On 30 January, the UK’s Financial Times reported that China is building the world’s largest military command centre in Beijing. Spanning 1,500 acres—at least 10 times the size of the Pentagon—the underground complex is designed to protect China’s military leadership, including President Xi Jinping, who also chairs the Central Military Commission, during conflicts, including nuclear war.
The command centre is in tune with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrine of subterranean warfare, which prioritises underground protection for vital command, operational, and logistical installations. It goes without saying that these installations will also be protected with anti aircraft, missile, drone, electronic warfare and cyber warfare shields.
The hostage-prisoner exchange following the 15 January ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas once again highlighted the advantages of subterranean warfare against a technologically superior adversary. Israel, with its unlimited supply of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and conventional munitions delivered by aircraft, missiles, drones and ground operations, could not destroy or defeat the Hamas fighting from its network of underground tunnels. In footage from the exchanges, substantial number of Hamas fighters dressed in immaculate battle gear were seen orchestrating (for propaganda purposes) the handover of small groups of hostages to the international Red Cross.
Defence analysts have assessed that from October 2023 to October 2024, Israel dropped 85,000 tonnes of bombs on Gaza. More than the combined explosive power of the two atomic bombs – 36-kilo tonne – dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the devastating bombing of Dresden in World War II. Yet, as evident from videos, a large number of Hamas fighters not only survived but also managed to keep most hostages alive within Gaza’s vast subterranean tunnel network. I predicted this outcome in my article dated 2 November 2023.
The Indian Army should adopt subterranean (underground) warfare in mountainous and high-altitude terrain to neutralise the PLA’s overwhelming superiority in aircraft, missile and drone-delivered PGMs.
PGMs dominate the transparent battlefield
Over the past 25 years, battlefield has become increasingly transparent. Satellite, aircraft, drone, and radar-based surveillance and reconnaissance, combined with electromagnetic and cyber interception, can pinpoint all targets on the battlefield. These targets are then hit with over 90 per cent accuracy by air – and ground-based PGMs. In addition, electronic and cyber jamming neutralises the command and control systems, fire control means, and guided munitions. The US has successfully used strategic drone warfare to locate and target adversary and terrorist leaderships in Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Syria.
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the Israel-Hamas/Hezbollah/Iran conflicts are a good example of the modern technological battlefield. However, the issue is relative, as active and passive countermeasures are available to counter the various threats.
Advanced militaries, such as those of the US and Israel, rely predominantly on anti aircraft, missile and drone defence, as well as anti-electronic and cyber warfare shields, in combination with passive measures. In contrast, relatively weaker militaries and non-state actors use subterranean protection, dispersion, and mobility alongside their limited active defence measures. Ukraine is a good example of this approach, while Hamas is the best example of complete reliance on subterranean protection.
Despite China rapidly advancing its active countermeasures to rival those of the US, it continues to utilise subterranean protection as a force multiplier—similar to weaker forces but on a far larger strategic scale.
Also read: China’s strategy is working—India’s neighbours are drifting away
A case for adoption of subterranean warfare
The military differential between India and China is predominantly in the domains of electronic and cyber warfare, and in the quality and quantity of aircraft and ground-launched PGMs. While nuclear weapons safeguard India from a decisive defeat or substantial loss of territory, in a limited war or in operations below this threshold, such a differential can prove to be decisive.
Standoff aircraft or ground-launched PGMs and drone strikes, as well as electronic and cyber attacks can be utilised to destroy our defences, along with command and control and logistics installations, without the adversary having to resort to physical attacks. Currently, India’s anti- aircraft/missile/drone and electronic/cyber warfare retaliatory capacity against standoff attacks, in terms of both quantity and quality, is at least a decade behind China.
Our mountainous and high-altitude area defences are designed to withstand the suppressive fire from small arms and non-PGM artillery and air attacks. The effectiveness of unguided firepower is further reduced due to reverse slope defences, problems of crest clearance, and ever-changing meteorological data. A company defended locality has approximately 50 bunkers. In the Kargil War, 5,000 to 10,000 rounds of artillery were used for one company defended locality along with some first generation aircraft delivered PGMs. Yet in almost all cases, the enemy survived to fight at close quarters. Defences in mountains and high-altitude areas on dominating heights can withstand conventional firepower, and the defender has a distinct advantage over the attacker, who is exposed and forced to attack uphill in a rarefied atmosphere.
Each bunker or pillbox is a dug out four to five feet deep with RCC walls or reinforced with steel sheets, with loopholes for firing about one foot above the ground. The roof is either made using RCC or troughed steel sheets supported by metal girders, or wood poles. Three feet of earth is then piled up on top to absorb the blast effect. The design of these defences, which stand out like sore thumbs on hill tops devoid of tree cover or vegetation, has largely remained unchanged for over a century.
The PLA will neutralise the ‘predominance of the defence’ in high-altitude terrain by not getting involved in “close combat” over unfavourable terrain. Classic close combat is passé. Its pattern of attack will be driven by the overwhelming use of PGMs, drones, and cyber/electronic warfare. Once the defences are destroyed, close combat will only be in the nature of mopping up. Standalone destruction of posts and logistical installations may also be undertaken as punitive measures without resorting to physical attacks. Headquarters and logistics installations in the open are also sitting ducks for PGMs.
The only way to protect permanent defences and installations is to adopt subterranean warfare or in simpler words tunnel warfare.
Also read: After thaw in ties, key questions facing India-China relations in 2025
What needs to be done?
The Indian Army does not have any formal doctrine or experience of subterranean warfare. Interestingly, the US Army has a doctrine. However, there is a wealth of empirical wisdom in and even actual systems at old battlefields. Friendly countries like Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan have a rich experience in tunnel warfare. The tunnels in Gaza have been well documented and also the experience of defence against PGMS/drones in Ukraine. India’s Border Road Organisation (BRO) also has extensive experience of construction of tunnels. Mountainous and high-altitude terrain is tailor-made for subterranean warfare as it enables both vertical and lateral entry.
The Army should promptly conduct a comprehensive study to exploit subterranean warfare. The study team should produce a manual for designing and construction of subterranean defences and also one for “How to fight”. Extensive training will be required in battle schools with realistic models. The Indian Army’s Corps of Engineers and the BRO should be made responsible for the actual construction. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) posts should also be based on subterranean defences. These can be exploited by forward elements of the Army during the war.
The cost of the Gaza tunnels is estimated to be up to $1 billion or approximately Rs 8,700 crore. In my view, in this budget all our defences and operational and logistics installations in Eastern Ladakh can become subterranean. A similar project for the Northeast will cost twice as much. The cost of PGMs is very high and the cost of creating an anti aircraft/missile/drone shield is even higher. Considering that India paid $ 5.5 billion for five regiments (40 launchers) of S 400 anti aircraft/missile/drone system, creation of subterranean defences for the northern borders would be a very cost-effective project. In due course, the project can be replicated for the Line of Control defences and for permanent defences in the plains too.
Since the history of warfare, the subterranean domain has been exploited to neutralise asymmetry in resources and technology. The Indian Army will ignore it at its own peril.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)
Great wisdom General!
But why did you not do that yourself when you were serving in the Army?
Such flashes of brilliance and deep insights count for little once you have retired.
Good article. China revolutionized the use of tunnel warfare when fighting the Japanese and again during their civil war. The Vietnamese and Koreans and Iranians learned from China and Hamas learned from North Korea and Iran.