The Narendra Modi government’s short–term engagement scheme for soldiers, Agnipath, came as a surprise to the Army and “like a bolt from the blue” for the other two services, according to former Chief of Army Staff, General Manoj Naravane. Nonetheless, as per the present COAS, General Manoj Pande, it was formally launched after “due consideration” in June 2022. Two years later, it has become a political hot potato for the BJP–led coalition government, which was sworn in on 9 June.
Two of the coalition partners, Janata Dal United (12 MPs) and the Lok Jan Shakti Party (5 MPs), have publicly demanded a review of the scheme. Scrapping the Agnipath scheme and restoring the status quo ante June 2022 with respect to terms and conditions of service for soldiers was also one of the main agenda points of the opposition—and reportedly paid electoral dividends for it in Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. Anticipating the adverse fallout, even Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had said on 28 March that the government was open to reviewing the scheme.
So, what’s next?
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Options for the government
The primary motivation for the short-term engagement scheme in our armed forces was the burgeoning and ever-increasing pension bill after the 2014 sanction of One Rank One Pension (OROP), which promised uniform pensions for military veterans of the same rank and length of service regardless of their date of retirement.
All other advantages cited by the government and the armed forces to justify the Agnipath scheme—lowering the median age from 32 to 26 years, satisfying the nationalistic aspirations of the youth, bringing discipline in society, providing trained manpower for the public and private sectors, and opening up employment opportunities—are default fallouts and political machinations.
The government now has three options. The first is to scrap the Agnipath scheme and revert to the pre–June 2022 status quo. The advantage is that this will maintain a time–tested system that has been proven in war and peace. The armed forces will remain a better career option than the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). The disadvantage is that the defence budget will have to be increased to accommodate the ever–increasing pension bill—it currently equals the capital budget, which in turn is inadequate for transformation. A defence budget of 3 per cent of the GDP instead of 2 per cent, as has been the case for the last 10 years, can resolve this issue. The rapid growth of our economy will further ease the situation.
The second option is a variation of the first. Here, the existing system can continue with the introduction of a special contributory pension scheme, with the government contributing an enhanced amount. There should be no change from the existing system for disability, death, and battle casualty benefits. This approach would keep the armed forces at par with the CAPF as a career option. I wonder why this viable option was not considered to begin with.
The third option is to review the Agnipath scheme to better meet the aspirations of the soldiers and the organisation. However, no matter what form it takes, it will make the CAPF, and not the armed forces, the preferred career option.
Since the first two options are self–explanatory, I will only focus on the optimisation of Agnipath and recommend a way forward for the government.
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Optimisation of Agnipath
A successful short-term engagement scheme requires adherence to three fundamentals. First, it must not adversely impact the operational efficiency of the armed forces. Second, it must be financially attractive for soldiers, both during service and post-retirement. Third, it must not be an exploitative scheme in a welfare state.
In its present form, Agnipath falls short on all three counts. Unfortunately the armed forced failed to consider their own repository of knowledge and experience with respect to short–term engagement.
Agnipath is a standalone reform that’s not linked to the planned transformation of the armed forces, which itself is rudderless due to the lack of a formal national security strategy and defence policy. There was much talk over the last 10 years about optimisation/reduction of manpower and restructuring/reorganization, but little progress has been made. There has been no recruitment of regular soldiers since 2020 and 50,000 to 60,000 personnel retire every year. From 2020 to 2023, 2,00,000- 2,40,000 soldiers have retired, but so far, only 72,340 Agniveers have joined units after training. The resultant manpower shortage is 1,27,660 to 1,68,660. The planned intake of Agniveers in 2024 will barely meet the outflow of this year. This shortage is severely impacting the operational efficiency of the armed forces.
Whatever form the reviewed scheme takes, this situation has to be redressed, keeping in view the transformation of the armed forces and pending optimisation/reduction and restructuring/reorganisation.
In General Naravane’s memoirs, Four Stars of Destiny, the chapter on Agniveers is titled ‘Undersoldiers’ to signify their unequal status. While the non-grant of pension is understandable, there is no logic for unequal pay, non-grant of dearness allowance (DA), and Military Service Pay, and unequal disability/death and battle casualty benefits. More so, when Agniveers face the same dangers/privations as other soldiers. During their service, short–term–engagement soldiers must be treated equally in all respects to regular soldiers. Failure to do so will seriously impact their morale and, thereby, the fighting prowess of the unit. The scheme must also include a well-thought-out special contributory pension scheme with an enhanced government contribution in view of the short tenure. Army Group Insurance contribution and benefits should be the same as regular soldiers.
A four–year tenure, including the training period, is too short to optimise cohesion, utilise trained manpower effectively, and provide adequate financial benefits for the soldiers. In my view, a five–year tenure, excluding the training period, with a voluntary option for another five-year extension would meet the requirements of the organisation and the financial aspiration of the individual. Consequently, we should not begrudge the grant of gratuity and ex–servicemen status, entitled after five years of service, on retirement.
A formalised plan for post-release rehabilitation/reemployment is essential. Why should trained Agniveers need to get recruited afresh and be retrained for service in the CAPFs? After a short reorientation course, they should be automatically absorbed. The reservation for Agniveers should be increased to a minimum 25 per cent of those released. Ideally, all should be absorbed. In all other fields of government employment also, a law should be passed for reservation. The same should be done by the states. Further, the Centre and states must formalise higher education reservation for released soldiers in both government and private institutions. A legislation mandating affirmative action by the private sector to employ released soldiers is a must too. All released Agniveers must be treated as ex-servicemen for reemployment, as is the case for regular soldiers.
At present, only 25 per cent of short–term–engagement personnel are absorbed as regular soldiers. This should be increased to 50 per cent without loss of seniority, which is a well–established government norm.
The term ‘Agniveer’ itself, along with its distinct insignia, creates a distinction between soldiers. This must stop, especially since all future intakes will initially be short–term.
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Way forward
The reduction of the pension bill will fructify gradually over 15 to 20 years, when the percentage of serving Agniveers increases and the number of regular soldiers retiring decreases correspondingly. It is pertinent to mention that by then, the Indian economy is projected to reach up to $20 trillion, with the defence budget at 2-3 per cent of GDP translating to about $ 400/600 billion. This increase would be enough to cater for the rise in the pay and pension bill as well as ongoing transformation efforts. Of course, this does not nullify the case for optimisation and restructuring/reorganization, backed by the infusion of technology, to reduce manpower.
Switching to a special contributory pension scheme with higher government contribution without any change in disability/death and battle casualty benefits is also a viable option. Of course, this does not nullify the case for optimisation and restructuring/reorganisation, backed by the infusion of technology, to reduce manpower.
In case it is decided to persist with a short-term engagement scheme, I recommend a five-year tenure with an option for a voluntary five-year extension. This, as elucidated earlier, should be accompanied by a special contributory pension scheme with a higher government contribution. And 50 per cent of soldiers should be permanently absorbed after five years without loss of seniority. There should be no distinction between soldiers in terms of status, pay/allowances, and other benefits.
There is no tearing hurry. It would be prudent for the government to set up an empowered committee/commission with representation from all stakeholders and experts. The primary aim should be to reduce the pension bill while meeting soldiers’ aspirations and without impinging on the operational efficiency of the armed forces. The temptation to save more by creating two classes of soldiers must be curbed, as must the political shortsightedness of using the armed forces for employment generation.
Current political circumstances have given the armed forces and the government an opportunity to examine the issue afresh. No impulsive decision must be taken and incremental tinkering will not do.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Asavari Singh)
Relinquish.