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HomeOpinionTheaterisation isn’t duplicating units in all Services. ‘Satisficing’ has consequences in war

Theaterisation isn’t duplicating units in all Services. ‘Satisficing’ has consequences in war

Posting of Army officers to Naval and Air Force units is only paying lip-service to the idea of integration and not really achieving the desired synergy.

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One of the major defence reforms of recent years has been the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff, or CDS. Announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 15 August 2019, it was put into effect when General Bipin Rawat, then the Chief of Army Staff, became the first CDS on 1 January 2020. Additionally, a Department of Military Affairs – DMA – was also created, with the CDS also donning the hat of the Secretary, DMA and permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, or COSC. The various duties and functions assigned to the CDS include bringing about jointness in operations, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc of the three Services; ensuring optimal utilisation of infrastructure and rationalising it through jointness among the Services; and bringing about reforms in the functioning of the three Services with the aim to augment combat capabilities of the armed forces by reducing wasteful expenditure.

The mandate of the DMA inter-alia also includes “Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilisation of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through establishment of joint/theatre commands”. This aspect has garnered the maximum attention in what is being referred to as ‘Theaterisation’. However, the other three equally important functions are being underplayed. There are many fields in which synergy between the Services can be achieved, in the interest of better operational efficiency, through a more rational approach.


Functions of the CDS

Threats to a nation’s security can manifest in different dimensions, and therefore, the necessity of three branches viz. Army, Navy and Air Force. The US even has a fourth branch, namely, the Marine Corps, which has all three elements under a single commander. These threats are dealt with utilising the weapon systems at hand, land-based for land threats, aircraft for aerial threats, and ships and submarines for sea-borne threats. However, over a period of time there has been a cross-pollination of some of these systems which needs review, in keeping with the ever-changing character of warfare.

One such field is in the management of Rocket Forces. It is generally accepted that if the target is on land (surface) and the weapon platform best suited to tackle that target is land-based, then that weapons system/platform should form part of the Army inventory. Shore-based artillery, although targeting ships at sea, also traditionally came under the Army. This was also the philosophy when the BrahMos Missile System (BMS) was first developed, a medium range supersonic cruise missile. Initially, there were no air-launched or sea-launched versions. However, much before these later Service-specific versions came into being, BMS regiments also came to be allotted to the Air Force. The targets being addressed by the BMS, whether of the Army or the Air Force, were similar, often duplicated, leading to the requirement of preparing joint target lists etc, an avoidable effort if seen through the prism of operational efficiency. Having similar units with two different Services also significantly increases the back-end; the logistics chain, maintenance effort and training requirement, resulting in redundancies and wasteful expenditure.

This is precisely what was meant when the functions of the CDS included ‘bringing about jointness in operation, logistics, transport, training, support services, communications, repairs and maintenance, etc. As a first step therefore, towards optimisation, all land-based systems should be allocated to the Army and inter-Service transfers effected as required, in keeping with the over-arching philosophy of dealing with land, sea and airborne threats, and totally within the purview of the Ministry of Defence itself. This is a low-hanging fruit and very much doable, with little or no financial effect. Posting Army officers to Naval and Air Force units is only paying lip-service to the idea of integration and not really achieving the desired synergy. However, the Navy and Air Force should continue with their ownership of ship-launched (including submarines) and air-launched systems, as the employment parameters differ.


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Rockets belong in the Army

Going forward, the induction of conventional ballistic missiles is also on the cards. These should all form part of the Army inventory, and the temptation to give all three Services a little bit of everything should be avoided at all costs. Even if India were to go in for a separate Rocket Force on the lines of the People’s Liberation Army of China, the personnel manning such ballistic missile units would essentially be from the Army. This becomes even more relevant since there would be a fair deal of commonality in the two systems, in the form of the launcher vehicle or command post etc. Consequentially, maintenance and training requirements would automatically be that much simpler. For the Air Force, rockets are of tertiary importance, after aircraft and air defence systems. For the Army, the BMS or any other such missile system would be its most potent weapon due to its range, and hence the top most priority.

As a first step therefore, towards optimisation, all land-based systems should be allocated to the Army and inter-Service transfers effected as required, in keeping with the over-arching philosophy of dealing with land, sea and airborne threats, and totally within the purview of the Ministry of Defence itself.

In his book Red Teaming: Transform your Business by Thinking Like the Enemy, Bryce G. Hoffman talks about the inherent dangers of trying to find a ‘satisficing’ solution, a combination of the words ‘satisfy’ and ‘suffice’, rather than an optimum solution. In trying to satisfy everyone (each of the three Services) and giving each of them just enough to suffice for their immediate needs, it ends up being the worst possible solution. In trying to satisfy everyone it ends up satisfying no one. While a ‘satisficing’ solution may succeed in the business world, it can have disastrous consequences in war. The three Services should, therefore, stick to what they know and do best and avoid inducting platforms that are not vital to their primary role and charter. It is in this context that the CDS, as the permanent Chairman of the COSC has a vital role to play, to make decisions based on national interest and operational considerations rather than individualistic Service requirements and yearnings.

General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)

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