The world’s idea of what constitutes a “world war” has been shaped by two massive wars in the first half of the 20th century. In these two “world wars”, multiple countries were at war with multiple other countries simultaneously. These direct combatants often used resources from non-belligerents (as Great Britain did using Indian soldiers and resources in the two world wars) and both wars ended only when one coalition achieved a comprehensive victory.
Today, where there are two unresolved conflicts going on in Europe (Ukraine-Russia) and West Asia (Iran-US-Israel plus some Gulf countries), we are still not able to call this a “world war” because of the framing that happened in our minds over the 20th century’s two world wars. Or, maybe, we are hesitating to call a spade a spade because of what it implies for our world’s future survival.
Technology and the nature of warfare have changed, not only because of drones and missiles, but also because of the role played by satellite-based surveillance and integrated war systems, artificial intelligence and near autonomous fighting forces that involve practically no humans, and conflicts driven as much by data analysis and cyber and information as by tanks, fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers.
Silicon Valley is now very much a part of the military-industrial complex. Geeks make warfare sound less like warfare because those waging war can stay so far away from the battlefields. Humans are an optional extra here.
There are now western reports suggesting that Ukraine is slowly pushing back the Russians on some fronts, thanks to cutting edge drone technology based on the latest from Silicon Valley. A New York Times report notes that Mikhailo Fedorov, Ukraine’s new defence minister, is pursuing a plan that involves killing as many Russian soldiers as possible so that the rate of deaths is higher than the rate of new recruitments. He is doing this through more precise drone attacks using data analysis, and is pushing for autonomous drones that could decide on their own who or what to attack. This is ethically problematic and will result in a moral disaster if many more countries begin to use any and every means to kill or economically incapacitate its enemies. It may happen with defence-tech firms in Silicon Valley. The US’s inability to bring Iran to heel suggests that Uncle Sam will be investing in such technologies, and China will not be left far behind.
To come back to the first question we asked: why is this not being called a world war when so many players are involved?
The Ukraine war may have only Ukrainians and Russians in the battlefield, but Ukraine is supported by almost the whole of Europe and the US with technology, defence equipment and resources, and Russia by China and North Korea (which has contributed some soldiers). There are now as many countries involved directly or indirectly in the Ukraine war today as there were in the Second World War (1939-1945). If we assume that most countries in Europe are supporting Ukraine with military supplies and economic resources, we are talking about a war involving 20-30 countries, with most still staying in the shadows.
In the West Asia war, the countries directly involved (either as attackers or the attacked) are Iran, Israel, US, Lebanon, and the UAE (to name only some of the actors), but indirect intelligence support may well be coming from Russia and China on the side of Iran.
In our short, four-day Operation Sindoor, Pakistan was supported by China, Turkiye and Azerbaijan with satellite intelligence and drones. If five countries can be involved in a short skirmish, surely the Ukraine and West Asian wars are really virtual world wars?
Complicating the war scenario further is the involvement of malign non-state or state-aligned actors. In West Asia, Iran has used proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Yemeni Houthis to target not just Israel, but also shipping routes in the Red Sea. Iran is using its chokepoint in the Strait of Hormuz to hold the world to ransom. America and the European Union have used economic sanctions, both primary and secondary, and China has used rare earth magnets, and Iran has targeted civilians in the Gulf to fight this war.
In future wars, we will see many more malign non-state actors, armed with drones and shoulder-fired missiles and other dangerous weapons, launching both bush wars and targeting civilians within a country which has ethnic fault-lines.
And since the Ukraine and West Asia wars have shown that even non-combatants may be targeted, and that destroying economic targets like refineries and oil wells may take centre-stage, we ought to be defining world wars differently.
In a world where technology is doing most of the fighting, though human casualties may result, world wars need a new definition. Virtual world wars are here, and we are hesitating to call that out because of its negative implications for how we view our economic and other prospects. This is denial of the kind we cannot afford.
R Jagannathan is an editor and the former editorial director at Swarajya magazine. He tweets @TheJaggi. Views are personal.
This article has been republished from the author’s personal blog. Read the original article here.

