During a visit to China to strengthen business ties, Bangladesh Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus made some remarks about India’s Northeast. Yunus’ assertions drew an odd correlation between India’s Northeastern states being landlocked, Dhaka serving as the ocean’s guardian for this region, and an extension of the Chinese economy. Although his statements lacked coherence, they highlighted India’s vulnerabilities, particularly regarding the strategically important Siliguri Corridor.
Such comments have understandably provoked a strong reaction from India, which has historically maintained a friendly relationship with Bangladesh. Not anymore, though.
Yunus made these comments in China, where there was no Indian representation, at a time when bilateral relations between New Delhi and Dhaka are at their lowest since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. The political landscape in Bangladesh has shifted since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, which was much-favoured by India. This has caused Bangladesh to increasingly lean toward China, raising India’s strategic concerns about potential destabilisation by its immediate neighbours.
Initially, the Ministry of External Affairs chose to remain silent in the face of these uncharitable remarks. However, it soon retaliated by withdrawing transshipment facilities for Bangladesh, citing congestion at its ports and airports. In response, Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue suspended the import of yarn from India through land ports, escalating the tit-for-tat exchange between the two nations.
Tip of the iceberg
The Siliguri corridor, a narrow strip of land located in West Bengal, connects mainland India to its Northeastern states. At its narrowest point, the corridor is just 22 kilometers wide, flanked by Nepal and Bhutan to the north and Bangladesh to the south. This geographical configuration has earned it the moniker “Chicken’s Neck,” highlighting its strategic significance.
The Siliguri Corridor is crucial for land trade between Northeast India and the rest of the country, with only one railway line facilitating freight transport. Given its strategic importance, any disruption to this corridor could have severe implications for India’s Northeastern states.
Precisely eight years ago, the India-China border standoff in Doklam had underscored the vulnerability of the Siliguri Corridor. The standoff arose when India intervened to halt Chinese road construction in the disputed Doklam region, which India considers part of Bhutan. The ongoing tensions have led to increased military readiness on both sides, with Chinese construction efforts continuing in the region. Incidentally, the Doklam Plateau lies at the intersection of Bhutan, India (Sikkim), and Tibet.
Consequently, India has heightened security measures around the Siliguri Corridor, deploying various security forces, including the Border Security Force (BSF), the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) in the region.
In the years following the 2017 Doklam standoff, China has established a series of villages in mountainous territories claimed by Bhutan, further complicating the situation. These developments have been accompanied by the settlement of individuals incentivised by the Chinese government, primarily from Tibet. The construction of these villages has raised concerns about China’s long-term intentions in the region and its strategy of extending influence over disputed territories.
Bangladesh’s China tilt does not pose an immediate threat. But it underscores the need for India to prepare for the potential implications of geopolitical tensions in the region.
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Prepare for two scenarios
One scenario remains the possibility of an all-out war, should either Bangladesh or China attempt to cut off the railway link connecting India to its Northeastern states via the Siliguri Corridor. Such an act would be perceived by India as a declaration of war, warranting a strong response. However, the likelihood of a full-scale conflict remains low, as it is not in the interests of either China or Bangladesh to engage in a war with India, especially given recent attempts at disengagement and tactical normalisation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
A more plausible scenario involves “grey zone” destabilisation, through which China would increase pressure along its periphery. This has been China’s long-standing tactic, and it becomes even more complex when considering Bhutan’s position. Bhutan, which has its own border disputes with China, has recently shown signs of engaging directly with Beijing, despite India’s historical role as its closest ally.
The border disputes between Bhutan and China primarily revolve around two regions: The northeastern side of Bhutan, and the Doklam Plateau and the Jhamperi ridge in the west. The latter is particularly significant, as it lies at a strategic tri-junction between China, Bhutan, and India. However, the border discussions between Beijing and Thimpu have raised concerns about the potential for a settlement that could favour China at Bhutan’s expense.
Geopolitical analysts speculate that Bhutan may have secretly agreed to a border settlement with China, which would not only grant China access to the Doklam Plateau but also exacerbate India’s insecurities regarding the Siliguri Corridor. Apart from building artificial villages, China has been actively ramping up military infrastructure in the region to keep pressure up.
Therefore, the potential for increased grey zone stress is significant if Bhutan were to concede to Chinese demands regarding Doklam.
As June 2025 approaches, marking eight years since the Doklam crisis, it is crucial to reassess the dynamics of modern hybrid wars around strategic land chokepoints.
Usually, it is the maritime chokepoints that receive most attention, given how heavily countries depend on sea-routes for trade. Now, land corridors in contested neighbourhoods are becoming increasingly vulnerable as theatres of hybrid warfare. One such example is the case study of the Suwalki Gap, a narrow strip of land between Poland and Lithuania, which became prone to unprecedented hybrid attacks after the Russia-Ukraine War broke out in 2022.
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The Suwalki Gap example
The Suwałki Gap, at only 65 kilometers long, holds considerable strategic significance due to its geographical positioning. It serves as a critical land corridor for NATO, connecting Poland to the Baltic states. The gap is bordered by the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad to the west and Belarus to the east, which is a key military ally of Russia.
Similar to the India-China case, the probability of Russia cutting off the land route between Poland and the vulnerable Baltic states remains a real but a distant possibility.
It is noteworthy that the Polish-Lithuanian borderland areas are not very conducive to moving heavy brigades, but are ideal for hybrid activities.
What truly makes the Suwalki Gap vulnerable today is the heightened hybrid attacks from Russia, which are getting devastatingly destabilising but remain below the threshold of an all-out war. European countries, though, have been steadily increasing their investments in tackling the grey zone attacks.
While there is no denying the fact that regional rivalries in South Asia have fundamental differences from the Eastern European theatre, it becomes imperative for India to take cues for better preparation against hybrid attacks.
From India’s perspective, an overhauled military doctrine highlighting proactive measures against cyber-attacks, disinformation, and electronic warfare capabilities, is crucial to prepare against the shadow wars of tomorrow.
Beijing may avoid a full-scale war with India due to its own commercial interests and because of cross-strait stakes, but its exponentially rising cyber capabilities need a proactive readiness from New Delhi’s side – especially where India’s strategic vulnerabilities are at their highest. There is an undeniable pro-China tilt in Bangladesh, and a rising possibility that Bhutan might settle border disputes with China, perhaps to the latter’s favour in Doklam. It is high time that New Delhi doubles down on the many shades of grey in the offing, even though an all-out war remains unlikely.
Swasti Rao is a consulting editor at ThePrint and a foreign policy expert. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)
Insightful article of Swasti where she analyzed geopolitics by presenting a broader spectrum rather than just sticking to the issue at hand. Quite thought provoking, Swasti is always incisive in her analysis and quite beautifully written
Thoughtful column by Ms Karishma Mehrotra for Washington Post. India edges closer to China, hedging against Trump’s unpredictability. In an increasingly transactional world, the ultimate validation of India’s China policy is that it should be successful in a purely bilateral setting.