The irony is hard to miss. India’s economic relations with China are thriving but the situation on the borders remains precarious, with massed troops facing off against each other. China is firmly in control of 1,000 square kilometres of territory that India patrolled and controlled until the end of April 2020, and diplomacy is at a standstill.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s fabled diplomatic skills have not cut any ice with President Xi Jinping and nor has he displayed the political will to militarily restore the pre-May 2020 status quo.
All of this makes for a sad commentary on Modi’s decade-long China policy. This decade has not ended like the period between 1947 and 1962 which culminated in an abject military defeat and the loss of 38,000 sq km of territory. However, the meek acceptance of a status quo with China in a dominant position on the borders does not augur well for India’s prestige and Modi’s legacy.
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China’s India strategy
China does not consider India as an equal but as a potential economic and military competitor. Its strategy has been consistent since the 1950s. It seeks to assert its hegemony over India by exploiting the economic and military differential, coerce a settlement of the border dispute on its own terms, and use force when necessary to impose its will. China maintained good relations as long as India did not directly challenge its position in the international arena or on the borders.
Former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not fulfil either of these Chinese conditions.
He positioned India as an independent player on the world stage despite its limited comprehensive national power. His “forward policy” to flag the frontier regions of Ladakh and the erstwhile North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh) led to border clashes in 1959. Subsequently, despite his popularity and overwhelming majority in Parliament, Nehru buckled under public and Parliament pressure to order a more aggressive “forward policy” and blundered into a war with an ill-prepared Army without a border infrastructure to sustain it.
Despite India’s abject defeat in 1962 War, China’s position on the borders has remained consistent. In Ladakh, it follows the 1959 claim line, which it secured in 1962. In the northeast, despite its claim over all of Arunachal Pradesh, it considers the McMahon Line as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). However, its interpretation varies from India’s by 5-10 kilometres due to the thick pen markings on a small-scale map. This settlement, offered by China in 1959-60, was maintained until 2005. Thereafter, it was put on the back burner due to perceived Indian belligerence.
Until 2008, despite the Nathu La and Sumdorong Chu military standoffs, China maintained its dominant position on the borders and in international relations. However, India’s emerging strategic partnership with the US with the signing of the nuclear treaty in 2008 and the development of border infrastructure from 2007 onwards were perceived as a security challenge by China. It became more assertive on the border, a case in point being the 2013 intrusion in the Depsang Plains.
Modi’s China strategy
Steeped in nationalism, the ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) embraces the utopian concept of Akhand Bharat (undivided India) as is evident from the mural illustrating this belief in the new parliament building. Consequently, reclaiming territories under the illegal occupation of China and Pakistan has always been its national security goal.
However, like Nehru, Modi recognised that India requires time to catch up economically and militarily with China. Hence, he decided to rely on diplomacy and economic relations to address security challenges from China.
Modi’s long-term strategy was to buy time to enhance India’s economic and military capabilities enough to challenge China and settle the border dispute on India’s terms.
In tune with his party’s ideology and his strong leader image, he also focused on developing border infrastructure and a strong military posture to deter China. He invested heavily in personal diplomacy to foster ‘one-to-one’ relations with Xi Jinping, engaging 18 times with him before 2020.
In Modi’s first three years, economic and diplomatic relations scaled dizzying heights. Unprecedented impetus was also given to the development of border infrastructure. Roads were developed in sensitive areas like the Depsang Plains, Patrolling Points 15 and 17 A north of Pangong Tso, and Demchok— which as per Chinese perception are across the 1959 claim line.
These developments on the border, Modi’s emergence as a world leader, and India’s strategic partnership with the US were again perceived as security challenges by China. The 2014 Chumar intrusion during Xi Jinping’s visit to India served as a warning signal from China.
In 2017, due to ideological investment in national security and his public image, Modi impulsively intervened in Bhutan’s Doklam to prevent Chinese road building— to which Bhutan was acquiescing. This led to a 73-day standoff and partial mobilisation of troops by both sides.
The crisis was diffused through diplomatic negotiations, but the Doklam intervention was a strategic error of judgement. China was embarrassed due to the loss of face. Its red lines had been crossed. While publicly declaring victory, Modi made desperate efforts through two informal summits at Wuhan and Mahabalipuram to mend fences. But this proved futile, as power flows from the barrel of the gun.
Like Nehru, Modi, due to economic compulsions and, more surprisingly, a lack of drive, did little to transform the military to match China. When China precipitated the crisis in Eastern Ladakh, Modi found himself in a situation similar to that of Nehru on the eve of the 1962 war. It is to Modi’s credit that, unlike Nehru, he did not recklessly blunder into a war from a position of terrain and military disadvantage. However, the military strategy to handle the crisis without a major escalation was flawed and failed to put China under pressure for restoration of status quo ante.
Despite the debacle in Galwan, India’s response was generally passive. The limited advantage gained by a half-hearted attempt at a quid pro quo occupation of the Kailash Range was frittered away during disengagement on Chinese terms. Buffer zones were accepted north of Pangong Tso, on Kailash Range and at Patrolling Points 15,16, 17, and 17 A—all in areas under India’s control until April 2020. Our control over the southern half of Depsang Plains and the Charding-Ninglung Nala Junction continues to be denied to us.
While the military situation can be called a stalemate, India’s passivity implies that the initiative rests with China, which can trigger a crisis at a time and place of its own choosing.
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Seize the strategic initiative
With troops massed on the borders, a crisis can be triggered by design or default. This time, India must shed its passivity and preempt China.
China’s comprehensive national power is 1.8 times that of India. Its economy is five times and its defence budget three times larger than ours. The Indian armed forces are at least a decade behind in military technology to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, the likely pattern of conflict between nuclear-armed states indicates that India must not take counsel of its fears. The current state of strategic paralysis with China must end.
The absence of a national security strategy and a clear military strategy led to a knee-jerk response and eventual inaction in Eastern Ladakh. India must declare its national security strategy, outlining our national interests and showcasing our resolve to adversaries. This will pave the way for a national defence strategy and a government-owned action plan for the transformation of the armed forces and provide clarity for a viable military strategy. Post 1962, the armed forces were partially reformed in three years and performed creditably in the 1965 war with Pakistan. This set the stage for their transformation and India’s greatest victory in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.
Full-scale wars between nuclear weapon armed states are unlikely. Thus, India faces no existential threat or substantial loss of territory. Engaging in nuclear brinkmanship can even reduce the probability of a limited war. Below the nuclear threshold, the impact of military technological differentials is limited. China’s escalation options are confined to the tactical domain, and within this realm, our armed forces must seize the initiative and go on the offensive.
A bold operational strategy must be formalised to manage the border situation. A red line on the borders must be declared, representing our perception of the LAC and areas under our control. The LAC should be reinforced with additional Indo-Tibetan Armed Police posts. Foolproof surveillance and reconnaissance must be ensured. Any aggressive movement across this line must be considered hostile and dealt with through appropriate military action.
This is not rocket science. A strategic review and military appreciation would have provided the answers. With the requisite political will, the status quo ante for the 1,000 square kilometres could have been achieved in 2020 itself. What we witnessed instead was political and military inertia to cover up failures. Psychological defeat and loss of territory was transformed into victory through obfuscation and political propaganda. It is time to regain the strategic initiative. However, for this political will is necessary, which has not been displayed so far.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was a Member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.