China’s defence leadership is back in the spotlight, once again for all the wrong reasons. The country’s Defence Minister, Admiral Dong Jun, is reportedly under investigation for corruption—a sharp fall from grace for a trusted Xi Jinping loyalist who has held office only since December 2023.
Dong is the third consecutive defence minister to face graft allegations, raising serious questions about the integrity of China’s military elite. Is Xi’s relentless anti-corruption drive exposing systemic rot, or does it signal a deeper failure to find leaders who can withstand the scrutiny of his “new era”?
Defence Minister Dong Jun: one among many
The story of Defence Minister Dong Jun being investigated for a “corruption-related scandal” in the People’s Liberation Army was first reported by the Financial Times, citing current and former United States officials. Dong’s appointment came just about a year ago after his predecessor, General Li Shangfu, was removed in October 2023 after weeks of speculation following his sudden absence from public view.
Other than Dong, another top military official, Admiral Miao Hua, a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and director of its Political Work Department, has also been axed and is being investigated for “suspected serious violation of discipline”. While the Ministry of National Defence has confirmed Miao Hua’s dismissal, no official statement has come out so far on Dong’s status.
Interestingly, these top appointments have a common connection—they all have close links to President Xi Jinping.
For instance, Admiral Ming Hua has been a confidant of Xi Jinping since the latter was a local leader. Ming was stationed as a navy officer in China’s Fujian province during the same period Xi served as an official there. Miao later became a member of China’s highest-level military command—the Central Military Commission. He has also served in the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection—the Communist Party of China’s highest institutional body, tasked with overseeing the implementation of rules and regulations and combating corruption. For someone with such a background, being held for violation of discipline and possible corruption comes as a major embarrassment to Xi Jinping and the CCP.
Corruption in the Chinese military
In less than a year, China’s military has seen severe corruption charges against its top officers. The axing of these top officials comes in the backdrop of a high-level committee, headed by President Xi Jinping, overseeing corruption cases in the military. Among those suspended over the past year, many are from the Rocket Force—the fourth branch of the People’s Liberation Army, founded in January 2016 and responsible for the country’s strategic missile forces and nuclear deterrence. The Rocket Force plays a critical role in China’s military modernisation efforts, managing its growing arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), medium- and long-range missiles, and hypersonic weapons.
Some of the top names removed from office include Yi Yuchao, the Rocket Force commander who was fired in July 2023, and his deputy, Zhang Zhenzhong, who served from 2016 to 2022 and was later promoted to deputy chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department. Similarly, Li Chuanguang, the force’s deputy commander since 2016, and Zhou Yaning, Yi’s predecessor as commander (2017–2022), were also implicated. General Wei Fenghe, Defence Minister from 2018 to 2023 and the predecessor of General Li Shangfu, was another Rocket Force official, and among the first to be purged on corruption charges.
The Xi loyalists now under investigation for “serious discipline violation”—a famous phrase often used in the past year as a euphemism for corruption—were frequently favoured with promotions and strategically placed in powerful positions to strengthen Xi’s control over the military, particularly within the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). These investigations highlight internal power struggles and raise questions about the effectiveness of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, which often appears selective in its targets.
PLARF key in military strategy, India to US
A key factor behind the establishment of the Rocket Force was to enhance the PLA’s strategic capabilities and bolster its air and missile power amid shifting geopolitical and military dynamics. This included addressing growing tensions with India along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and asserting territorial claims in the region. The Rocket Force has been instrumental in deploying DF-21 medium-range ballistic missiles and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles along the India-China border, providing Beijing with rapid-response capabilities in the event of escalating hostilities.
This reasoning also applies to China’s growing contest with the United States. Chinese concerns over a potential US response to a Taiwan contingency and other regional security challenges have increased the need for a powerful and agile Rocket Force. To this end, the Rocket Force has deployed new nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the DF-5A and DF-31, to strengthen deterrence and expand operational reach. The Rocket Force is also tasked with deterring conflict with Japan in disputed areas such as the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
While the PLA’s Rocket Force remains central to China’s military strategy, the pervasive corruption within its ranks has marred its political effectiveness. It appears that under Xi Jinping, China’s ambition to develop the world’s most feared military has driven advancements in military capacity, institutional mechanisms, and policies such as Periphery Diplomacy, which aims to expand China’s influence through all means, including unacknowledged military aggressions. Reflecting this ambition, China’s defence budget has steadily grown, rising by 3.36 per cent in 2019, 7.34 per cent in 2020, 10.84 per cent in 2021, and 2.11 per cent in 2022, reaching $291.96 billion—a clear indication of its prioritisation of military modernisation.
Also Read: How Chinese media explains LAC ‘thaw’—India has given up on US support
A disruptive purge
The sudden removal of top military leaders risks disrupting China’s military communications, particularly with countries like India and the United States. For example, the investigation into Defence Minister Dong may slow down defence-level talks with India, which are critical for easing tensions at the LAC. Replacing Dong could take months, potentially stalling negotiations. Notably, Dong had met India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh in Laos during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in November. This marked the first such meeting since the June 2020 border conflict and signalled a continuation of dialogue to resolve LAC tensions.
On the US front, Defence Minister Dong had refused to meet his American counterpart Lloyd Austin last month, citing Washington’s support for Taiwan, further straining military-to-military engagement. That meeting was expected to ease the existing military tensions since House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. In mid-November, Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden had agreed to resume military-to-military communication on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in San Francisco.
Amid this, the leadership vacuum not only creates internal instability in the PLA but also hinders Beijing’s ability to maintain critical security dialogues. While Xi may continue cracking down on corruption, each cycle of such purges increasingly highlights the political fragility within his own system. The recurring scandals at critical moments, including his appointees in top posts, point to a deep-rooted political crisis in China.
Rishi Gupta is the Assistant Director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi. He writes on the Asia-Pacific affairs, strategic Himalayas, and South Asian geopolitics. He tweets @RishiGupta_JNU. Views are personal.