For Indian Prime Ministers, while dealing with China, unlearning is perhaps the highest form of learning. In 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru confided to India’s ambassador-designate to China that he does not trust the Chinese one bit and they are deceitful, opinionated, arrogant and hegemonists. In 2020, Narendra Modi could be probably harbouring a similar opinion. Nehru’s subsequent dealings with China did not prevent the 1962 war. Now, time masks the answer to the query that is being increasingly posed — will there be another war and what will be the forms of conflict?
Mao famously said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed. In Ladakh, military force has been used by both sides, soldiers have been killed and territorial status quo along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been changed. Substantial military mobilisation has taken place all along the India-China border, though actual confrontation has been contained within Ladakh. A conflict is ongoing, though its future forms are unknowable.
The last round of major military activity was on the night of 29/30 August when in a pre-emptive move, Indian troops occupied a critical portion of the Kailash Range and in the process gained tactical dominance in the Chushul area. Politically, this bold military manoeuvre marked a proactive shift, because the heights occupied have disputed ownership rights. No Chinese military reaction has ensued as yet and politically it could have begot the joint statement of foreign ministers when they met in Russia on 10 September.
Also read:China has taken LAC clock back to 1959. India not in a position to take back Aksai Chin
Strategic blunder
The five points in the foreign ministers’ joint statement indicate the preference of both India and China to resolve matters through dialogue under the framework of existing agreements. So far, the dialogue has been confined to military commanders, and the seventh round of Corps Commanders talks is due on 12 October. But it is unlikely to deliver progress towards easing of tensions because it presumes that the militaries were responsible for the extant situation. Problems created at the political level will have to be resolved diplomatically and politically. Another way to perceive the adopted approach is to let the oncoming winter ease the military tensions while political leaders find a denouement that saves face for both. But it is an ask that the prevailing military situation does not easily lend itself to.
The main impediment to return to the military status quo ante is the loss of trust. The disputed nature of the boundary makes peace possible only if the political leaders on both sides so desire. It is not difficult to stage-manage a military incident to justify military actions and therefore even if there is a return to the status quo based on satellite images of deployment prior to the current crisis, there is no guarantee that a similar situation will not be created post-winter. Can India now afford to vacate the Kailash Range segment as part of a political deal?
India can make the deal but it would be a strategic blunder, if it is done to ease tensions while leaving the broader issue of the mutually agreed LAC unresolved.
Also read: India has to plan for a hot war where friends are few. US-China cold war won’t help it
Avoiding long-term pain
Any propensity to buy immediate relief has potential for long-term pain. There are three reasons why this is so.
First, India must be clear that China has no intention to settle the boundary issue and intends to use the border as a pressure point aimed to contain India within the sub-continent. Having built up military capability and infrastructure in Tibet and Xinjiang, China’s has upgraded its potential to exert pressure through contrived border incidents. However, the late August Indian manoeuvre would have upset China’s presumption of a muted Indian response. But China’s capability is still useful to get India to expend more resources to defend the border. This strategy is linked to China’s main source of confrontation, which is the United States.
Like Pakistan harbouring a deeply held belief that India is an existential threat, China harbours the belief that India could in tandem with the United States and other powers gang up to prevent China’s rise. This geopolitical imagination is the prime driver of China’s strategic behaviour towards India and India’s geo-economic compulsions must not be allowed to mask this fundamental reality.
Second, there is a geo-economic reality that cannot be wished away. India requires China, due to its economic and technological dependency. This reality has to be juxtaposed with China’s geopolitical intentions, which are specifically aimed at Asian and global political supremacy. Chinese coercion to achieve its aim has to be resisted whatever be the price. The alternative for India is some economic relief at the cost of a China-centric international order that will pose immense challenges for India’s rise. The thrust for self-reliance must therefore be coupled with all measures to reduce dependency on China. In summary, long-term geopolitical interests should not be sacrificed at the altar of geo-economic temptations. This will require sacrifices from the Indian public and considering the change in the national mood, it is not a political show-stopper.
Third, India must deal with China not only based on its historical experience but also with the knowledge that China perceives itself as being stronger than ever before and on the cusp of becoming the Asian hegemon. China has chosen India as the first test case for military coercion through large-scale mobilisation. India cannot afford the coercion to succeed. The stakes are great for both and backing down is unlikely. Instead, a prolonged military confrontation that is perennially embedded with potential for conflict in varied forms is likely.
Also read: Why has India’s China policy been such a failure? Question New Delhi’s assumptions first
Politics without bloodshed
The challenge for Indian statecraft is how to increase the number and effect of the pain points against China while minimising the military burden that it will impose on a weakened economy. Effective pain points lie along the axis of collaboration with other powers that have similar interests in dealing with China. The potential for such collaboration has been precipitated by China’s continued aggressive behaviour. This requires a foreign policy shift that promotes the notion that India will sit in a tent on the basis of common interests but will not join any camp. Militarily, it must rebalance and shift its weight towards the North from the West, while attempting to preserve its growth in the maritime sphere. Despite a weakened economy, these national security considerations should not be neglected.
It will be very difficult, if not impossible, to regain a level of trust that can stabilise India-China relations and prevent military tensions. It is this reality that must also guide India’s policies towards China. The time for dealing softly is over and the future looks hard and uncertain. While politics without bloodshed is preferable, the Indian military must prepare for conflict in order to prevent it.
The author is Director Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution, Bangalore and former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. Views are personal.
Any dialogue with China should be one time final solution not a piece meal approach for entire border. China is a snake it can bite and deceit time and again. China has no intention to resolve border issue with India. So India should stand firm. No summit document with China should be signed without refering to foreign experts. Chinese can trap India because they thrive on DECEIT…
This is a balanced article which eschews blame but lays out that India MUST bite the bullet. Modi hai toh Mumkin Hai !!! India has done a wonderful job by capturing Black Top. India must now forge ahead and capture Spanggur Gap and the Depsang Plains before November snow. This will give us a huge military boost and enhance our diplomatic and global power. Best wishes. Dr Sandeep Parmar
All those with multiple stars and cross batons who write about what should be done and what should not be done must at one stage enumerate their contribution to avoid another HIMALAYAB BLUNDER. That would be more relevant and of interest to readers.
If only the great have beens, were to collectively put down their foot, the waste of resources we suffered over decades would have been arrested to some extent.
In fact these are the experts who can realistically express their views as to the extent to which we can push back given the capacity differential.
Apparently the author thinks he’s clever than the prime minister and Indian military itself
Dear General
Your views a bit obtuse.
1. Had the Chinese been able to exert greater pressure and occupy greater portion of land claimed by them, they would have done it in April of this year, when they had numbers advantage at LAC. If they did not, then they lost the battle. It is the Indian Army’s rapid reaction which prevented it. Now it is a stalemate. They are kind of hoping that winter will force India troops away but it is not happening.
2. Waiting for Commander meet to convince Chinese to back away was not succeeding. Hence Indian Army moved to occupy Kailash Range heights to equal the score of their deceitful occupation of Finger 4 and other tiny areas to threaten the new DBO to Leh road. Now the score is equalized. From Kailash range India can threaten Chinese supply line in Southern Ladakh as Chinese threaten Indian supply line in northern Ladakh. Score is equal now.
3. Chinese High command and their political circles have misconception that India Army could be overrun as they did in 1962. They kept holding that view until Indian Army went ahead and occupied the Kailash heights. When the Chinese came with their light tanks to take back the Spanggur Gap, they found Indian tanks waiting for them. They quickly retreated. With those two incidents the message has been driven home….. that is ‘you do not get past without a fight’. Chinese very well understood it and have made no effort to challenge Indian occupation of Kailash Range heights.
4. Politically and diplomatically, India is in strong hands than in 1962. No fight is invited but none will be turned down. With equal number of Indian forces at LAC, Chinese are unable to force their will. Diplomatically, that push to create an Indian NATO, the QUAD has acquired importance. Push is on write the charter for QUAD quickly. If formed, as envisaged, it will corner Chinese nascent and inexperienced navy which is high in numbers but low in experience in South China Sea. If they do escape that trap then the Straits of Malacca will be their Waterloo.
5. Economically, a greater economic damage is being inflicted on China by India in last six months. Rest of the world doing the rest. Unnecessary consumer goods items import from China is declining rapidly. Everything which was Indian made previously but lured away by Chinese will be back in India. Elsewhere in the world, people’s abhorrence for anything Chinese after Covid -19 pandemic release by China has turned them away. People are examining the label on the products for its make and contents more carefully. There is a cease and desist feeling in North America for anything Chinese unless no alternative is available. That alternative will emerge soon. Chinese are deeply concerned about it and they cannot do anything to assuage that anti Chinese feeling. I know this because I live in North America.
6. That 1959 claim line at LAC, diplomatic block buster they unleashed on India has had a counter affect. They were hoping to lure Indian public opinion away from confrontation. It had the opposite affects. Fools like Rahul Gandhi, threw in 15 minutes challenge to get Indian territory vacated. Rapid successful trial of multitude of missiles in last four weeks has increased Indian self confidence and scared a bit the Chinese commanders. Irrespective India is in no mood to talk anything except outright vacate our area, no matter how useless that is and india will not be first to vacate all the heights occupied by it. India will think about it later.
7. A topic which you missed to cover is the Pakistani attitude on all this military confrontation at the LAC. The Pakistanis are happy to see trouble for India on the northern border. Their next move, even if they are bankrupt, is to capitalize on it. That is where QUAD comes into the picture. Pakistanis may try to grab some portion beyond LOC, but presence of an American Aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea will kill their ambition. From Indian point of view, QUAD then has served its purpose.
Hence, Dear General….. you are falling into Chinese propaganda trap. They want opinion makers like you to persuade Indian government to commit suicide and agree on 1959 line.
Cheers…….
In 1958, Jawaharlal Nehru confided to India’s ambassador-designate to China that he does not trust the Chinese one bit and they are deceitful, opinionated, arrogant and hegemonists. In 2020, Narendra Modi could be probably harbouring a similar opinion.
Yes it is more than likely that both leaders realized and came to the same conclusion. The difference should be in approach now based on the hind sight and an honest appreciation of the capacity differential.
Unlike in 1962 a limited war is not very likely to give the Chinese the kind of gains they managed at minimum cost. Major escalation is also the Chinese will be unwilling to precipitate given the deterrence quotient.
Sitting through the winter on the heights that we have occupied will be expensive, given the Chinese financial mussel, they may be hoping that that we may be able to sustain that. If the professionals are left to take a call we need not worry, there does not seem to be a Menon on the scean.
Read the title and it was evident what is expected.
Author mentions strategic blunders, what he is suggesting is one of them.
If you want to buy peace at cost of sovereignty and territorial integrity than rather give up the claim.
Buying this kind of peace is it really a guarantee against future confrontation.
If past history is any guide India will cave again to make and buy peace by validating Chinese claims.
The bureaucracy is in a rut since 70 years. With defeatist and slavish mindset pervasive all around since independence no wonder everyone is for their own good.
Author is symptom of this malice and psyche.
Where is India’s core interest or do we always have to be worried about Chinese core interest first.
What we need is a cocktail of long term strategies to maintain an uniformly peaceful intent while making it clear by our action that we are leaving nothing to chance. We must take advantage of the geo-politically crucial stature that has come to us as a bridge between east and west
The Quad is a great beginning and gives us a certain logic to further strategic ties with USA which still has a deterrent image. USA has used our air base in A & N and we wd be justified in visibly opening logistical facilities to members of Quad to start with. We shd encourage an eastern NATO type alliance of mutual support to sustain rights in SCS and stay in consultation with members..
Persist with diplomatic exchanges in which we offer not to fire the first OFFENSIVE shot and insist on a declared guarantee of no military advances or developments near LOC on China’s part. We should continue to insist on the old mutually agreed protocols as the only acceptable guarantee of Chinese assurances.
Enforce our right to develop our territory in any way we consider necessary and visibly take whatever defensive military measures that we need to in order to match Chinese force across the border. This includes continued requirement of Chinese withdrawal to April 2020 level.
Yes, any solution needs to solve the entire border issue, not just in Ladakh. For that to happen, Modi and Xi need to talk. Of course, there’s a massive trust deficit now. But, it needs to be overcome in the larger interests of both nations.
As of now, the strategies of both countries seem to be ankle biting – a nibble here, drawing a few drop of blood there. But like the Cola wars, it’ll only end up costing each other, without much gain. Time for heads of both countries to show leadership and statesmanship. You never know.. if successfully settled, a permanently peaceful border might win the duo a Nobel Peace Prize. Not bad on your resume, or the plaque on your grave, to be remembered in the centuries ahead!!