In a surprise move the Government of India removed both the Director General of the Border Security Force as well as the Special Director General of BSF in charge of Western frontiers on 2 August. Although there was no official word, the sudden removals were linked to an alleged spurt in infiltration from the Jammu Sector and northern parts of the border with Pakistan, along Punjab.
Sacking them on the eve of the trouble brewing on our east and its implication for the security of the long porous borders with Bangladesh is symptomatic of the low priority accorded to borders in our security architecture.
The militancy in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir, besides several insurgencies that India has had to deal with in the past, make it amply clear that internal security is inextricably linked with border security. The Pakistanis had exploited the open borders in the west to send militants and provide logistical support to Khalistani separatists and Kashmiri militants. In order to prevent militants from exploiting the open borders, the then government initiated a Punjab Action Plan (PAP) in the mid-1980s. The plan had several components including enhancing the strength of the BSF, inducting technology for border guarding, as also constructing a fence along the border with Pakistan in Punjab.
It is now almost forty years since the plan was initiated and the fence has been incrementally strengthened to enhance its obstacle value by way of floodlighting and adding alarm systems. This has compelled the militants to adopt innovative methods to infiltrate. They are now resorting to digging tunnels to cross over and using drones to send logistics i.e. arms, ammunition and finances.
The first tunnel in a border area in Punjab was detected in the 1990s. However, we have so far not been able to find and induct an effective technology to assist the troops in detecting tunnels. A couple of Drone Mounted Ground Penetration Radars have been inducted. More such devices are required to be inducted to cover the entire border of over 3300 km with Pakistan and almost 4100 km border with Bangladesh. Tunnels have been detected either through visual observation by the troops or have been accidental finds by the farmers working in their fields. BSF has adopted measures like special Tunnel Detection Patrols, extensive coordination with farmers whose land is on the home side of the fence, and intelligence operations in order to detect and neutralise these tunnels. While these measures are essential, they are time-consuming and prone to human error. Hence, technological intervention to detect tunnels is essential. Ironically, this has not happened despite several tunnels being detected. It is a reflection of our priorities that the country has not been able to develop such technology in spite of India boasting of prominent mining institutes.
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Intercepting drones
Having realised the difficulty and risk involved in negotiating the fence, the enormous effort required in digging a tunnel and them being increasingly compromised, the Pakistani handlers of militants have, for the last few years, resorted to drones to provide logistical support to militants. Drones are also being used to send drugs across the border.
They’re operated remotely from Pakistani territory to obviate any risk to life and they’re also cost effective. The only method available with BSF against drones is Light Machine Guns (LMG) in anti-aircraft roles. They have been successfully employed to down several such drones.
Interception of drones however depends on visibility, weather conditions and the height at which it is flying—below 1,000 yards. It is therefore ironic that instead of focusing on research to acquire anti-drone technology, the government and industry are focusing on manufacturing drones. We must urgently work on this and equip BSF with an anti-drone system to enhance their efficiency. Some technical assistance in the shape of soft kill devices, which use jamming of frequencies are in the process of induction. This needs to be sped up.
Rudimentary technology available to BSF troops includes first or second-generation Night Vision Devices (NVD) or Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTI). They are neither user-friendly nor have they proved effective in reducing the burden on troops.
The supply chain management, including repair and replacement, is costly and time-consuming because these are not indigenous. Thus, a large percentage of these devices are not available to troops for long periods.
The ambitious Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) launched in 2019 is still in the trial stages. The system was initially installed on two patches (10 km on the west and 61 km on the east). However, covering the entire 7,000 km of border with Pakistan and Bangladesh and subsequent supply chain management, repair and maintenance cost issues will continue to fester unless indigenisation is undertaken. In order to overcome this, a system consisting mostly of components indigenously made is being tried now.
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Diversion of troops
The management of men behind the machine is also a major problem negatively impacting border security. The lack of modern technology means that the border guarding methodology is manpower intensive. Resultantly, even the manifold (almost 1000 per cent) expansion of BSF from 25 battalions (of six company strength) in 1965 to almost 200 (of seven company strength) has not resulted in qualitative improvement in the border guarding system and work-life balance for border men. The troops still have to perform duties for over 12 – 16 hours every day resulting in reduced alertness, which negatively impacts the security of borders. There are several reasons for the heavy strain on troops.
First, the expansion in the number of BSF battalions over the years has not been followed with similar augmentation of manpower in the supervisory headquarters. Resultantly, men are attached to these headquarters thus depleting the strength of battalions.
Second, a very large number of troops are withdrawn from their primary task of border guarding for other tasks. For example, almost 50 per cent of troops from the eastern borders were withdrawn for the recently concluded General Elections. Even trainee recruits were diverted for election duties. A similar large-scale diversion also happened during the 2021 Assembly elections held in West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Assam and Puducherry. A large number of troops was also withdrawn for the commemoration of 50 years of Bangladesh’s independence.
The prescription of “one task, one force” given by the Group of Ministers after the Kargil War thus falls flat on its face. One can understand the compulsion of the government to deploy these forces to ensure free and fair elections. However, their utilisation for such duties needs rationalisation and should be restricted to Parliament and Assembly elections. Their diversion for elections of Panchayat and other lower-level bodies is not justified.
Such large thinning out from the borders not only leaves gaps along the border, which are exploited by the criminals, but also puts a heavy burden on the remaining troops leading to a lot of stress. It adversely affects their mental and physical health. It also disrupts the training schedule, leave plan and other aspects of personnel management of troops and commanders. Even at present about 40 battalions of BSF have been diverted to Manipur, and as security for the Amarnath yatra. This is almost 20 per cent of the force strength.
With notification for election to J&K and Haryana Assemblies and anticipated elections thereafter in Maharashtra and Jharkhand, these troops are unlikely to return to their primary task for a long time.
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Promote from within
About twenty years ago, the government had decided to add an additional company to each battalion of the Central Armed Forces.
This was a short-sighted move that has led to the additional burden of supervision on the Unit Commandant both in terms of increased operational area of responsibility as well as administration and man management of additional troops under his command.
Further, support staff for the additional company was not ab initio planned but had to be sanctioned later as their administration needed manpower, for which troops had to be withdrawn from the border. The additional company has led to heavy stagnation among troops, as well as, operational-level leadership.
An important factor adversely impacting border management is the matter of policy and supervisory-level leadership of these forces. Leaders who haven’t worked at operational levels suffer from a lack of knowledge of border guarding, operational philosophy and ethos of border guarding forces. This leadership, parachuted at higher levels from the police, is out of depth in managing the complexities involved. It results in decisions like the one on additional company discussed above.
Except for some honourable exceptions, this lack of familiarity results in most leaders focusing on perfunctory issues and attempts to impose the ethos of the police on these forces.
This leaves the troops and operational-level commanders confused as they have to adapt to changes at frequent intervals.
It is high time that the apex leadership of the border guarding forces is passed on to the experienced cadre officers who are domain experts. This has also been recommended by the parliamentary committee headed by Ex-Home Minister Chidambaram, and a report by IIM Kolkata.
Last but not least, the inordinate delay in the appointment of heads of these forces leaves them directionless. For example, the government has so far not decided on the appointment of a new Director General of BSF. Even earlier, the BSF was leaderless for almost six months before the appointment of Nitin Agarwal in June 2023. The DG CRPF held a dual charge during this period. It is not difficult to comprehend the enormity of managing two large forces with entirely different domains.
Border guarding is an extremely important function, which has a great impact on internal security, especially in the Indian context. It must be given due priority to ensure that it is carried out with optimum efficiency. The list of reforms suggested above, both in terms of technology as well as human resource management must be taken into consideration at the earliest to prevent border crimes and illegal migration and to ensure the integration of the border population into the mainstream.
Sanjiv Krishan Sood is the BSF Additional Director General (Retd). He tweets @sood_2. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)