An intelligence operation does not always begin with a stolen document or a breached computer system. Sometimes, it begins with an entirely ordinary conversation. Recent espionage allegations that involve Indian Navy personnel in Visakhapatnam have, once again, drawn attention to social-media-based honey-trapping. There are allegations of attempts by Pakistani handlers to obtain sensitive information through this methodology.
These cases warrant scrutiny beyond individual conduct. They raise a larger question: how effectively is India preparing its defence personnel to recognise and resist the human dimensions of contemporary intelligence warfare?
An adversary does not always need to penetrate a network if it can persuade an authorised user to provide the information it seeks. The technology and vocabulary of espionage has changed. The exploitation of human vulnerability has not.
The missed strategic lesson
Kautilya’s centuries-old Arthashastra treated intelligence, deception, and the management of human loyalties as essential elements of statecraft. His framework offers a starting point for examining the contemporary security problem: the relationship between military strength and the judgement required to protect it. His intelligence architecture, organised around Gudhapurushas (covert agents), illustrates intelligence as a systematic enterprise. He distinguished between samstha, agents operating from established positions, and sanchara, mobile agents. And also distinguished between prabhav-sakti, associated with material and military strength; utsaha-sakti, associated with energy and morale; and mantra-sakti, the power of counsel, deliberation, and intellectual judgement. These distinctions are significant. Military resources give a state capability, but the effective use and protection of that capability depend on the quality of decisions made by those entrusted with it.
His discussions of covert operations (upajapa), involving subversion and the manipulation of loyalties, demonstrate that an adversary can gain strategic advantage by influencing people rather than directly confronting military strength.
The strategic parallels with contemporary social-media-based recruitment are instructive. It exploits access, relationships, and human motivations to gain strategic leverage. The medium has changed, but understanding human behaviour remains important.
AI and digital deception
Generative artificial intelligence adds a new dimension to an old intelligence problem. Fabricated identities, synthetic voices, and increasingly convincing impersonations can assist malicious actors to construct plausible online personas and tailor communications to a target’s professional interests and public digital footprint. These capabilities may make it easier to initiate contact, sustain deceptive relationships and test an individual’s willingness to disclose sensitive information.
Kautilya’s Arthashastra offers a useful historical point of comparison. Its account of espionage describes agents operating under assumed identities and gathering information through access to social and political networks. Categories such as parivrajika illustrate how intelligence collection could depend on an operative’s ability to enter environments that might otherwise remain inaccessible. The comparison should not be taken to mean that ancient espionage and AI-enabled recruitment are identical. Rather, both demonstrate the strategic value of concealed identity, access and the deliberate management of trust.
The contemporary difference lies in scale, speed and the ability to personalise deception. An intelligence approach may begin with an apparently ordinary conversation, a shared professional interest or a seemingly harmless request. It may then progress toward information that an individual would not knowingly disclose to an unauthorised recipient. AI can make such approaches convincing, although a fabricated identity or AI-generated communication channel alone need not establish an intelligence operation.
This makes security education more important. This must not be limited only to reminders not to disclose classified information. Personnel must comprehend how apparently harmless routine interactions can develop into attempts at recruitment, influence or compromise. The objective is to develop the judgement to recognise warning signs, verify identities, and report suspicious approaches before they become security incidents.
Security awareness to counter-intelligence literacy
Our defence and armed forces are not unfamiliar with honey-trapping. Through security advisories and awareness initiatives, such threats are addressed; at least an attempt is being made, to say the least. The recurrence of investigations does not, however, by itself, establish that it is sufficient. This leads to justified asking whether existing measures develop the judgement capability needed to recognise manipulation before it becomes a security breach. An approach may begin with an innocent exchange before requests for minor details or suggestions to continue the conversation on a private platform.
Personnel need to recognise these shifts. This makes counter-intelligence literacy important. The Kautilyan framework offers a practical lens for examining this challenge. Upajapa highlights the manipulation of loyalties as an instrument of statecraft; mantra-sakti underscores the importance of judgement and deliberation in protecting state interests. Applied to contemporary security education, these concepts direct attention not only to the rules personnel must follow, but also to their ability to recognise and respond to attempts at manipulation. It involves understanding how an approach might unfold, questioning inconsistencies, verifying identities and knowing when to seek guidance or report a concern. These are practical skills that require more than a circular or an occasional briefing.
Another challenge lies in reconciling technical security with the interpersonal trust on which military organisations depend. Zero Trust Architecture offers a useful analogy: verify access rather than assume it. Military effectiveness nevertheless depends on camaraderie, cooperation, and confidence among colleagues. These principles need not conflict. In digital spaces, professional familiarity should not replace identity verification, and people should report suspicious approaches without treating every unfamiliar contact as hostile. India needs evidence-based assessments of existing programmes, not assumptions about their adequacy or effectiveness.
Three reforms India should consider
Strategic heritage has value only when it shapes contemporary practice. India must ensure that its understanding of espionage evolves as rapidly as the methods used to conduct it.
First, move from rule-based instruction to scenario-based recognition training. Exercises should expose personnel to realistic examples of fabricated identities, gradual information elicitation, impersonation and coercive approaches. The aim should be to develop judgement, not simply memorisation.
Second, make early reporting accessible. Personnel who suspect that an interaction has become compromising should know how to report it promptly through appropriate confidential channels. Fear of embarrassment or professional consequences can delay disclosure, potentially allowing a manageable incident to escalate. Early reporting must coexist with proportionate accountability for deliberate misconduct.
Third, institutionalise learning from investigations. Where an intelligence compromise is established, appropriate reviews should examine not only individual responsibility but also the methods used, procedural weaknesses and lessons for future training.
These measures will not eliminate espionage, but they can help India assess whether its personnel are equipped to recognise and respond to evolving threats. Military modernisation cannot be measured solely through advanced platforms, weapons systems and technological resilience. It must also account for the judgement of the people entrusted with the modernisation effort. An adversary may seek to bypass sophisticated defences by exploiting an ordinary human interaction. India’s counter-intelligence preparedness must account for that possibility.
Shrawani Shagun Jha is a research fellow at the Centre for Aerospace Power and Strategic Studies (CAPSS). She holds a PhD in Law and is a recipient of the Max Planck Scholarship (2023). She tweets @CosmicLawyerS20. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)