The smooth and efficient functioning of the military organisation is to a great extent determined by the state of relationships between commanders in the chain of command. Fairly often, the dynamics of relationships transpires in an ambience that is often fraught with uncertainty, ambiguity, danger and fear. However, when combined with institutionalised and professional civil-military relations, military effectiveness gets maximised. The institution of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and creation of the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in December 2019 were clearly designed to enhance military effectiveness. The mandate assigned to create the Theatre Command system was a recognition of the need to change the prevailing structures so as to strengthen jointness among the three Services and improve civil-military relations.
The structures that are put in place have to prioritise the imperatives that can meet the demands placed on the system during wars. The system must be able to quickly transition from No War No Peace (NWNP), which has been for long the prevailing norm, to higher levels of limited war that could be in different forms and of varying intensities. It is in this context that the ability of the CDS, who has been assigned diverse roles, requires examination by posing the question – can the CDS perform the assigned roles effectively, when India is at war?
A burdened CDS?
For all purposes, the highest level of war can be envisaged as a prolonged one fought under the nuclear overhang. As per new assignment of roles, the CDS is the Permanent Chairman of the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC), the Principal Adviser to the Defence minister on all matters related to tri-Services, Military Advisor to the Nuclear Command Authority and is the head the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). To expect the CDS to perform effectively in all these roles, during a situation of a prolonged war, seems too much of an ask.
It is learnt through some people who know that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) note that led to the approval of the creation of the posts of the CDS and the DMA had specified that the CDS would not have an operational role. This is questionable when he performs the role of the Permanent Chairman of the COSC that would perhaps have to be renamed as the Joint Commanders Staff Committee (JCSC) as it is the highest military mechanism which in the Theatre Command System has to include the CDS as Permanent Chairman, the Chiefs of the three Services and the Theatre Commanders.
At the highest level, the JCSC evolves military strategy and oversees joint military planning and execution which involves issue of operational directives along with the allocation of resources between theatres and monitoring while making adjustments to operational plans that are executed by Theatre Commanders. The operational role of the CJCSC as the highest military leader that directs operations in the pursuit of political objectives laid down by the political leadership. Therefore, while the CDS has no operational role while wearing the other three hats it cannot be the case as long as he is to be the CJCSC. The role is indirect as he is not in direct command and would be akin to the present role of the Chiefs of the three Services. A detailed examination of this issue can be viewed here.
In the Theatre Command System, the three Service Chiefs would not have operational responsibility but instead be primarily responsible for planning, training, human resources, administration, and Acquisition for their respective Services. The role of the Chiefs while being curtailed is still crucial in resolving Service specific issues. The Service Chiefs will have to exercise their functions through Service-specific structures. They should also have direct access to the Raksha Mantri.
During a war or NWNP, the CDS has to perform the advisory roles to the Defence Minister and the Nuclear Command Authority, be Secretary of DMA and lead the highest military mechanism, the JCSC. The demands of the advisory, strategy formulation and operational roles would require constant and continuous interaction with the political and military leadership. These roles in practical terms will be taxing for any individual as they involve multiple responsibilities that would call for the CDS to be in too many places at the same time. It is apparent that the CCS directions of the CDS not to have an operational role can only be met if he is not the CJCSC. There is then the need to have another person as CJCSC.
Presently, the COSC is constituted by the three Chiefs of four-star rank and the senior most Chief is the Chairman of the COSC. In the new system, since Theatre Commanders have to be part of JCSC, they must be of equivalent four-star rank. All Deputy Theatre Commanders and several Component Commanders will have to be of three-star rank and C-in-C status. This is also necessary when considering the fact that the Theatre Commanders could also have to operate with a host of three-star generals who would be Corps/Fleet/Operational Groups/Component Commanders.
There would also be integrated Commands that function under the directions of JCSC like the Integrated Logistics Command. In addition, there would be Service specific Commands that carry out training and logistics functions. Several of these Commands would be headed by three-star C-in-Cs.
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DMA role and the contention
When building military structures, it is imperative that preparations and conduct during the times of war remain the guiding principle. The efficiency and effectiveness of the military instrument is based on the ability of all levels in the chain of command being given roles that can be fulfilled in times of war/NWNP. Moreover, the CDS wearing the hat of Secretary DMA is a comedown in rank for a four star. Therefore, there is a case, preferably, for a serving/retired three-star C-in-C to be Secretary DMA. Once relieved of DMA duties, the CDS would then be able to perform his advisory and operational role as CJCSC better and there would not be a need for a separate CJCSC. Such a change is for the MoD to bring about.
One can expect resistance to the increase in the number of four-star ranks with the Theatre Commanders also having to be equivalent to the Chiefs. But if the PMO could override the resistance to the creation of the Theatre Command System that was long overdue, there is no reason that they will not see the importance of these military ranks in providing a viable base for jointness.
It has been three years since the political leadership approved the laudable defence reform and then came the tragic death of the first CDS and was followed by the delay in the appointment of his successor. The creation of the Theatre Command has been in the planning stage for three years. It is certainly a complex task that has to negotiate many obstacles in the form of turf battles.
Hopefully, in the of case of Theatre Commands, the political leadership would recognise the growing geopolitical tensions and exert its will to complete the task it has assigned to the MoD. A task, which if delayed and executed half-heartedly could well have a significant adverse impact on national security.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (retd) is Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Takshashila Institution; former military adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweets @prakashmenon51. Views are personal.
(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)