The commissioning of INS Arighaat, India’s second Indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine has bolstered spirits among defence analysts and given cause for celebration. It has been heralded by Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh as crucial for strategic balance in the region as well as strengthening deterrence – signaling a focus on China.
Conveying concern, China’s Global Times was quick to lecture India on the responsible use of such platforms. With reports of larger and more long-range armed (3,500 to 5,000 km) SSBNs expected to be commissioned in the coming years, analysts are pleased with the emerging growth trajectory of India’s sea leg of nuclear deterrence. However, it also sharpens the focus on unresolved questions regarding the state of India’s overall nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis China and the role of SSBNs within that framework.
Is India’s nuclear sea leg meant to bolster deterrence against China or is it aimed at projecting Indian naval capabilities to deter Chinese naval encroaches in the Indian Ocean Region? Or is it simply a signal that India is now part of the ‘big boys’ club? The acquisition of such niche capabilities should be complemented with a rigorous debate on their optimal uses, hidden risks, and associated costs.
India’s tryst with nuclear debates
Nuclear debates, after all, in the 1980s and 1990s prepared India to both ‘erupt’ as a nuclear power as well as navigate international repercussions with a well-articulated strategic rationale and a force posture/structure that conveyed responsibility and stability. In the years after the civil nuclear deal, a second round of debate helped India think through the knotty problem of Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail while also considering significant revisions to its nuclear posture in light of China’s rise. Statements by officials and political leaders after 2014 signalled some ambiguity in India’s minimalist doctrine, reflecting New India’s strategic assertiveness. At the same time, India’s deployment of nuclear-capable Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighters in Assam between 2009-2011 signaled to China in very material terms that it could not rule out India’s nuclear weapons during a conventional war. Such a posture complemented the then-ongoing shift in conventional doctrine from deterrence by denial to punishment.
However, a survey of published materials since 2020 indicates a definite shrinking of this debate – only reinforced by the absence of official calls for revision of the doctrine, which had been frequent from 2014 to 2019. While an explanation of the causes of this decline is beyond the scope of this column, it is easier to infer that a revival of the nuclear debate is necessary, owing to significant shifts in both bilateral relations with China and the international order. What is also worthy of note is the evolving Chinese nuclear thinking.
According to Larry Wortzel, former U.S. defence attaché in Beijing and an expert on the People’s Liberation Army, Chinese military writings “place a great emphasis on joint counter nuclear intimidation” during “informationized joint operations” in situations resembling a crisis with India. The purpose of such contingency planning is to “actively deter enemy nuclear deterrence and conduct the right level of reasonable and constrained counter-nuclear intimidation operations to thwart enemy nuclear blackmail”. Such exercises indicate that Chinese military leaders are determined to negate the deterrence effects of India’s nuclear arsenal.
This was on display to a minor extent in 2021, at a time when the People’s Republic of China arguably felt the most nervous about possible Indian adventurism at the LAC. According to journalist Aadil Brar, during a tense negotiation period in 2021, Chinese State media released two videos that had aspects of nuclear signalling. The videos “reference the military tensions at the border with India and include images of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) carrying out preparedness exercises of nuclear-capable missiles”.
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New field for nuclear debates
Recent developments, such as the ongoing construction of a submarine base (Project Varsha) in the Bay of Bengal, the future induction of K-5 longer-range missiles, advances in Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities of both India and China and increasing Chinese oceanographic research for submarine operations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and close to Bay of Bengal, necessitate careful consideration of future nuclear operational challenges and dilemmas – both within and outside the government. India’s development of the sea leg of its nuclear triad is likely to cause concern in Beijing. Whether this concern is a net positive or negative for India will depend entirely on how India tailors its growing capabilities with its overall nuclear and strategic doctrine.
The Indian nuclear debate, closely tied to the Bernard Brodie school of thought, never veered too deep into issues related to nuclear deterrence in the sub-surface dimension. Nuclear maxims of credible minimum deterrence work so elegantly in the land domain and suit Indian sensibilities, but they struggle to maintain relevance at sea. India’s strong emphasis on civilian control has led to a three-phase process for mating nuclear weapons with launch tubes and platforms, prioritising safe usage over operational readiness and survivability. This has arguably resulted in a growing gap in alertness or operational readiness between India and China over the years—a crucial factor in any meaningful crisis situation that further incentivises Chinese ‘counter-deterrence’ thinking.
Nuclear doctrine and sea-based deterrence
Instead of the sea leg propelling changes to this system, owing to the very nature of sea-based deterrence, India appears to have adopted the land-suited system of civilian control on its Sea Based Strategic Deterrence (SBSD) as well. Hence, India’s SSBNs are unlikely to operate like traditional SSBNs, which are ever ready to launch a nuclear missile from undetectable areas of operation in the open ocean. Instead, they are likely to adopt a ‘Bastion strategy’, similar to the Soviet approach during the Cold War, hovering near piers and awaiting weapon mating during the early stages of significant crisis or conflict. Such a posture negates the unique benefits an SSBN promises to a degree – an assured retaliatory strike due to its survivability to a first strike. This approach also requires India to achieve reliable sea control in the Bay of Bengal region, including strong ties with neighbouring States of Bangladesh and Myanmar to deny Chinese maritime influence and presence.
Growing anxieties about submarine warfare in the Indo-Pacific and India’s own foray into it (with a strong degree of cooperation with regional partners) necessitates analytical investments to think through the opportunities and risks inherent in this new field. Such debates, by touching upon both guiding doctrines as well as operational resiliency, are likely to assist decision-makers in preparing for a more dangerous world at sea.
Recent Chinese ‘over-reactions’ (in the form of the Galwan stand-off) to India’s force development in the conventional domain have indicated that it is not enough for India to assert the defensive intent undergirding some of its offensive-oriented capabilities when it comes to China. Delhi might hope that showcasing key assets will generate strategic dividends, but they may not. If anything, under-investments in these capabilities, done in a time-insensitive manner, could leave India even worse off. In that sense, India’s development of its SBSD is both a cause for celebration and a catalyst for strategic assessment.
As India seeks to turn the Bay of Bengal into a ‘bastion’ for its SSBNs, China is likely to increase its surveillance and targeting capabilities in the region. And it will do so while enhancing maritime relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar. As China seeks to exploit the US’ concern over the risk of nuclear escalation for strategic benefit, India must ensure that the common pursuit of non-escalation in the nuclear domain during a military crisis remains just that – a common pursuit.
Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New-Delhi-based Think Tank. He tweets @SRaimedhi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)