a rebalancing of the Army from the west to the north, a process that is probably underway, but also the restructuring of its offensive combat capability housed in the Strike Corps. The capture of large parts of territory can no longer be a realistic political objective. The Navy needs offensive capability embedded in submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface ships.
All of these are extremely costly, have long periods for development and manufacturing, and may need foreign technological assistance. It certainly cannot be achieved by the 17.8 per cent allocation of the defence budget to the Navy. Air power, which will play an important role over both continental and maritime spaces, is in dire need of wide-ranging replacements due to a large part of its inventory nearing expiry. It is, therefore, a matter of grave concern that debilitating delays continue in the procurements of platforms like aircraft, submarines, aircraft carriers, and surface ships.
Also read: Tawang to AIIMS, Chinese intrusion has a pattern—to keep India in a reactive mode
What must be done
The moot point is that while the Army is now better prepared to counter territorial threats — despite its 1.18 lakh vacancies — India still has a long way to go to become the player its geographic potential offers in the maritime domain. Such potential cannot be harnessed without a significant increase in the defence budget that has been decreasing, both as a percentage of GDP and government expenditure. It also has to be accompanied by the allotment of resources keeping in mind the larger strategic picture and one underpinned by identifying operational means tied to political objectives.
Developing military capability has always been challenging. It has to be guided by a vision that is enlightened by the major forces at play in the strategic environment and, therefore, facilitates the prioritisation of national goals. From a national security and development perspective, the answer lies in the ability to envision India’s growth to power in an adrift world. In the absence of a vision and strategy, the short-term and the tactical find a space that could be politically useful at the cost of sacrificing national interests.
Yangtse and such incidents must certainly alert us to ground realities. At the same time, they should not blind us to the strategic vectors that matter.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)