The United States will soon have a new president, with the outcome likely determined by a close race in the swing states. A Democrat administration under Kamala Harris would largely continue Joe Biden-era policies, but Donald Trump’s return wouldn’t drastically shift the nation’s course either. Despite Trump’s bold claims of being a “problem-solver” compared to Democrats as “problem-makers,” the US today has limited room for sweeping manoeuvres.
The current global dynamics prevent America from adopting an isolationist stance or affording an exclusive focus on the Indo-Pacific region.
Long and short of America’s restraints
First, the nature of the current global system, where security theatres are interconnected, partly explains the challenges. Larger, protracted conflicts are driving a growing polarisation in the global order, creating a divisive environment. This is particularly challenging for “neutral countries” that aim to maintain broad, multi-aligned relationships—a logical approach to easing tensions created by such stark divides. India’s involvement in groups like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) exemplifies this approach. I’ll expand on that later.
Second, the structure of the American presidential system plays a significant role in shaping US foreign policy. Contrary to common belief, the US system does not permit unchecked presidential power, unlike France, where presidents can independently make critical decisions regarding war and foreign policy. In the US, the president’s authority is constrained by Congress and the Senate, which would act as checks even if Trump, representing the Make America Great Again faction, were to return to power.
Related to the above is the difference between a Trump 1.0 and a potential Trump 2.0 presidency. Trump’s original approach in 2016 operated in a vastly different global environment, unaware of the economic and supply chain disruptions that a pandemic could cause. At that time, withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was relatively straightforward, as the vulnerabilities in supply chains, particularly due to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), were not yet fully understood. Moreover, the world had not witnessed the re-emergence of large-scale warfare, highlighted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which stirred memories of the world wars.
During his first term, Trump leveraged Middle Eastern normalisation efforts, particularly through the Abraham Accords, which laid the groundwork for strategic partnerships such as I2U2 (India, Israel, United Arab Emirates, and the US) and IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). However, this geopolitical landscape shifted dramatically following the 7 October Hamas attack on Israel, and then Iran’s offensives, thus altering regional dynamics.
Additionally, events like the tensions in the Galwan Valley and China’s crackdown on Hong Kong were not on the horizon in 2016.
The post-Covid world has become increasingly complex, marked by the resurgence of conventional warfare and shifting alliances. This complexity is further compounded by advancements in AI and critical technologies, which now influence economic, security, and military dimensions alike.
Even the Biden administration’s assertion that ‘America is back’ has proven to be rather lukewarm. While the US has engaged in two key theatres—Europe and the Middle East—while continuing to invest in the Indo-Pacific, it has struggled to take decisive action in any of these regions. This dissonance arises from a reluctance to engage deeply in distant issues such as those involving Ukraine, Israel, or Taiwan, coupled with an inability to disengage from them entirely. As previously noted, the US straddles an international identity characterised by both globalism and isolationism. As long as these opposing viewpoints dominate American political discourse, the US-led order will experience recurring instability.
Fourth, a critical issue today is analysing the merging of security theatres in relation to US foreign policy rather than merely abandoning one for another. For instance, experts like Elbridge Colby, who advocate for a US pivot solely to the Indo-Pacific, lack a viable response to the complex dynamics in the Middle East, where leaders such as Benjamin Netanyahu anticipate a more aggressive stance from a potential Trump administration toward Iran and its proxies.
Choosing one security arena over another is overly simplistic. The US cannot afford to concentrate exclusively on any single region, as no ideal security threat exists. Global conflicts reveal a noticeable pattern– an axis of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (collectively referred to as CRINK) is actively challenging the Western-led order, with each state taking the lead in different theatres. Russia leads in Europe, Iran in the Middle East, and China in the Indo-Pacific. This cross-regional alignment disrupts the notion of a multipolar world, complicating efforts for countries seeking neutrality or hedging strategies in an unpredictable international order. Efforts to balance these competing poles have had minimal impact on weakening the increasingly entrenched and coordinated strategic alliance among these four nations.
The US will continue supporting Europe and NATO, but such assistance will come with conditions. European nations increasingly recognise that a “Trump-pill” might be necessary to ensure a fairer distribution of defence responsibilities among allies. While some of these Trump-proofing adjustments may have limited immediate effects on the war in Ukraine, they could lay the groundwork for a more robust and self-reliant European defence structure.
Trump’s approach to Ukraine might hinge on capitalising on war fatigue within the US rather than pursuing concrete resolutions—I doubt he has any. Although he may advocate for measures like fully activating the Biden administration’s unused Lend-Lease Act to ensure that military aid benefits US domestic industries. Additionally, North Korea sending troops to support Russia marks a shift from a European to a more widespread conflict involving other theatres.
This escalation has drawn South Korea closer to the conflict, transitioning from just providing humanitarian aid to a more active role. Japan and South Korea may also directly engage due to increasing North Korean threats in the Indo-Pacific. The US, with military stockpiles in Israel and South Korea, indirectly supports Ukraine through these supply chains. Both South Korea and Japan could play a more active role should North Korean aggression escalate further. The US has indicated that North Korea’s involvement has lifted previously established red lines for Ukraine regarding the use of American weapons in Russia, pointing to a potentially dangerous escalation.
Meanwhile, the Middle East remains a volatile region, particularly following Israel’s recent military actions against Iranian targets.
Tensions in the Taiwan Strait also persist. Recent agreements between China and India regarding disengagement along specific points at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) represent a positive development. However, China’s approach remains tactical rather than strategic, with its ambitions for a unipolar Asia under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) standing in stark contrast to India’s vision for a multipolar region.
Also read: Is Five Eyes destabilising India’s rise as non-white power? Idea is as old as Cold War era
What is the way out?
The four factors outlined above will ultimately ensure that internationalism perseveres in US foreign policy, regardless of presidential campaign rhetoric. The deeply interconnected nature of today’s security theatres will continue to shape America’s foreign policy and strategic interests.
The key takeaway is—the US cannot counter China or uphold a rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific on its own; it will need allies. For this reason, a form of conservative internationalism—with transactionalist overtones—is likely to define America’s approach, regardless of who takes office. Originally proposed by Kori Schake, conservative internationalism strikes a balance between total isolationism and total globalism, offering a practical path to serve US interests.
India is witnessing the American elections from its intersectional global moment. Any US pivot to the Indo-Pacific is unlikely to succeed without India’s involvement. The strong trajectory of India-US strategic ties is expected to continue, despite recent challenges, including the Pannun controversy and the sanctioning of Indian businesses for trading technology with Russia.
Today, the US is India’s largest trading partner, with a trade balance favouring India. However, a Trump administration would likely bring heightened protectionist policies that would impact New Delhi.
The question, then, is how India should respond. New Delhi views the Democrats’ often patronising tone on issues concerning India as intrusive, finding the Republicans relatively less inclined to lecture internationally. Yet, India must reflect on its own need for external validation. New Delhi’s focus should be on enhancing its investment ecosystem to attract China+1 investments that are currently being diverted elsewhere and building strategic gateways into untapped economies. India must maintain a strategic realism that evaluates nations through a lens of shared interests rather than friendships, trust, or validation. While admirable in human life, such values hold limited weight in the hard-nosed realm of statecraft.
The writer is a geopolitics analyst and author. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)