China’s assertive foreign policy has spurred the formation of several minilateral groupings in recent years. The resurgence of the Quad, comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the US, in 2017-2018 and the establishment of AUKUS—Australia, UK, and the US—in 2021 were largely driven by concerns over Beijing’s aggressive and coercive policies.
A novel trilateral partnership between the US, Japan, and the Philippines is currently in progress. The inaugural Trilateral Leaders’ Summit is set to convene on 11 April. “The three leaders will discuss trilateral cooperation to promote inclusive economic growth and emerging technologies, advance clean energy supply chains and climate cooperation, and further peace and security in the Indo-Pacific and around the world,” the White House announced.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ spokesperson, Mao Ning, remarked on the impending meeting, stating, “Defense cooperation between any countries should be conducive to regional peace and stability. We oppose cobbling together exclusive groupings and stoking bloc confrontation in the region.” Reacting to a Financial Times report on the US warning Beijing over its aggressive activities in the South China Sea, the Chinese Community Party’s newspaper Global Times labelled Washington as a “delusional guest”. It accused the US of meddling in its internal affairs by colluding with a “few ill-intentioned” countries in the region.
Collaborative efforts among minilateral groupings are widely recognised and practised as the most effective strategy for managing China’s assertiveness. The US-Japan-Philippines grouping assumes particular significance given Japan’s status as a key defence ally of the US, while the Philippines is a major non-NATO ally. Importantly, the China threat weighs heavily in the strategic calculations of all three countries, resulting in a notable convergence and alignment of interests within the trilateral framework.
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Philippines vs China
The Philippines stands out among the countries contending with China’s aggressive actions for its steadfast response in the South China Sea. Nevertheless, discussions regarding China remain implicit.
Regarding the summit, Hans Mohaiman Siriban, the Philippines’ acting foreign affairs deputy undersecretary for bilateral relations, underscored that “the trilateral summit was not directed at any specific country. Instead, its purpose is to enhance cooperation in economic, maritime security, and climate change among the three countries.”
However, recent developments contrast with Siriban’s stated objective. On 7 April, Japan, the US, Australia, and the Philippines conducted joint naval and air drills in the South China Sea. The joint statement read: “Demonstrating our collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific, our combined defense/armed forces will conduct a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone.”
On 28 March, the Philippines President, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., took to X to convey a strong message to China. “Over the succeeding weeks there shall be, implemented by the relevant national government agencies and instrumentalities, a response and countermeasure package that is proportionate, deliberate, and reasonable in the face of the open, unabating, and illegal, coercive, aggressive, and dangerous attacks by agents of the China Coast Guard and the Chinese Maritime Militia,” he wrote.
Marcos added that the Philippines doesn’t seek conflict with any nation but it won’t be “cowed into silence, submission, or subservience”.
Some Chinese commentators on the microblogging site Weibo are blaming the Philippines for escalating tensions with China. One post even warns that “history suggests those who shout the loudest often suffer the most in the end”.
Additionally, a Chinese professor, educated in the US, was quoted as saying: “It is unprecedented for a superpower like China to endure such harassment from a smaller country like the Philippines and remain so patient. Marcos’ China policy is responsible for his approval rating soaring to 65 per cent.”
The Philippines is increasingly turning to extra-regional powers and reinvigorating its alliances due to the lack of a unified approach from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. Against the backdrop of strained relations between the Philippines and China, other Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia are strengthening their ties with Beijing.
This trilateral partnership may hold the potential to fulfil what the Philippines has long sought—a collective approach from like-minded countries and support from key security partners to reduce reliance on fellow ASEAN members.
The US has already stated that its mutual defence treaty with the Philippines covers Second Thomas Shoal.
With a significant likelihood of the US involvement in any China-Philippines conflict in the South China Sea, Japan, also facing potential impact, is reevaluating its military role and capabilities in both the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Assurances of partnership from these two countries could provide substantial backing for the Philippines against China. However, it will take more than just forming a trilateral arrangement.
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Are minilaterals working?
In a recent article, former Japanese diplomat Yamagami Shingo highlighted the paramount importance of collective security. While the assertion regarding the vital significance of mechanisms like the US-Japan-Philippines trilateral summit and the Quad in addressing contemporary security challenges is accurate, questions are being raised about the efficacy of such groupings. The confused nature of these minilaterals is becoming increasingly evident, casting doubt on their ability to successfully tackle complex security issues.
While the White House press statement acknowledged the US’ “ironclad alliances” with the Philippines and Japan, it conspicuously omitted any reference to the robust security dimension of the grouping, particularly concerning China. Instead, there has been a deliberate attempt to downplay the China factor and portray these groupings as primarily focused on developmental goals. This aims to underscore their non-threatening nature to regional countries and avoid appearing to target any specific third party, namely China.
But is this approach effective? As it appears, no. Despite the proliferation of trilateral arrangements, many of which ostensibly aim to address challenges posed by China, few have translated into concrete, action-oriented initiatives thus far.
Trilaterals and quadrilaterals will only be effective when their formation is followed by tangible actions and frameworks. It’s the only way to counter and deter China. But most of the recent gropings lack any deterrence capability. The US-Japan-Philippines trilateral will only garner serious attention when its actions align with its rhetoric, rather than hiding behind the guise of developmental goals.
Sana Hashmi, PhD, is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George HW Bush Foundation for US-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)