‘Leading from the front’ is a military virtue that decides the fate of battles. When enemy fire has pinned down attacking troops and brought heavy casualties, when fear is pervasive and mission accomplishment is at stake, the leader who inspires HIS command by saying “follow me” and is the first to move forward carries the day. All professional armies endeavour to instil and nurture this trait, particularly in their junior leaders—Young Officers, Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) and Non Commissioned Officers (NCO)—who are the mainstay in close combat.
Goes without saying that ‘leading from the front’ in combat should not be a brash, adrenaline-fuelled action and must adhere to tactical norms. The high-risk factor means that relatively senior leadership must reserve it for critical situations and missions. It must not be practiced as a norm or disregard the layered leadership structure, right down to a section of 10 soldiers. While the importance of ‘leading from the front’ principle is obvious in combat, its ambit is all encompassing and applies to all spheres of the military profession.
The Indian Army takes great pride in its officers leading from the front, as is evident from the high officer-to-soldier casualty ratio in its wars—1:18 in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, 1:20 in the 1971 India-Pakistan War, and 1:17 in the 1999 Kargil War.
Detailed statistics are not available in the public domain, but two high-profile encounters in Kokernag and Rajouri in Jammu and Kashmir indicate that this ethos is present in counter-insurgency operations as well. During these operations, only four terrorists were killed while four officers, including a commanding officer, were killed in action. This high cost was justified by the Army and most veterans because the encounters upheld the noble ethos of ‘leading from the front’.
However, this high cost also raises disturbing questions. Has ‘leading from the front’ become such a reckless and obsessive trait that fundamental tactics and standard operating procedures are being disregarded? Is this ethos justified in a prolonged insurgency at a low ebb? Are we an officer-oriented Army where leadership below officer rank is either not up to the desired standards or is not being allowed to exercise initiative?
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Unholy hurry & loss of precious leadership
Given the high risk and adverse impact of the fall of a leader, ‘leading from the front’ has to be reserved for critical missions. Every skirmish or action is not an end itself and does not warrant relatively higher-rung leaders to take high risks. Their more important job is to plan and direct junior leaders and troops in combat to accomplish the mission at minimum cost. They have to ensure that under no circumstances should audacity, boldness, and bravery override their command responsibility and adherence to required fundamental tactics.
There can be no better example of disregarding this principle than the conduct of Lord Cardigan, commander of the Light Brigade, at Balaclava. During the infamous Charge of the Light Brigade against Russian forces in 1854, he positioned himself ‘five lengths’ (related to length of a horse ie 8-9 feet) ahead of the first line, remained ahead for a mile during the approach, and was the first one to charge the Russian guns. But, due to a misinterpretation of the orders of his superior, Lord Raglan, by Captain Nolan, who conveyed the orders, his charge had targeted the wrong objective leading to decimation of the Light Brigade. Lord Cardigan’s job as a commander was to assess the tactical situation, check back the orders with his superior, take the correct decision, and direct his command. Instead, he led the Light Brigade ‘from the front’ to disaster. The rest is history.
The recent encounters in which officers ‘leading from the front’ were killed in action follow a repetitive pattern. With insurgency at a low ebb, terrorists are not proactive in Jammu and Kashmir. They trigger an odd incident and retreat into difficult mountainous and forested terrain. Information is deliberately planted through their sympathisers acting as police or Army sources to lure the troops into an ambush over favourable terrain. Commanders of units/subunits, ignoring years of experience, disregard the basic assumption of a trap and rush into operations lest the terrorists get away. Fundamentals of reconnaissance, tactical movement, establishment of time-consuming inner and outer cordons, and the final closing-in by the strike elements with fire and movement, are ignored. Officers ‘lead from the front’, overriding subordinate leadership at the JCO/NCO level and a very heavy price is paid in terms of casualties. More often than not, the terrorists manage to slink away.
In my view, the ethos of ‘leading from the front’ is being used as an afterthought to cover up undue haste and violation of tactics and standard operating procedures (SOPs).
Eliminating one or two terrorists is not a critical mission and one more encounter is not going to end an insurgency of 34 years. Hence, there is no need for undue haste, disregarding tactical norms, and risking avoidable casualties.
It would be more prudent to place the area under surreptitious surveillance, plan the operation methodically, and, where possible, surprise the terrorists. In remote and difficult terrain, the security forces have the advantage of time and superior capability. Why lose precious leadership due to unholy hurry and an obsession with ‘leading from the front’?
Indeed, time and mission are both critical in some counter-terrorist operations like hostage situations or when terrorists have infiltrated garrisons or public places, causing casualties
by the minute. However, such situations at this stage of insurgency in J&K are very rare.
Using terrorist kills as a measure of success for decorations and individual or unit glory has long been the bane of our Army. This also leads to high leadership and soldier casualties. This approach needs to end as well.
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Unempowered JCO/NCO leadership?
Close combat is the domain of sections and platoons, which are commanded by JCOs and NCOs. Indian Army takes pride in having the best soldiers in the world. Why, then, are JCOs, NCOs, or for that matter soldiers, not ‘leading from the front’? Is it a noble ideal reserved only for officers? Or is it that the junior officers are not adequately empowered and trained for the leadership role? In my view, it is a combination of all these factors and a flawed perception that every operation in the prolonged insurgency is a critical mission.
During World War 2, the Indian Army fought with 11 officers per battalion. A Subedar was the company’s second-in-command, and in event of casualties even commanded it. Platoons were commanded by Havaldars and sections by Naiks. Today, the authorised strength is 21 officers and over 60 JCOs. However, due to shortages, not more
than 15 officers are available. There is no shortage of JCOs and NCos. Platoons are commanded by JCOs and sections by Havaldars. Yet, only officers are seemingly leading operations at all levels.
Institutionalised training for infantry JCOs/NCOs or the platoon/section commanders suffers from lack of capacity. As per my assessment, only about 25 per cent attend institutionalised training. Others are supposed to be trained in the units, which in turn suffers from lack of infrastructure and peace/field commitments. The German Army in World War 2 began with a 1:30 officer-soldier ratio but ended with 1:300 in the sewers of Berlin. However, it never lost its cohesion as a fighting force. The reason was an empowered NCO corps. Even during the war, no one could become a section/platoon commander without going to an NCO’s academy for six months of institutionalised training. They also had the concept of partial direct enrollment of NCOs who, like officers, came trained as platoon/section commanders to units.
In a nutshell, in absence of an adequately empowered JCO/NCO leadership, an environment where every mission is critical for decorations/glory, the officers have no choice but to ‘lead from the front’, and in the event of a failure, this noble ethos is used by the superiors to justify time and tactical lapses.
The recent experience of Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which are also known for ‘leading from the front’, proves this point. In their standing army of approximately 1,70,000, as per my assessment, only 30 per cent constitute the permanent cadre and the rest are conscripts. A total of 3,00,000 reservists have also been called up. IDF suffered 444 casualties across ranks between 7 October and 13 December. Approximately 300 were killed on 7 October in the initial Hamas attack and Israeli counter-action to eliminate the terrorists. 115 all ranks have been killed in the ground offensive into Gaza. The casualty list includes 112 officers, including four Colonels, seven Lieutenant Colonels, 30 Majors, 35 Captains, 30 Lieutenants, and six 2nd Lieutenants. This astounding 1:4 officer-to-soldier casualty ratio is one of the highest in modern military history. The reasons are obvious. An unempowered, poorly trained, and ill-motivated mass of conscripts had to be ‘led from the front’ by officers undertaking a critical mission.
The reasons are obvious. An unempowered, poorly trained, and ill-motivated mass
of conscripts had to be ‘led from the front’ by officers undertaking a critical mission.
‘Leading from the front’ is a military virtue and a battle-winning factor. However, it has to be tempered and reserved for critical missions where a conventional, methodical approach is failing, and without sacrificing fundamentals. Under no circumstances must this virtue become a compulsion due to non-empowered JCO/NCO leaders who should also, logically, ‘lead from the front’ at their level.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)