In June 2022, when the Agnipath scheme was announced, I was asked about my views and I unequivocally expressed my reservations about the scheme. My interactions with several serving and retired soldiers and officers further confirmed my views, with most of them opposing the scheme. A few who supported the scheme had recommended its implementation with modifications.
The government has now announced modifications to the scheme but has not gone whole hog. The revised scheme, while addressing some issues, still leaves many others unaddressed.
Under the original scheme, only 25 per cent of Agniveers were to be retained in the regular armed forces. Now, the remaining 75 per cent have a chance as well. They can serve another two years, only after which, depending on their performance, they are likely to be retained if found fit. Therefore, the revised scheme still leaves the factor of uncertainty in the minds of Agniveers unaddressed.
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A threat to morale
First and foremost, with Agniveers continuing to face uncertainty of absorption even after the extended tenure, their motivation and morale, and therefore the war-fighting abilities of their units, could be adversely affected.
The media briefing by the Chief of Defence Staff on Agnipath did not clarify whether these six years will be counted for pension or not. It would be in the fitness of things to count these years for the purposes of pension and promotion to the next rank.
The revised scheme also does not factor in the morale of those 75 per cent rejected for absorption after the first four years. The fact that they will be placed below the 25 per cent retained in service adds to the factor of demotivation. This may also give rise to unhealthy competition among the Agniveers and sycophancy to remain in the good books of commanders and increase their chances of retention in the first go. This is likely to adversely impact efficiency.
The uncertainty of retention even after six years might also lead many Agniveers to leave service because they might cross the eligibility age for most government jobs, besides not possessing the skill sets required for private-sector jobs, except in the low-paid private security sector.
The question of soldierly skills
The revised scheme does not address the inadequate training of Agniveers. Their training period is much shorter than that of regular soldiers and therefore not enough to develop the requisite soldierly qualities.
The problem for technical arms is even more acute because basic soldier training doesn’t cover the specialised training required to handle equipment used by the Armoured, Artillery and Signal Corps, besides the Air Force and Navy. This equipment training is imparted after soldiers join their regiments. A lot of additional effort is needed to make Agniveers proficient in handling specialised equipment. The revised scheme addresses this aspect to some extent, as the enhanced tenure will improve their skills.
It’s also worth noting that after the Agnipath scheme came into effect, Nepal suspended the recruitment of its citizens into the Indian Army because of the new terms of service. This, to an extent, adversely impacted our relations with Nepal. The revised scheme doesn’t address this aspect, and the Indian defence forces will continue to be deprived of a large portion of brave and fierce Gorkha soldiers from Nepal.
The struggle after service
The issue of employment after release is only partially addressed.
Even though Agniveers would have received a corpus in the region of Rs 10-12 lakh after their release under the original scheme, it would not have been adequate to start a venture of their own, especially because their tenure in the Army doesn’t equip them with any entrepreneurial skills. The larger corpus for those released after six years still may not be adequate for starting their own business or venture.
Most Agniveers would not have been eligible for many civilian jobs because of age considerations and lack of skills. The 50 per cent reservation of vacancies for former Agniveers in CAPFs and Assam Rifles has its own set of issues because of the different nature of duties and long working hours. Without such opportunities, they would have joined the already large number of unemployed or underemployed youth.
Another possibility is that unemployed former Agniveers trained in handling weapons could have been easy pickings for criminal gangs engaged in nefarious activities. The revised scheme therefore could help prevent that risk.
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National security comes first
As stated above, the revised scheme, even while addressing some issues, leaves fundamental flaws unaddressed. The lack of continuity and uncertainty continue to affect operational readiness and combat experience, thereby risking national security. This is especially so because recruitment of regular soldiers has been totally stopped. The impact on the long-term career aspirations of our soldiers is also unclear, as there is no clarity on whether service as Agniveers will count toward pension and promotion.
The defence forces of India are not an experimental employment scheme. These are professional fighting forces built on experience, continuity, competence and commitment. The earlier recruitment system was time-tested, professionally structured and well-designed to ensure operational effectiveness, preserve regimental ethos and provide prospects of reasonable career progression for our jawans.
National security must always come first. Hopefully, there will be further reforms in the scheme, keeping warfighting abilities as the priority.
Sanjiv Krishan Sood is a former Additional Director General of the Border Security Force (BSF). He tweets @sood_2. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)