In the last few weeks, Ukrainian military operations have faced significant disruption after certain restrictions were imposed on services offered by Starlink and its military-oriented counterpart, Starshield. Reports indicated that connections became unreliable or failed for platforms moving faster than approximately 160 km/h. This limit severely impacted drone interceptions, communications, and other air defence tasks. Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, stated that the limits hampered Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian attack drones. Reports also indicated that offensive drone operations had been cancelled. SpaceX chief executive Elon Musk acknowledged restrictions on Starlink access in Ukraine. He accused Ukraine’s military of exploiting the satellite internet service for offensive drone strikes, and warned that a complete shutdown of SpaceX services could cause Ukraine’s front line to collapse.
Much political activity followed, including personal intervention by President Trump. Eventually, the restrictions were lifted by 24 October. The episode revealed a key vulnerability that also served as a centre of gravity (CoG). It highlighted the dangers of operational dependence on a privately controlled satellite system that relies on the operator’s willingness to act in a compliant and friendly manner. When Starlink and Starshield were withheld, Ukraine appeared defenceless.
There are lessons for India in this episode that must be carefully extracted through an analysis of the events. The episode comes against the backdrop of recent controversy surrounding Elon Musk’s accusations that “certain oligarchs were blocking Starlink’s satellite communication services in India”, followed by denials from the Indian government. This makes space sovereignty even more significant.
We start by understanding the basics.
Starlink and Starshield
Starlink is SpaceX’s commercial low-Earth orbit (LEO) broadband constellation. It provides high-speed, low-latency internet (typically 20–40 ms) to users on a paid basis. Its typical user base comprises civilians, enterprises, maritime vessels, aviation companies and government agencies, including the military. The service has near-global coverage and is delivered through an array of ground stations and compact phased-array user terminals. As of late 2026, the constellation had well over 11,000 active satellites. Services are sold directly by SpaceX under commercial terms.
Starshield is SpaceX’s national-security offering for government and military customers. It provides secure communications, Earth observation capabilities, and hosted payloads with enhanced encryption. User terminals are dedicated, rugged and more expensive. Service levels, prioritisation, and operational limits are governed by contracts. The United States is the primary customer, with some services offered to US allies such as the United Kingdom.
The two systems share substantial infrastructure. Starshield communications primarily use the Starlink satellite constellation as a backbone. The systems also share launch capability, engineering, inter-satellite laser links, and ground stations, including terrestrial gateways. Where required, dedicated terminals and separate network gateways provide segregation, higher-assurance cryptography, and different control authorities. Outages (or policy intervention) in one constellation can therefore affect both services. In short, the satellites and much of the ground architecture are common; the distinction lies in encryption, terminals, prioritisation, ownership of certain payloads, and who holds operational control.
Alternatives to Starlink
Several other LEO broadband constellations are in operation or at advanced stages of deployment. Eutelsat OneWeb operates a constellation of several hundred satellites focused on enterprise, government, and mobility markets. Eutelsat works closely with Indian companies such as Nelco Limited (a satellite communication service provider belonging to the Tata Group) and Bharti Airtel.
Similarly, Amazon Leo (formerly Project Kuiper) has launched hundreds of satellites and is scaling production, targeting commercial service in multiple markets. China’s Guowang and Qianfan (Thousand Sails) projects aim to establish large national constellations for broadband and strategic connectivity. Europe’s IRIS² is a planned sovereign multi-orbit system.
Compared with Starlink, these systems generally offer lower peak capacity and slower deployment timelines. In most cases, they lack the same density of inter-satellite laser links. None currently matches Starlink’s combination of scale, global coverage, and demonstrated low latency for mobile users, though several are progressing rapidly.
Russia’s Rassvet effort
Russia’s Bureau 1440 is developing the Rassvet (Russian for dawn or daybreak) LEO broadband constellation as a domestic alternative. By late October 2026, 38 satellites had been launched across two batches. Although several satellites experienced difficulties raising their orbits, plans remain in place to launch 156 satellites by the end of 2026, with partial commercial service expected by late 2027. The long-term target is 900 satellites. The system is intended to support broadband and, eventually, 5G non-terrestrial network features. It remains far from Starlink’s scale or maturity and has shown early reliability issues.
Chinese capabilities
China is building two major Starlink-style LEO broadband constellations: Guowang (China SatNet), targeting roughly 13,000 satellites, and Qianfan (Thousand Sails/G60), aiming for up to about 15,000 satellites. As of late October 2026, Guowang had around 220 satellites in orbit, while Qianfan had roughly 250. Both began deployment in 2024, use multiple orbital shells, and remain well behind their 2026 targets. Challenges involving launch cadence and unspecified technical constraints have delayed deployment. They are intended to deliver sovereign, high-capacity connectivity for civilian, government, and military use. Combined, they have fewer than 500 satellites in orbit, compared with Starlink’s more than 11,000 working spacecraft. China has barred consumer Starlink access and is accelerating domestic launches. However, both programmes are still at an early stage, with service maturity, density, latency, and global reach yet to match the levels achieved by Starlink.
One interesting feature of Chinese efforts has been the early recognition of dependence on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and attempts to create a terrestrial backup. China operates the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, a fully independent global GNSS with regional enhancements. It provides positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services worldwide and is integrated into Chinese military and civilian infrastructure. In a unique approach, China has complemented its GNSS with a terrestrial system. China has created and expanded a national enhanced Loran (eLoran) terrestrial network. Ground stations provide high-power, low-frequency timing and positioning signals that are far more resistant to jamming and GNSS denial attempts. The system is designed as a backup and complement to satellite navigation, with demonstrated timing accuracy improvements.
GNSS dependency
Virtually all current LEO broadband user terminals (including those discussed above) require accurate knowledge of their own position to function effectively. In standard designs, this information is obtained from GNSS receivers (GPS, BeiDou, Galileo or GLONASS). Without it, terminals cannot form precise beams or maintain reliable links, especially while moving. Starlink has demonstrated a GNSS-independent positioning capability derived from its own constellation; however, equivalent capabilities are not widely available. Most other systems, including planned Russian and Chinese broadband constellations and the systems proposed for India, have not publicly demonstrated equivalent independent modes. Therefore, access to GNSS signals remains a key dependency and a vulnerability.
Also read: India’s NavIC is not fully functional even after 27 years—military loses the most
The Indian situation
India has licensed several operators for satellite broadband but has not yet authorised commercial LEO consumer services. The final decision is pending spectrum allocation and security clearances. Reliance Jio holds a Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) licence. At the recently concluded India Mobile Congress (IMC) 2026 in New Delhi, Jio displayed the banner reading ‘Sovereign Satellite Connectivity’. The company has proposed a constellation of around 1,600 low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites and 23 ground stations across India. The plan targets broadband and direct-to-device services, with a test flight around September 2027, several hundred satellites by 2030, and full deployment later. Bharti-backed Eutelsat OneWeb is further advanced in securing regulatory approvals and has partnered with Tata Group companies for ground infrastructure. Starlink and Amazon Leo are also in the regulatory pipeline.
All of these systems will require reliable PNT for their operation. Until Navigation with Indian Constellation (NavIC) regains the capability to provide PNT services, Indian terminals will depend on GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, or Galileo for positioning, navigation and timing.
NavIC is India’s regional GNSS. Ageing satellites, atomic-clock failures, and the loss of NVS-02 due to a propulsion problem left the constellation short of the minimum of four satellites needed for reliable PNT services. ISRO has scheduled the launch of NVS-03 on 30 October aboard GSLV Mk II to help restore its capability, with further NVS satellites planned for subsequent launches.
Myth-busting: Stealth detection claims
Some commentary has suggested that Starlink and other similar LEO constellations can detect stealth or low-observable aircraft from space. Isolated academic and experimental work, including some in China, has explored the use of commercial LEO broadband signals as illuminators of opportunity for passive detection. These experiments have demonstrated limited detection under controlled conditions, but they do not constitute an operational tracking system. Geometry, signal characteristics, processing complexity, and the lack of dedicated sensing payloads remain outstanding challenges. In fact, the demonstrated capability is far weaker than the detection capabilities of terrestrial L-band or VHF ground-based radars optimised for low-observable targets. Claims that proposed Russian Rassvet or Chinese LEO broadband constellations would inherently possess superior stealth-detection capabilities are similarly unsupported. These systems are designed for communications, not target illumination or tracking. Any opportunistic passive-radar detection would not be operationally useful because of high latency, low probability of intercept (LPI) considerations, and uncertainty.
Dedicated space-based assets, such as those planned by the US Space Force, would be required for any militarily usable tracking and detection function. The Space Force has shifted its airspace management strategy from the sky into space. The flagship Space-Based Airborne Moving Target Indicator (SB-AMTI) programme would perform functions previously carried out by crewed AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) aircraft. Lacking similar resources, India could consider high-altitude pseudo-satellites (HAPS) equipped with relevant sensors to provide persistent surveillance, including weapon-grade targeting capabilities.
India’s space priorities
India needs to accelerate the development of its sovereign capabilities. Restoring and expanding NavIC is foundational to both civilian and military resilience. The forthcoming NVS launches are necessary but must be followed by sustained replenishment and modernisation. Dedicated military communications satellites in the Rukmini/GSAT-7 series (Navy) and planned successors for the Army and Air Force provide secure links, yet their numbers remain limited relative to operational demand. HAPS offer an attractive alternative. These are largely solar-powered and remain at stratospheric altitudes, giving them a large field of view. Several are under development by NAL, DRDO, and private industry. These offer a useful interim layer for persistent surveillance and communications relay while orbital constellations grow.
The approved Space-Based Surveillance Phase III programme, involving approximately 52 military satellites, would offer a key capability enhancement. The payloads include SAR and optical assets. The satellites and payloads would be delivered by ISRO and private industry. When operational, the programme aims to provide near-continuous ISTAR coverage. A larger, more distributed LEO architecture for both communications and sensing would reduce dependence on any single foreign provider and improve resilience.
India must treat the recent Ukraine experience as a clear warning against over-dependence on foreign commercial satellite systems. Restoring NavIC to a fully operational constellation is the highest priority, as both indigenous and foreign LEO broadband services will require reliable domestic PNT for efficient terminal operation.
Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat is a retired IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @Ahlawat2012. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant Dixit)