Three years ago, on 1 May 2020, the Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat was giving final touches to the plans of a military spectacle to be organised after two days on 3 May to show the solidarity of the frontline soldiers with the Covid-19 warriors. The event was indeed a grand success. Unknown to the political and the military hierarchy on those very dates, 4th and 6th Combined Arms Divisions of the Xinjiang Military District of the Western Theatre Command of the People’s Liberation Army were creeping up to the 1959 Claim Line.
Employing the empirical ruse of field exercises, the PLA had concentrated the forces forward by the end of April. Achieving strategic surprise, in early May, through a preemptive offensive manoeuvre, it secured approximately 1,000 sq km of territory earlier controlled and patrolled by us up to end April, in Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Kugrang River Valley, North of Pangong Tso and Charding-Ninglung Nala, South of Demchok. In so doing, China had re-secured the 1959 Claim Line, which it had captured in 1962 in all areas except the Indus Valley.
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Brinkmanship in high Himalayas
India responded with massive deployment of troops to prevent further ingress and soon locked horns with the PLA in a game of brinkmanship that culminated in a gruesome unarmed clash on night of 15-16 June, resulting in 20 Indian soldiers being killed in action at Patrolling Point (PP) 14 in the Galwan Valley. Negotiations were held to diffuse the situation and both sides disengaged in July 2020 with a buffer zone of 3 km, mostly on our side of the LAC.
A preemptive action by Indian forces on night of 29-30 August 2020 to secure the Kailash Range brought both sides to the brink of real war. The Kailash Range, though on own side of the LAC, gave a relative position of advantage to our forces in Chushul Sector. After a tense period of three months, Corps Commander-level military talks were resumed again, which led to the first major disengagement with buffer zones in February 2021 from North Bank of Pangong Tso and the Kailash Range. After a series of military talks and six months later, in August, disengagement took place in PPs 17 – 17A and another 13 months later in September 2022, from PP 15-16, both in Kugrang River Valley. 18th round of Corps Commander level talks is likely to be held in the near future. So far, China has refused to negotiate its intrusions in Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala.
To sum up the situation in Eastern Ladakh, India has lost access to 1,000 sq km of its territory, including the buffer zones North and South of Pangong Tso at PP 14, PP 15-16 and PP 17-17A. Troops of both sides have disengaged from eyeball contact but de-escalation has not taken place. Double the number of troops from both sides compared to the pre-April 2020 deployment are holding ground with operational level reserves and readily available within striking distance.
Smug with its success in Eastern Ladakh, China has also commenced salami slicing along the McMahon Line in the north east and has been endeavouring to assert its control over areas of differing perceptions due to the original marking of the line on small scale map with a thick pen. This has led to increased deployment and brinkmanship, the latest example being a foiled intrusion attempt at Yangtze Ridge in December 2022 in the Tawang Sector.
The absolute approach of both sides — China determined to impose its will to maintain the status quo and India seeking to restore the status quo ante — leaves little room for restoration of normalcy. In fact, rival strategies are about coping with the new normal.
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China’s strategy
China considers India as an unequal power, lacking the capacity to challenge its security or status. However, in alliance with the US whom China perceives as its principal competitor, India is considered as a regional and international competitor. While territorial dispute is the primordial casus belli, the same was largely settled in favour of China by force of arms in 1962. Thereafter, it has used the dispute in terms of its perception of the LAC and revived or reinvented its claim over entire Arunachal Pradesh, to assert its hegemony.
So long as India did not regionally or internationally challenge China and did not attempt to disturb the status quo on the border, peace prevailed. Barring the Sumdorong Chu confrontation (1986-87) that saw India adopt the forward posture, till up to 2014, the government followed a policy of strategic restraint. The Indo-US Nuclear Treaty of 2008 and development of Darbukh – Shyok – Daulat Beg Oldi Road[6] saw the first shift towards confrontation — reflected in the temporary Depsang intrusion in 2013.
After Modi government came to power in 2014, India’s quest for power saw an emerging alliance with US, aggressive development of border infrastructure, particularly in Eastern Ladakh towards Aksai Chin, belligerent statements to recover lost territories, proposed transformation of its armed forces and aggressive contestation of China’s threatening moves in Depsang Plains, Chumar and Doklam in Bhutan. Beijing reviewed its strategy and decided to use the favourable economic and military differential to exploit the unsettled borders and reassert its hegemony to deter India from allying with the US against China and neutralise any future threat to Aksai Chin and other territories usurped in the 1962 war by halting India’s infrastructure development in sensitive areas.
India’s strong defensive posture, uncertain outcomes of a conventional war and nuclear weapons have forced diminishing returns on China. However, it has decided to persist with this strategy to force economic cost on India and still endeavours to shape its behaviour through triggering incidents.
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India reverts to “strategic restraint”
After an initial aggressive policy on the borders and intense diplomatic engagement as an equal, including two summits, in pursuit of its ideology, the Modi government came to terms with realpolitiks after Doklam and Eastern Ladakh intrusions. China has a much higher Comprehensive National Power, and its GDP is 5 times, and its defence budget three times that of India. Unless this differential is bridged, India will not be in a position to challenge China. While China aims to become the preeminent world power by 2049, India needs to increase its GDP to $10-15 trillion and achieve the dependent transformation of its armed forces by 2047 to be in a position to challenge China in the same way the latter is challenging the US today.
Keeping the above in view, Modi has swallowed the bitter pill — loss of face and control over 1,000 sq km of territory — to revert to a policy of “strategic restraint”. China will not be challenged directly, diplomatically or militarily. Its assertion of hegemony on the borders will be deterred by a dissuasive defensive posture to impose unacceptable costs in the event of Chinese escalation. Offensive riposte and nuclear brinkmanship will back the defensive posture depending on the degree of escalation by China.
The erudite Foreign Minister S Jaishankar was absolutely right when he said, “Look, they (China) are the bigger economy. What am I going to do? As a smaller economy, I am going to pick up a fight with the bigger economy? It is not a question of being reactionary, it’s a question of common sense….” It is difficult to fault this strategy on merit. However, Modi’s strongman image and the dependent electoral prospects of the BJP have to be safeguarded. Consequently, the reliance on obfuscation, rhetoric and bombast to blind public opinion and avoid the debate in Parliament. A course correction is warranted.
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The way forward
It would be prudent for the government in power to strive for a national consensus to formalise its National Security Strategy against China. Once it is explained in Parliament and to the public, there would be no need to fear accountability as the political debate will shift to who can achieve the national vision better.
A formal NSS will give direction to the transformation of the armed forces. It will also give shape to the immediate and long-term military strategy to manage the border with China and prevent embarrassment.
India must unilaterally declare its Red Line on the borders along our perception of the LAC and marked maps handed over to China. LAC must be physically secured by the ITBP to deny opportunity for preemption. Any aggressive movement across this line must be considered as hostile and dealt with through appropriate military action. Non-military “riot police” actions must stop forthwith. The government must subtly signal its threshold for use of tactical nuclear weapons. Below this threshold, the military differential is irrelevant to secure borders, but political will is necessary.
China has no other leverage except the disputed border to assert its hegemony. So long as this opportunity is denied, China can do very little as unilateral escalation is fraught with uncertain outcomes.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)