There has been a flurry of diplomatic engagements with China in the months following the beginning of Prime Minister Modi’s third term on 9 June. Not that diplomatic engagement ever stopped since China’s surprise military manoeuvre to secure 1,000 square kilometres of territory previously controlled and patrolled by India between April and May 2020. There is, however, a discernible change in the tenor of follow-up official statements.
Both sides seem to have softened their earlier rigid stands. India had sought peace on the borders including disengagement, de-escalation, and restoration of status quo ante April 2020 as a prerequisite for restoring broader cooperative diplomatic and economic engagement. China desired the opposite, emphasising the historical nature of the border dispute, implying that it had merely re-secured its 1959 claim line, thus trying to make the altered status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) a fait accompli for India.
It is being speculated that the ground has been prepared for a Modi-Xi meeting in October on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia. There is a possibility of an agreement for tactical normalisation of India-China relations, both in respect of the altered status quo in Ladakh and cooperative engagement.
The drivers for peace
China’s GDP is 4.7 times that of India and its defence budget is three times larger. India needs time to bridge this huge differential and be in a position to challenge China. A realistic timeline for this is 2047, when the Indian economy, going by the current 7 per cent growth, will be $21 trillion. In the interim, any form of conflict with China can lead to embarrassing military setbacks and a drain on the economy. Thus, the primary driver for India to seek peace is conflict prevention.
Another important driver is the necessity of economic engagement with China, which was flagged in the pre-budget Economic Survey 2023-24. “To boost Indian manufacturing and plug India into the global supply chain, it is inevitable that India plugs itself into China’s supply chain. Whether we do so by relying solely on imports or partially through Chinese investments is a choice that India has to make,” it noted.
Global and regional uncertainty due to the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Gaza conflict, and tensions in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait have drained the resources and diverted the attention of India’s potential allies. India’s import of Russian equipment and spares has been affected. The Russia-China alliance further queers the pitch. India also has to grapple with unfriendly regime changes in its immediate neighbourhood.
Sooner or later, China will be accepted as a great power alongside the US. In the G2 scenario, the US and its allies may seek to accommodate it rather than confront it. Their economic interdependence contributes toward the same. Lastly, as an emerging power, India itself wants to retain and showcase its strategic autonomy as was demonstrated by Modi’s visit to Russia.
The last four years have made China realise that it cannot coerce a nuclear India to capitulate. Its hegemonist approach and confrontation on the borders are providing diminishing returns with respect to shaping India’s international conduct. In fact, coercion has produced the opposite effect, driving India closer to the US.
China’s initial gains notwithstanding, a strategic stalemate prevails on the borders, which can only be altered by a limited war. The uncertainty of outcome in enforcing its will in war, even against a weaker adversary, will be a strategic defeat for China—as it has been for Russia in Ukraine.
While it may be too late to make complete amends, peace on the borders will inspire India to maintain its strategic autonomy. China also does not want an active southern front in case it is forced to go to war over Taiwan. The Chinese economy, too, needs unhindered trade with India as China’s investments in India will, by default, signal the global pecking order.
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Hectic diplomacy
The first signal for renewed efforts for peace came from Modi during his interview with Newsweek on 24 April. “For India, the relationship with China is important and significant. It is my belief that we need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us,” he said.
Modi stressed the need for India-China relations to be stable and peaceful. “I hope and believe that through positive and constructive bilateral engagement at the diplomatic and military levels, we will be able to restore and sustain peace and tranquility in our borders,” he added. His statement was welcomed by China. Hectic diplomacy began within days of the new government being formed.
In July, Indian and Chinese foreign ministers held two back-to-back meetings on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit on 4 July in Astana, Kazakhstan and the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting on 25 July in Vientiane, Laos. Relatively conciliatory follow-up statements were issued.
These meetings were followed by two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) on 31 July in New Delhi and on 29 August in Beijing. While the follow-up statements were shrouded in diplomatese, these meetings in quick succession were probably used to prepare the ground for the Ajit Doval-Wang Yi meeting on the sidelines of the Meeting of BRICS High-Ranking Officials Responsible for Security Matters/National Security Advisers in St Petersburg, Russia which took place on 12 September.
The formal statements issued by both sides after the meeting gave a clear indication that the peace was being negotiated in right earnest. While both sides reiterated their known positions, accusatory rhetoric which dominated the discourse in the past was absent.
A press release from the Ministry of External Affairs stated, “Both sides agreed to work with urgency and redouble their efforts to realize complete disengagement in the remaining areas … peace and tranquility in borders areas and respect for LAC are essential for normalcy in bilateral relations. Both sides must fully abide by relevant bilateral agreements, protocols, and understandings reached in the past by the two Governments.”
Contrast this with Doval’s statement in a meeting in July 2023, where he told Wang that the military standoff in Ladakh had “eroded strategic trust” in the India-China relations.
On the day of the Doval-Wang meeting, EAM S Jaishankar addressed a think tank in Geneva, highlighting that “75 per cent of the disengagement problems” had been resolved. However, he added that the bigger issue was the militarisation of the border.
Chinese spokesperson Mao Ning gave a different interpretation of the talks, focusing on the progress made in the consultations on border issues and how both sides agreed on enhancing mutual trust and improving bilateral ties. “In recent years, front-line armies of the two countries have realised disengagement in four areas in the Western sector of the China-India border, including the Galwan Valley. The China-India border situation is generally stable and under control,” she said.
It is apparent that the real test of diplomacy will be to reconcile the differences with respect to the Chinese blockade in Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala Junction to arrive at a face-saving solution.
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Contours of peace agreement
Let there be no doubt that the 1959 claim line, which has formed the basis of Chinese assertions in Eastern Ladakh since 7 November 1959, is central to any tactical agreement with Beijing, paving the way for de-escalation and normalisation of India-China relations. The 1959 claim line was broadly described by the Chinese during the five rounds of talks with India in 1960. In the 1962 war, China secured this line and did not attack beyond it despite being in a position of strength. After the war, China unilaterally withdrew 20 kilometres east of the 1959 claim line in Ladakh.
Over the years, India began patrolling—but not physically occupying—some of the areas which it held before the war in 1962 i.e., the southern half of Depsang Plains, Galwan Valley, Patrolling Points 15/16/17/17A, Finger 4 to 8, north of Pangong Tso, and Charding-Ninglung Nala Junction, south of Demchok. Apart from the macro political aim of asserting its hegemony, the limited military aim of China in 2020 was to re-secure the 1959 claim line. It is these areas, patrolled but not physically held by India, that the Chinese secured between April and May 2020.
Indus Valley between Fukche and Demchok was physically secured by India, but has been left alone by China—despite cutting 30 kilometres across the 1959 claim line—due to a number of villages in the area.
All agreements over the last four and a half years have centred around the 1959 claim line with buffer zones in areas of dispute, which are mostly on the Indian side of the LAC. A de facto demarcation of the border has taken place. However, China has been adamant with respect to Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala Junction.
The diplomatic challenge is to reach a face-saving agreement in these two areas with equitable buffer zones. Thus, any future interim tactical agreement in Eastern Ladakh will be based on India accepting the 1959 claim line with buffer zones in areas in which it differs from India’s perception of the LAC, with Indus Valley being an exception.
Rapprochement with China is an economic necessity as militarily India is not in a position to challenge it. Whatever be its past strategic failures in dealing with China, the Modi government’s peace initiative is realpolitik.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)
Since Dokalam, and with added concern since the summer of 2020, have consistently posted in favour of a deepened diplomatic dialogue with China. For the security implications, the need to avoid a costly arms race, and also because our economy would benefit from increased trade and investment. Hopefully, a particularly fraught phase in the relationship can lie behind us.
Premier Chou en Lai had visited India, made the case personally. PM Nehru was overruled by his colleagues. The rest is history.