After the insurgents ambushed an Assam Rifles convoy, killing a Commanding Officer, his wife and their eight-year-old son and four personnel, in Manipur’s Churachandpur district, a deluge of platitudes like ‘Unka Balidan vyarth nahi jayega’ (their sacrifice will not go in vain) and Desh unke balidan ko kabhi nahi bhoolega (nation will never forget their sacrifices) etc are once again coming from those at the helm of affairs. We hear these so often, every time security personnel lose their lives.
It wouldn’t be surprising if this setback too, like the ones in the past, is forgotten after the initial outrage and cynical invocation of their names for electoral gains.
The ambush in the far northeast, close to the India-Myanmar Border, is beyond doubt a result of complacence induced by a prolonged period of calm on the highway 102B, leading from Churachandpur (CCPur) to Singhat and on the road connecting Singhat and Behang at the India-Myanmar border.
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The timing of movement
Notwithstanding the deceptive calm, the troops should have taken all precautions. The first tenet of operating in these areas is ensuring unpredictability of movement, in terms of timing and routes. There being only one road connecting Behang to Singhat and then on to CCPur, the only unpredictability available to troops is of timing. In the latest incident, perhaps the Commanding Officer was hamstrung by the fact that his wife and son were with him and the remote Company Operation Bases (COB) did not have proper facilities fit for overnight stay, especially for families. The militants, secure in the knowledge that the convoy will return before the last light, had ample time to plan and lay their ambush for maximum effect.
During my two tenures in that area in 1999-2000 as Battalion Commander and in 2006-07 as DIG of BSF training Centre at CCPur, we ensured that the troops coordinated their movement with the timings for opening and closing of schools — early morning and in the afternoon — because the militants never attacked convoys at those times in order to avoid collateral damage. Any other movement necessitated due to exigencies was either a surprise one precluding any reaction time to the insurgents or undertaken only after deploying a proper road opening party (ROP) to clear the route.
While inducting my battalion in 1999, I was under strict instructions from then DG BSF E.N. Rammohan to ensure that my troops moved on foot from Imphal, extending at least 1,000 meters on each side of the road to prevent militants from bringing upon fire on our vehicle convoy moving on the road. This ensured that we could reach our designated tactical headquarters safely even though it took two days to traverse the distance.
One may argue that such tactics have less chances of success in the remote hilly stretch of road along Singhat/Behang – the general area where this ambush has taken place. No information is available whether or not an ROP was deployed before the movement of the convoy of the deceased Commanding Officer. If the ROP was deployed in a routine manner along the road, there was no chance of it succeeding in its assigned task of providing protection to the convoy. The meandering road passing through difficult hilly terrain with thick foliage is amenable to ambush at every turn of the road. The road, therefore, cannot be dominated by routine deployment of ROP. They have to be deployed on heights to prevent militants from occupying them and causing casualties to troops.
Also read: PLA & MNPF — Militant groups behind ‘well-planned’ ambush that killed CO, family in Manipur
Strengthen intelligence, leadership
The ambush also points towards the necessity of our intelligence operatives being active at all times, irrespective of the prevalence of relative peace. If the intelligence operatives had cultivated long-term sources in these areas, they would have forewarned the forces about the presence of militants in the area. It should not be difficult for the Assam Rifles to deploy local people for intelligence gathering work because a large percentage of their troops belong to the northeast.
Another aspect that the policy makers need to pay attention to is the dual role of Assam Rifles. It is a designated force for guarding the India–Myanmar border, besides being responsible for anti-insurgency operations in the northeast. Are 46 battalions with approximate strength of 65,000 troops adequate to perform the dual task of guarding over 1,643 km of border passing through extremely difficult terrain, besides managing anti-insurgency operations across three of the seven northeastern states of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram? Needless to say that the lack of troops leads to dilution of operational efficiency.
Another problem common to all Central Armed Forces (CAF) relates to leadership. Like the other CAFs (BSF, CRPF, ITBP, SSB), in Assam Rifles too, the connection between leaders and troops is lacking. Only difference being that the other CAFs have IPS at the helm of affairs whereas the Assam Rifles has Army officers in command with the cadre officers being relegated to sundry staff assignments.
What is further confounding is the fact that the responsibility for the ambush has been taken by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and little known Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF). The PLA isn’t normally known to operate in this area. Moreover, a Naga group claiming responsibility may be indicative of prolonged impasse in resolving the vexed Naga issue.
The timing of the attack is also concerning. Is it an attempt by China to revive the northeast insurgency in view of the border problems that India is currently facing at the LAC? Does it have any connection with the upcoming elections and the desire of the Naga insurgents to underline their presence and put pressure on the government to bring back focus on their demands for greater Nagalim?
The strategic community and policy makers have to analyse all these factors and devise a strategy to tackle the problem.
Sanjiv Krishnan Sood @sood_2 is a retired additional director general of Border Security Force. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)