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HomeOpinionIndian Liberals MatterCan the state take your property in the name of equality? This...

Can the state take your property in the name of equality? This 1971 essay had an answer

Confiscation of lawfully acquired properties and efficiently conducted concerns is certainly not the way to reduce economic disparities, wrote VM Tarkunde in 1971.

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It is doubtful whether Justice Hidayatullah, as he was then, was justified in the view expressed by him in his judgment in the famous Golaknath case that it was an “error” on the part of our Constitution-makers to place the right of property in the category of fundamental rights. He was, however, undoubtedly justified in his further observation that, of all the fundamental rights, the right to property is the weakest.

Both liberty and property are basic concepts in the law of all countries. An essential element in the right to property is the right of its owner to prevent other persons from using it without his consent. This element operates in the case of public as well as private property. Railways in India are public property, but this does not enable a member of the public to use the railway without purchasing a ticket. Like any individual, the state also restricts the use of the property it owns.

In defence of the fundamental nature of the individual right to property, some liberal thinkers have advanced the view that property in material objects magnifies an individual’s “sense of self” and is in essence “an extension and definition of personality”. The validity of this view, however, appears to be confined to a particular stage of social development and a particular type of social organisation. A man with an insignificant amount of property may have a much bigger personality and a keener sense of self than another possessed of abundant wealth.

A more realistic, and therefore more readily acceptable, argument in support of property as a fundamental right is provided by the fact that some amount of private property is essential if an individual is to enjoy some of the other rights which are undoubtedly fundamental. Even the basic right to live cannot be enjoyed in the absence of food, clothing and shelter, nor can the freedom to move about freely be enjoyed by a person who does not have the wherewithal to do so.

Property as a fundamental right has been subjected to a persistent attack from various quarters in our country on the plea that it comes in the way of progressive legislation aimed at social justice. It is mainly on this ground that a demand for amending the Constitution is voiced in the election manifestos. Before judging the justification of this demand, one must be aware of the limitations on the fundamental right to property which were either initially provided in the Constitution or were subsequently introduced by constitutional amendments, prior to the decision of the Golaknath case which put a step to further abridgement of fundamental rights within the framework of the Constitution.

In the Constitution as it was promulgated, property as a fundamental right was guaranteed by two provisions—article 19(1)(f) which recognised the right of every citizen “to acquire, hold and dispose of property” and article 31(2) which laid down that no property shall be taken possession of or acquired except for a public purpose and without providing compensation. The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property recognised by Article 19(1)(f) was, however, subject, under clause (5) of Article 19, to a limitation which enabled the legislature to impose “reasonable restrictions” on the exercise of that right “either in the interest of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe”.

Very far-reaching constitutional amendments in respect of all property rights were brought about by amending Article 31(2) and more particularly by introducing two additional articles—31A and 31B. The amendment in Article 31(2) retained the provision that no property shall be acquired by any law except for a public purpose and without providing for compensation, but added a clause that such a law shall not be called in question in any court on the ground “that the compensation provided by the law is not adequate”. This amendment led to endless difficulties in judicial interpretation. Prior to the amendment, the Supreme Court had already held in a series of decisions that “compensation” meant a “just return” for the property to be acquired.

Far more effective limitations on property rights were imposed by articles 31A and 31B. Article 31A (in its final form) lays down that laws on a variety of property rights will be incapable of being challenged on the ground that they violate the fundamental rights conferred by articles 14, 19 and 31. Article 31B goes even further. It provides for a separate Schedule (the Ninth Schedule) to the Constitution and lays down that none of the Acts and Regulations included in that Schedule will be capable of being challenged on the ground of violation of any of the fundamental rights. ,Thirteen Acts and Regulations were included in the Ninth Schedule by the First Constitutional Amendment, eight more Acts and Regulations by the Fourth Constitutional Amendment, and as many as forty-four more Acts and Regulations by the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment.

It will thus be seen that under the Constitution as it stands today, the fundamental rights to property have been subjected to very severe limitations. Broadly speaking, these limitations are of two types. In the first place, laws can be passed and have been passed to regulate the use of property, the prices and distribution of commodities, and the commencement and conduct of industrial undertakings. Laws regulating the rents of properties, the prices and allocation of goods, the starting of industrial undertakings and the manner of running them, the wages of workmen and the other conditions of their work, and several other types of measures, fall in this category. Secondly, laws have been passed and can be passed for the acquisition or modification of interests in agricultural lands, for taking up the temporary management of properties, for abolishing or modifying the rights of company managers and shareholders,—in each case by providing such compensation as the legislature thinks fit to award or without providing any compensation whatever.

Taking the sweep of these limitations on property rights into consideration, it would be probably right to say that, broadly speaking, while the use of properties and the starting and running of industries can be fully controlled in the public interest, and while properties of many types can also be acquired by the state or transferred from one class of persons to another. There are two types of properties which cannot be acquired by the state without providing a fair amount of compensation. These consist of (a) urban properties and (b) undertakings which are being run in an efficient manner.

The question then is: Is it necessary in the public interest to further restrict the fundamental rights to property so as to enable the state to acquire urban properties and efficiently conducted undertakings without giving a fair amount of compensation? Those who are committed to a mixed economy consisting of both a public and a private sector must, we think, answer this question in the negative. We cannot expect the private sector to grow and to play its proper role in a mixed economy if we lay down that property which is lawfully acquired, or an undertaking which is efficiently run, can be taken over by the state without paying a fair amount of compensation. Nor is such a constitutional amendment necessary for ensuring social justice or for reducing economic inequalities.

Confiscation of lawfully acquired properties and efficiently conducted concerns is certainly not the way to reduce economic disparities. A more effective remedy, however, for bringing about a greater degree of economic equality is to devise and adopt a policy of full employment. In countries where the prevailing economy provides for full employment and where the demand for labour equals or exceeds the available supply, the disparities of earned incomes are automatically reduced.

What we have stated above about the extent of existing restrictions on fundamental property rights is not belied by the results of the Bank Nationalisation case and the rulers’ de-recognition case. The first Bank Nationalisation Act was a hurried measure. When the second Bank Nationalisation Act was passed after removing the defects of the first, it was not even challenged in any court. It was, in fact, noticed by knowledgeable people that if the compensation for the nationalisation of the banks had been fixed on the basis of a fair price of bank shares, instead of on the assumed value of bank properties, the amount payable by the exchequer would have been considerably less. As to the rulers’ case, the rights in dispute were the subject of constitutional guarantees which had been voluntarily given in pursuance of solemn agreements, and instead of trying to take them away by an executive fiat, the proper way was to reduce and eventually abolish those rights by negotiation. This course can be followed even now.

Fundamental rights constitute the main guarantee for the preservation of freedom and democracy in our country, and any attempt to tinker with those rights without a compelling necessity deserves to be deprecated.

This essay is part of a series from the Indian Liberals archive, a project of the Centre for Civil Society. This piece is excerpted from the booklet Forum of Free Enterprise, titled “Fundamental Right to Property”, published in May 1971. The original version can be accessed here.

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