There is a tech-driven verve in India that is unmistakably strategic. It is driven by the need to be an indistinguishable competitor, if not a leader, in a set of defined marketplaces. The country plays a crucial role in various domains. These include the storage, management and movement of data; the creation of a semiconductor ecosystem; striking deep and far-reaching technology partnerships with like-minded states and transnational jurisdictions; co-developing cutting-edge military platforms; and creating new grammar and architecture for the right kind of digital transformations across the world. India is at the heart of a set of debates and actions that, if exercised with a continuing commitment to imagination and resources, can set the path for a geo-digital age that is unparalleled in the history of this outsized democracy.
It could, in turn, provide an alternative logic and pathway for digital change in emerging economies and beyond and serve as a distinct location for global supply chains. India’s drive toward its geo-digital age places the philosophy of Vishwamitra at the heart of strategic practice.
Clearly, we are more than optimistic about India’s current quest for digital transformation.
What drives India’s tech transformation?
In August, the Indian parliament passed The Digital Personal Data Protection Bill, 2023 (DPDPB). Endless debates around data localisation finally came to a close. Personal data is not to be localised, nor is the cross-border movement of data across jurisdictions to be a natural right. Who India shares personal data with can be decided, in time, upon a set of notifications. There are, no doubt, parts of the law that will require evolution and change, but, at last, India has a legal framework for the treatment of personal data.
The next step is the creation of a Data Protection Board. The rules and regulations that shape the creation of this new institution are currently being authored. For companies, both within India and outside it, the existence of a law provides a degree of predictability in making large bets that require certainty. It also ends a process of argument and law-making that started as far back as 2017. It will be followed by a set of further legislative actions. In total, these foundational laws set the basis for a more transparent digital change and rule-making.
Days after India passed the DPDPB, a ground-breaking multilateral initiative came to life. Digital ministers from the G20 member states met in Bengaluru on 19 August. They were taking part in the fourth and last meeting of the Digital Economy Working Group (DEWG). An outcome document published that evening laid out the first globally agreed language on Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), a term that was known to a few only a year earlier. In another G20 platform, known as the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI), a consensus was reached on best practices and formulations for DPI deployment.
To be clear, in the first quarter of this calendar year, almost no G20 member states were ready to acknowledge the import of DPI. Diplomacy, persuasion, leadership, and the sheer value of what DPI could do for inclusion transformed the minds and hearts of those negotiators who, only a few months earlier, had little interest in DPI. Even China signed.
A suggested framework for building DPIs has been agreed to. It was highlighted in the G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration in September. In November, at the G20 Virtual Summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the creation of a Social Impact Fund designed to “advance Digital Public Infrastructure in the Global South.” India also announced an initial contribution of $25 million to the fund. The institutional home of this fund is currently being detailed. It has every potential to serve as the most striking institutional outcome of India’s G20 Presidency.
As the negotiators on and for the G20 worked toward a staggering 205 action points that require pursuance, the small but punchy team in India’s Semiconductor Mission (ISM) remained focused on building a new ecosystem. They are located in the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY). They work in tandem with colleagues in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). In September 2023, Micron – a leading American semiconductor manufacturer – broke ground in Sanand, Gujarat. They are currently building an assembly, testing, and packaging facility. All eyes are on Micron. If this works, there is every potential to attract more American, Korean, and Japanese firms to build out an ecosystem that few thought possible only a year ago.
To be sure, the efforts around Micron are directly connected to a one-of-its-kind techno-diplomatic framework built between India and the United States, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET). An iCET framework was announced following a meeting of National Security Advisors (NSAs) in India and the US at the end of January. This was detailed in a joint statement during PM Modi’s state visit to the US in June of this year. In short, the iCET is a political framework for action in different domains of critical and emerging technologies.
Apart from semiconductors, which remain an area of deep and constant monitoring, the momentum on iCET is most palpable in deepening US-India defence ties. General Electric (GE) Aerospace and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) have agreed to co-manufacture jet engines in India. This agreement involves significant technology transfer. The two governments worked closely to clear regulatory hurdles to make this deal move from paper to practice. On the last day of August, the US Congress cleared the way for this unique and pioneering partnership to commence.
To be sure, both governments have worked hard to unbundle the difficult issue of export controls, providing greater clarity to Indian start-ups, MSMEs and larger industries of how they can access technologies available only in the US.
This is an ongoing process and part and parcel of an iCET-inspired marketplace that encourages deep collaboration and co-innovation. These areas include quantum computing and potentially dealing with the advancements in artificial intelligence. This is the first time that the Indian National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) has led a technology partnership such as this. It is, possibly, only the beginning of a new era of bespoke partnerships. The United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea – as we understand, are knocking on India’s doors for similar arrangements, keeping their niche technologies in mind. Indeed, the European Union-India Trade and Technology Council (EU-India TTC) is another such novel innovation. Following a high-level meeting of ministers on both sides in May 2023, three working groups were established to deepen public and private sector relationships in technology more broadly. The EU has a similar arrangement with only the US. There is no reason why, in some sectors, the two sets of TTCs cannot come together.
All this while, India’s negotiators in Geneva and elsewhere have made bold strides in space diplomacy. In June, India signed the Artemis Accords, becoming the 27th country to do so. The Artemis Accords provide guidelines for “sustainable civil space exploration.” Many were shocked at this development. For years, India resisted signing these Accords, should they affect India’s space policy and explorations. In the end, the government clearly took the call that partnering in space is prudent policy, and it does not, in fact, take away from sovereign choices it may need to make in outer space. Neither Russia nor China are part of this agreement. There is every chance that India will be a part of a small coalition of states co-building the next international space station.
In short, from data to space and from technology partnerships to setting the framework to build DPIs in emerging economies and beyond, there is little doubt that India, in recent years, has created the footprint for a coming geo-digital age. While the section above may appear like a litany of announcements and outcomes, it is worth reflecting on the enormity of parallel actions that are underway at a time of stark geopolitical uncertainty and increasing fragmentation. To make the best of this momentum, we offer the following suggestions.
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Looking ahead
We make two sets of suggestions below. The first is substantive, in that we make specific recommendations about what more India can do in and with DPI and AI. The second is about offering options to think afresh about administrative arrangements that can support, maximise, and take forward India’s geo-digital age.
First, while the Indian government has announced the creation of a “Social Impact Fund” for DPI deployment in developing countries, there is an equal need and opportunity to create a truly Global DPI Institute that is India-led. This needs urgent brainstorming and action. It could be created as a multistakeholder institution that has the potential to be turned into a multilateral institution based in India.
Second, there is a need to consider India’s approach to AI more carefully. From the question of needing computing to creating guardrails for the safe use of AI, there is a need for a strategy. There is, potentially, also space for a unique approach. An Indian way in AI is not impossible to imagine. India will chair the Global Partnership in Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) summit in the second week of December. India is one of four developing countries that are a part of the 29-member initiative that was started in 2020. The Indian convening authority has been remarkable in running stakeholder brainstorming sessions with hundreds of actors around the world. This kind of outreach is rare. The GPAI is the right place to begin to socialise an Indian take on AI. For this to happen, India needs to develop at least the light footprint of such an approach with urgency and purpose.
Lastly, as this essay makes clear, there are many different moving parts with regard to India’s geo-digital age. There is an urgent need for intra-ministerial coordination. With limited capacity, the NSCS, MEA and MEITY have punched way above their weight class. Yet, there is a need for a capacity surge if India is indeed to make the most of the drivers for change and action that has unfolded in the last few years. In all likelihood, there will be many more iCET-like structures in the offing.
The global DPI journey is in an early stage of advancement. This will escalate into a multi-vector advance, including the need for technical solutions, diplomacy, and new kinds of partnerships with the private sector. Many countries have dedicated considerable resources to the office of a Special Envoy for Critical and Emerging Technology or some such conceptualisation. Others have brought in experts from the private sector to serve for three to four years in government. India needs to do the same. Clearly, there is a political vision for such a surge. The government’s bid to create lateral entrees into the civil service is a start. There is a need to take this many steps forward, and create the capacity that is required to make the best of this time in the geopolitics of technology.
Rudra Chaudhuri is Director, Carnegie India. Shatakratu Sahu and Upasana Sharma are Research Analysts at Carnegie India. Together, they convene the Global Technology Summit, co-hosted by Carnegie India and the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.