Creation of the Indian military’s Integrated Theatre Commands is in danger of becoming a classic case of reform by endless consultation. Nearly seven years after the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), whose mandate included establishing Theatre Commands, the three services are still debating their structure.
In May, General Anil Chauhan, the former CDS, had completed the military deliberations and submitted the proposal for three Theatre Commands—western, northern and maritime—to the Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh, duly endorsed by the three Service Chiefs. Yet, the fundamental reservations of the Indian Air Force (IAF) persist.
In his interview to PTI on 25 October, six days before his retirement, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal AP Singh reiterated that “We are not viewing theaterisation as an exercise to permanently divide fighter assets geographically. The IAF is fully committed to jointness and integration.”
He advocated “centralised control where necessary and decentralised execution where appropriate,” citing the flexibility of air power and the lessons of Operation Sindoor. His position is not new. The IAF has consistently and rightly argued that its limited combat resources must remain available for concentration across multiple fronts rather than being permanently tied down to individual geographical theatres.
The IAF’s concerns are valid and can be addressed through a flexible integrated command structure. But they must not become a veto over national military transformation. After seven years of deliberations, it is time for the government to impose its will, resolve the differences, approve a workable framework, and kick-start execution with pragmatic timelines.
IAF’s case
The IAF’s strongest argument is based on the unique characteristics of air power. Unlike land formations and relatively slow-moving naval ships, aircraft are not confined to the geographical area in which they are based. Their speed, reach, aerial refuelling capability and long-range weapons allow them to be employed across theatres. Limited resources of force multipliers like airborne early-warning aircraft, aerial refuellers, strategic transport aircraft and specialised electronic warfare platforms are even more difficult to allocate permanently.
The problem is compounded by the IAF’s depleted combat strength. With approximately 29 fighter squadrons against an authorised strength of 42.5, permanently dividing its already inadequate inventory among three Theatre Commands could result in suboptimal force packages. In a two-front contingency, this could compromise air power at the decisive point.
There is also a doctrinal concern. The IAF’s principle of centralised control and decentralised execution is intended to ensure that air power is employed as an integrated resource rather than dissipated through piecemeal support to ground formations. Air power has an independent role in strategic air campaigns, counter-air operations and strategic interdiction, which may extend across all theatres. It cannot be reduced to counter-surface force operations, air-land operations and maritime air operations in support of the Army and the Navy alone.
These are legitimate professional arguments. Indeed, I had defended the IAF’s position in my 2021 article, arguing that it would be wrong to perceive the Air Force merely as a supporting arm of the Army. Theaterisation must recognise the independent strategic role of air power, which may encompass all theatres.
However, the argument that theaterisation necessarily entails permanent geographical division of air assets does not withstand professional scrutiny. Allocation is not the same as permanent division. Aircraft can remain at their existing bases, under IAF administrative and technical control, while being assigned operationally to Theatre Commands. Their allocation can be reviewed and modified according to the changing operational situation. This principle also applies to all other resources, subject to constraints of time and space.
It defies empirical wisdom and professional comprehension as to how the idea of permanent allocation of resources to geographic ITCs came to be bandied about. How can the preeminent principles of war of concentration and economy of forces can be violated? Given the real-time availability of strategic and operational information, there is no reason why a flexible command-and-control system cannot be evolved to ensure the optimum utilisation of critical resources across the ITCs. The only constraint is time and space, determined by mobility and flexibility of the assets. The IAF suffers from no handicap in this regard.
Time-tested solution
In any system of integration, there is no permanent geographical or command division of critical resources. There is always a political authority and a military apex headquarters (HQ) through which missions are assigned and resources allocated or reallocated.
In the US, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under a Chairman who is first among equals by appointment, allocate resources and carry out inter-theatre coordination in the form of a Unified Command Plan, which is approved by the President. Joint Chiefs of Staff have no operational role and do not exercise command over ITC, which rests with the political authority—President/Secretary of War.
In India, we have the Chiefs of Staff Committee with the CDS as the permanent chairman. As part of the establishment of the ITCs, a Joint HQ would have to be established with the merger of the operations directorate of the three services, which would probably become part of Integrated Defence Staff. This Joint HQ will carry out strategic planning, assign missions, allocate/reallocate resources to the ITCs, and carry out inter-ITC coordination. Surprisingly, there has been little or no discussion on this critical issue, which I had flagged in 2023. Two days ago, Lt Gen Dushyant Singh(Retd), Director General of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, has highlighted this imperative.
The three geographical Theatre Commands will have operational authority over the forces assigned to them. Each will have an Air Component Commander, a three-star IAF officer responsible for planning and executing air operations. The component commander will advise the theatre commander on the employment of air power and ensure that air operations are integrated with the joint campaign plan. The same arrangement will apply to naval and Army resources.
The IAF should retain responsibility for raising, equipping, training, maintaining and sustaining its aircraft and personnel. Its professional expertise, technical standards and operational doctrines must not be diluted. However, the operational employment of forces assigned to a theatre must rest with the theatre commander. Otherwise, the latter would be little more than a coordinator, dependent on negotiations with individual Service Headquarters for every operational requirement.
The distinction between operational control and administrative and technical control must be clearly laid down. The theatre commander should determine operational priorities, while professional air commanders retain responsibility for the technical and tactical execution of air missions. In effect, the IAF would not surrender its professional identity or strategic role. It would become an integral part of a joint operational command structure.
Operation Sindoor itself offers an important lesson. Air Chief Marshal AP Singh has acknowledged that centralised allocation and timely reallocation of critical resources under the joint architecture helped achieve operational objectives. This is precisely the flexibility that a properly designed Theatre Command system must institutionalise rather than leave it dependent on personal coordination between Service Chiefs.
The government must impose its will
The larger problem, however, is not the IAF’s position. It is the status quo nature of the armed forces and the government’s failure to resolve the differences between the services and impose its will.
I had argued in my 2021 article that a major restructuring of the military like raising of the Integrated Theatre Commands cannot be left to the military to resolve through consensus. It is the government’s responsibility. The government is the ultimate authority and must provide political direction, settle inter-service differences, and ensure implementation. The experience of the last seven years has vindicated that argument.
The CDS was created to promote jointness and facilitate theaterisation. But he does not exercise operational command over the three Service Chiefs. He is expected to build consensus among three powerful institutional heads, each with distinct operational doctrines, organisational interests and resource priorities. The CDS has responsibility without commensurate authority to impose a settlement.
Admiral Arun Prakash, in his recent article, has rightly highlighted that the US went through the Key West Agreement in 1948 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to politically settle the issue.
The lesson is not that India should replicate the American system. It is that professional disagreements must ultimately be settled by the political leadership. The government cannot remain a passive spectator while the services negotiate indefinitely.
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The way forward
Tri-service integration is part of the overall transformation of the military, which must be owned, approved, funded, and monitored by the government. The government must formalise the national security vision and strategy on which the national defense policy for transformation is contingent.
As part of the above, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) must approve the broad framework of the ITCs and issue a formal political directive to the Ministry of Defence and the CDS. The directive should lay down the objectives, command relationships and implementation timelines. Command and control from political authority to Theater Commanders must be clearly spelt out. It can be direct or through the Chiefs of Staff Committee/Joint HQ. The government must make it clear that theaterisation is a national decision, not an option subject to the continuing concurrence of individual services.
The Defence Minister should head an empowered steering committee comprising the CDS, the three Service Chiefs, the National Security Adviser and the Defence Secretary. Its mandate should be to settle the outstanding issues relating to command authority, allocation of resources, strategic assets and service responsibilities. It should not become another forum for reopening settled questions.
The CDS must be made accountable for implementation. He should be empowered to translate the government’s decision into an organisational and operational framework, develop joint doctrine and ensure compliance by the services. The three Service Chiefs must retain their responsibilities for force generation, but the operational chain of command must be unambiguous.
Implementation must be monitored through measurable milestones and periodic audits, with parliamentary oversight. The objective should not merely be to establish new headquarters but to integrate operational planning, intelligence, communications, logistics, training and force employment.
Theaterisation should be implemented in phases without compromising operational readiness. As I had suggested in my 2023 article, the new command structure should initially be superimposed on the existing one for a transitional period of four to five years. ITCs can progressively assume operational responsibilities while the existing single-service commands continue to perform their administrative, technical and force-generation functions.
This would provide the time to develop joint doctrine, integrate communications and intelligence networks, train officers for joint appointments and test the command arrangements through exercises. The existing 17 single-service commands can then be progressively reorganised or absorbed.
Theaterisation is not an organisational exercise or a redistribution of service turf. It is about how India will fight its future wars. Modern conflicts are increasingly joint, multi-domain and technology-intensive. The speed of decision-making and the ability to concentrate capabilities across domains will increasingly determine operational outcomes. The existing structure of 17 geographically dispersed single-service commands is ill-suited to this requirement.
Seven years of endless deliberations are enough. The armed forces have done their part. The broad proposal is before the government. It is now for political leadership to decide, direct, and monitor implementation. The next security crisis will not wait for the three services to settle their differences. Neither should India’s military transformation.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post-retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)