Wars can sometimes provide great clarity. A year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the shape of global politics for the coming decade or decades is clearer than ever before. What this reveals is a bipolar contest between the US and China with much of the West and the Indo-Pacific in Washington’s corner, and Russia and the Global South in Beijing’s. The Russia-Ukraine war itself has now become the arena of this contest and the results, irrespective of who wins, will only deepen this global conflict.
There’s no way that Russia can win this war because even in the unlikely event that its fortunes on the battlefield turn around, it will only spur greater Western support for Ukraine. Even the current Western restraint will fall away. On the other side of the equation, Russia-China bonds have become tighter and Moscow’s dependence on Beijing will continue to grow.
Thus, global politics will essentially be dominated by a bipolar contest between two sides. There is technically a third side as well with various neutrals and non-aligned countries but they are irrelevant to the outcome of this contest, just as they were during the Cold War. This is why all the frenzied hand-wringing in the West about the Global South supporting Russia-China has a sense of strategic deja vu. The Global South was fought over in the Cold War too but they contributed little to the American victory and Soviet defeat. They are as irrelevant to the outcome of the bipolar contest as their disinterest in it. No matter which of the two sides they are on, it will have little bearing on the power balance between them.
Nevertheless, it is understandable that both sides fought over the Global South because, in a global fight, neither would want to take a chance at letting the other advance anywhere.
And even the Global South’s disinterest in the contest and the resulting neutrality made sense because they had little stake in it. Moreover, being neutral and forcing the two sides to fight over them has brought political and material benefits. These tendencies can be counted on to be repeated too.
Worse, India is now predictably the odd man out in BRICS. In addition to Russia being in China’s corner because of necessity, both Brazil and South Africa are also increasingly and openly with Russia and China. If there is a conflict in Asia that pits China against Taiwan, India, or Japan, there is little doubt that South Africa and Brazil will lean toward China.
Also read: What’s behind India’s Ukraine policy, Western hypocrisy & how nations act in self-interest
France, Germany, self-interest
For India, even within the Western coalition, some should matter more than others. Understandably, India wants a broad array of diplomatic partners. But this includes many whose capacity and willingness to counter China are suspect. For example, Europe, particularly, France and Germany. Their pusillanimity in dealing with the Russian threat to Europe’s flank has been a source of frustration to both Nordic countries and to Central Europeans. Germany, under former Chancellor Angela Merkel, undertook a strategy of befriending Putin to the point of sacrificing the interests of the smaller European powers, such as, for example, by supporting the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline with Russia that cut out Ukraine, making the Russian invasion more likely. France has been no better. Even as Putin massed his forces on Ukraine’s border, French President Emmanuel Macron was trying hard to appease Putin, though to ultimately no avail.
It is not that France and Germany’s position had no strategic logic. It was just that, for all their talk about European values and global norms, it was entirely about the narrowest form of self-interest. Both benefited from Russian energy and other resources. Hanging out with Putin also gave them a sense of their great power, and possibly even satisfied some need for autonomy from the US. More importantly, Russia was not a direct threat to them, unlike during the Cold war when Russian tanks had surrounded Berlin while the Russian military was stationed in Central Europe. Now, many Central European powers stand between France and Germany and Russia. Distance matters because it reduces the sense of threat and increases other national desires.
And for Europe, China is even farther away, and the sense of threat is purely an intellectual and even less importantly, a moral one. France does have territories in the Indian Ocean but these are not proximate to China, scattered as they are deep in the Pacific and in southern Indian Ocean. Being much more dependent on China than Russia, major European powers especially Germany have made economic bets on China that are difficult to back away from. Indian Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar is right that Europe’s problems are not the world’s, but by that same logic neither are Asia’s problems Europe’s.
Putin’s gamble, India’s stand
It may be true that Moscow has no interest in becoming entirely dependent on China, but Putin’s gamble has left him little choice. Especially when it comes to India, Moscow may want to do what it can to preserve its traditional relations. The question is whether Russia can do much given its dependence on China. Even before its invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s need for China’s support has clearly been a constraint. For example, Moscow is yet to say a single word of support for India—let alone criticism of China—for China’s aggression across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If further evidence is needed, note the difference in Russia’s position when it comes to the India-Pakistan conflict and the India-China one.
It is true that Russia has so far not let this come in the way of honouring its arms deal with India, though Indian officials have noted that supplies from Russia have been affected by the war in Ukraine. Russia needs the Indian arms market to sustain its own arms industry, which provides it additional incentive to maintain its relations with New Delhi. Whether this will suffice to keep Russia supplying India with weapons remains to be seen. However, history suggests some reason for scepticism. In China-India war of 1962, the Soviet Union slowed down the MiG-21 deal with New Delhi because it needed China more. It needs China even more so today.
Chinese analysts are already suggesting putting pressure on Moscow to be on its side on the China-India conflict. It is quite possible that Beijing will heed such advice if it hasn’t done so yet. Irrespective of that, India has made itself vulnerable with its overwhelming dependence on Moscow for arms despite all talks about non-alignment, strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. This has to count as one of India’s worst strategic mistakes, which is saying something.
This points to one key difference in India’s position in this global contest. India is now on the frontlines, which means it no longer has the luxury of standing above the fray. Another luxury it does not have is making mistakes when it comes to choosing partners. The margin for error is narrowing and India should not risk using all of it up.
The author is a professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweets @RRajagopalanJNU. Views are personal.