Prime Minister Narendra Modi is back from his state visit to the United States after substantive bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral engagements.
The three-day visit resulted in two detailed, expansive, and substantive joint statements. Quad took a tough view on China despite not naming Beijing and added layers of enabling frameworks to implement its vision of a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific with the new maritime domain awareness initiatives, among others.
Bilaterally, the key takeaway is a groundbreaking semiconductor fabrication agreement, enabling India’s transition from a “chip-taker”—importing $1 billion worth of chips annually—to a “chip maker”. This shift carries significant strategic implications, signaling India’s role in shaping the evolving global digital landscape. It’s crucial to recognise that those shaping this still-developing, unregulated digital order will eventually dominate global security and geo-economics as well. In this context, multipolarity doesn’t seem to apply; India has aligned with nations that prioritise open and transparent systems and regulations.
While it’s too soon to predict the exact contours of 21st-century digital diplomacy, it’s likely that democracies and proponents of a rules-based international order will have to unite against authoritarian regimes like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, uncomfortably for India, some of its allies. The sheer nature of the digital order is such that ethical and value-laden considerations are interwoven in its various components of critical and emerging technology, artificial intelligence, and the like.
But not everybody is happy.
The commentary following the PM’s visit largely falls into two categories. The first includes analyses on the groundbreaking defence and technology partnership India has developed with the US over the past decade and its myriad implications. The second, however, consists of critics who argue that India should not ‘trust the US’, citing the sanctions imposed in 1998 and its involvement in regime changes worldwide, with Bangladesh being the latest example. These critiques claim the US is forever plotting to destabilise India, this time around by overthrowing Sheikh Hasina over a small, obscure island called St Martin, which gained attention after commentators began speculating about US military plans there. Following this, amateur YouTubers posing as strategic experts fueled the narrative with sensationalist videos about “sinister Amreeka”.
While this does reflect India’s democratic spirit, where free expression thrives, it offers little substantive reasoning for New Delhi’s deepening alignment with the broader West, particularly the US.
Still fresh and warm, these convictions have free flowed in Indian strategic discourse despite the US Department of State rejecting such allegations and the Indian intelligence agencies themselves pointing at China and Pakistan.
This (mis)trust saga is fixated in the geopolitics of the Cold War, overconfident decoding of the American deep-state, and the tendency of questioning selective narratives while accepting others as gospel.
What’s notable is that both sides, despite their opposing views, are motivated by a genuine belief in what they consider to be in India’s best interest.
However, it is India’s political class that has come out as the most enthusiastic supporter of the nation’s new-age strategic priorities.
A month ago, defence minister Rajnath Singh was in the US to sign two key agreements—the Security of Supplies Arrangement (SOSA) and a Memorandum of Agreement regarding the Assignment of Liason Officers in continuation of the growing defence bonhomie. In recent years, the two sides have signed crucial agreements like the National Security Advisor-steered initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), INDUS- X, and an ambitious defence industrial roadmap that has seen inking of a critical deal on jet engines, drones and other munitions amid others.
What was particularly striking at that time were the candid statements made by the defence minister.
In a political culture where evasive responses filled with qualifiers and hesitation are often preferred over straightforward answers, his clarity surprised many. He stated unequivocally that only the collaboration between India and the US can ensure global peace, prosperity, and stability.
In essence, he effectively affirmed that the India-US relationship is set to be the defining partnership of the 21st century, a move that unsettles Cold War loyalists who maintain a deep-rooted skepticism toward the West, especially the US. Despite their reservations, the West remains India’s best option for building capabilities for countering China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where India appears to have accepted the status quo ante of April 2020 as the most feasible outcome rather than seeking a complete resolution of the border dispute.
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Multi-alignment is not equal distribution
India today understands the limits of engaging Russia for balancing China, even though Delhi-Moscow engagement will continue due to various other factors. New Delhi’s caution against placing new defence orders with Moscow can be explained by a suspected technological reliance on Beijing after being cut off from Western tech. Due to this, India-Russia engagement is set to evolve to newer areas like energy as Delhi’s new defence partnerships are being diversified with technological cooperation as the main pivot.
The most enduring legacy of the Modi era is likely to be the modernisation of India’s military and the significant enhancement of its technological infrastructure. This transformation is not only about strengthening India’s defence capabilities but also carries a clear geopolitical message: Empowering India is in the West’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region.
The US-India bilateral relationship is a good example that even though India remains multi-aligned, this strategic position doesn’t mean India is equidistant from all its partners .
New Delhi now exhibits a strategic realism by prioritising its national interests, engaging with both historic and new partners, but being clear about where to forge deeper, more substantive ties. It’s safe to say that bipartisan support for India will remain strong, regardless of who is in the White House, although Delhi will need to make adjustments on certain issues depending on the specific administration in power.
If Donald Trump comes to power, India will face more trade protectionism and tighter regulations on mobility in general. The attitude of the Trump administration on selling in classic Trumpian transactionalism, instead of co-developing and co-producing, could also be a headache for India. Delhi currently enjoys a trade surplus with the US. However, the US policy would primarily continue in the Indo-Pacific, where shared convergence is driving the focus on India. Contrary to “deep state forever destabilising India”, it is in US’ interest to have a strong India in the region to share the mounting pressure on American security assistance.
Traversing complexities
Amid all the good things that the US-India strategic partnership offers, there are genuine points of friction, most notably over the overblown Khalistan question and the Gurpatwant Pannun controversy. And no matter what, they are stoked all the time.
Then there are Indian reservations on America’s obsession with democratic backsliding in Delhi that has always touched a rather raw nerve here throughout the Modi years. However, that is more a problem of strategic communication than any real danger to bilateral ties.
Democracy inherently involves accommodating dissent related to our respective images, methods, and democratic experiences. Ultimately, the proof of the pudding is in the eating—as long as our policy decisions, initiatives, and frameworks can withstand scrutiny, there should be no reason for India to feel uneasy about another democracy critiquing its practices.
This discomfort often arises from a misunderstanding of how such criticism from the US is typically aimed at addressing its domestic audiences and lobbies back home. Engaging in critical discussions is a vital part of the democratic process. In India, we do this regularly, and it’s a strength and resilience we should take pride in, rebutting condescending attitudes in clear terms whenever need be. That all democracies will behave like we would like them to, could be a preferred but not a realistic yardstick to assess critical drivers that fuel and shape this crucial partnership.
Therefore, the question of whether we trust the US must always have a geopolitical and geostrategic answer rooted in strategic realism, not conspiracy theories or bygone antics of the Cold War.
The writer is an Associate Fellow, Europe and Eurasia Center, at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)