The path toward normalising India-China relations will be long and obstacle-ridden. From an Indian perspective, the journey has to contend with China’s motivations for its aggressive actions. New Delhi would be better off viewing Beijing’s motivations as rooted in India’s role in the geopolitical churn that’s underway between China and the US-led West.
India-China relations have ostensibly entered a healthier phase after crucial announcements on 21 October. Both parties reached an understanding on the resolution of outstanding issues relating to Depsang and Demchok in Ladakh. By 30 October, disengagement and verification were supposedly completed. The 21 October agreement was followed by a bilateral meeting at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit in Russia’s Kazan, held between 22 and 24 October. This was significant because the countries’ top leadership hadn’t met in five years.
A perusal of the Indian and Chinese readouts indicates that the mutual desire to stabilise relations has been on a turbulent path since 2020. The Chinese readout, for one, states: “Development is currently the ‘greatest common denominator’ between China and India”. This indicates expectations of economic policy modifications from India, particularly with regard to trade and investment measures imposed post-Galwan. It is perhaps also a reflection of the troubles being faced by the Chinese economy. India’s challenge lies in dealing with the political and security dimensions of Chinese investments while managing its economic and commercial considerations.
Divergences are also evident in the readouts on multipolarity in the international order. For India, multipolarity in Asia must accompany multipolarity on a global scale. China, on the other hand, envisions an Asian order dominated by it. This difference is likely to endure.
How China views India
In essence, China perhaps sees India as a potential spoiler in the larger geopolitical churn. Containing New Delhi within the sub-continent has been Beijing’s strategic choice. It has, for long, been attempting to increase its influence in India’s neighbourhood. In addition, China has, for over a decade, leveraged its vast border with India as a pressure point in order to force the latter to expend and divert its political and military resources. Such a diversion is meant to slow down India’s growth and ability to strengthen its maritime power. The maritime domain of the Indian Ocean is one strategic space where India enjoys a geographic advantage due to its peninsular structure – international trade routes run through it, and China depends on these routes for trade and commerce.
India jumped into Quad waters after Galwan even though it wasn’t too enthusiastic earlier. This change in stance was not in China’s interest. India also proceeded to deepen its relations with the United States, which resulted in a number of steps to strengthen the country’s maritime and intelligence capabilities. This has been a net loss for China’s geopolitical power play.
Depending on the context of the issue, India now sits in the maritime tent with the US and its allies but has kept away from being part of the US-led camp. India continues to be part of BRICS and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and has maintained close relations with Russia. Improving ties with China from the level they reached post-2020 would help restore the current skewed balance in the country’s multi-alignment posture toward Washington and Beijing. For sure, such a political position is a tightrope walk shaped by India’s embrace of strategic autonomy.
Also read: China benefits from US involvement in Ukraine & Gaza. India must tread carefully
China can always be aggressive
On the northern borders, China has created a tricky situation. It has the wherewithal to use military force in many places and carry out actions that India describes as ‘salami slicing’. These existing threats will likely remain as they are part of China’s strategy toward dealing with India in its larger global power play with the US. Sure, disengagement and agreements on patrolling could stabilise military tensions on the border. However, Beijing has the potential to carry out aggressive actions whenever it wants to influence India’s posture in the larger geopolitical tensions.
The scale and scope of infrastructure and deployment of military forces, and the wherewithal created by China on the Tibetan plateau, are likely to remain as well. So agreements, or any understanding reached in the tactical realm on matters of patrolling, grazing or management of buffer zones, do not take away the larger threat. The Indian military, no matter what the change in political relations is, has no choice but to make such preparations and deploy forces that could deal with China’s aggressive moves. There will be talk about rebuilding trust. But when this trust is connected to geopolitical forces that India may not have much control over, the military’s threat imagination must not depend on China’s goodwill.
It is time that India’s political leaders realised one thing: If the country wants to defend its northern borders and emerge as a maritime power, it requires a major increase in the defence budget along with further improvements in research and development and production and acquisition systems. Atmanirbharta is a lofty goal that must also cater to the urgency of circumstances. The defence budget in particular has remained more or less static despite burgeoning threats. The increase has to be a substantial one depending on how much the system can absorb. And it’s more a compulsion than a choice.
Notwithstanding the agreements and understandings that are likely to be reached with China, the political leadership must not get carried away and slacken their interests to provide military resources. The thrust toward cooperation with the US and its allies, especially in the maritime domain, must be continuously strengthened. The military leadership on the other hand must work jointly to figure out priorities and evolve strategies and operational innovations. The long-delayed creation of Integrated Theatre Commands could certainly help decide priorities – especially with regard to resource allotment in the context of balancing continental and maritime power.
China would have its own reasons for reaching an understanding about Depsang and Demchok. But it will continue using the northern border as a pressure point. And this strategic reality should guide our political leadership and defence planners.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)