A country cannot choose its neighbours; geography does. These neighbours could be either friendly or unfriendly, and friends could become foes overnight. Confronted with unfriendly neighbours, a country could be forced to deal with multiple challenges at the same time, including the spectre of fighting a two-front war, as is the case with India. As history attests, fighting on two fronts or Interior lines is most ill-advisable, yet circumstances can make it unavoidable. Does this mean that a force fighting on Interior lines will always lose and therefore should surrender from the outset? That would be a very defeatist attitude for any nation or its armed forces to adopt. War and its prosecution is not an exact science; there are many intangibles and imponderables that can never be fully factored in. Through deft handling at the strategic (national) level and at the level of operational art, the disadvantages of fighting a war on two fronts or against multiple thrusts can be mitigated.
The first example that comes to mind is the Battle of the Pusan (Busan) Perimeter in August and September 1950 during the Korean War. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) had out-fought the United Nations forces and pushed them down the Korean peninsula, toward the port city of Pusan. To counter the KPA offensive, a defensive perimeter was set up along the Naktong River, extending 60 plus kms East to West and 90 plus kms North to South, with Pusan at its base. The KPA were thus on Exterior lines and the UN Command on Interior lines. Given the KPA’s greater numbers and higher standards of training and motivation, the result of the battle should have been a foregone conclusion, but that was not to be.
One of the pre-requisites for a force operating on Exterior lines to be successful is that they must apply pressure all along the front, all of the time, and in sufficient strength, not allowing the defender any respite or opportunity to utilise or recreate reserves. This is precisely what India had done during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, when Indian forces operating on Exterior lines had applied such resolute pressure from multiple directions that it led to the psychological collapse of the Pakistan Army and the surrender of over 90,000 troops. However, this is where the KPA faltered; it did not sustain the momentum and tempo of operations. As a result, the UN forces were able to repel each uncoordinated thrust, and then regain balance to counter-attack at the next critical point.
We go back to the boxing analogy, where after unleashing a flurry of blows, a boxer regains balance and guard. For the UN Command, as the perimeter shrunk in size in the initial days of the battle, it freed up more units to act as its critical reserves. This allowed for valuable time to rush in reinforcements, which saved the day, preventing the embarrassment of a Dunkirk-type evacuation. Although this may be seen as an example of forces operating on Interior lines prevailing over those on Exterior lines, it was only after the Inchon landings of mid-September 1950 to the rear of the enemy, which effectively put the UN forces on Exterior lines, that the tide turned in favour of the UN forces.
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Taking one front out
Another relevant example is the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, also known as the Six-Day War from 5 to 10 June. Israel fought on multiple fronts against the combined forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and emerged victorious. The main cause of the Arab defeat was their lack of coordination among their armed forces. This is evident from the fact that in spite of the escalating tensions and clear indications of imminent hostilities, Israel was able to launch a pre-emptive air strike that took out 90 percent of the air forces of both Egypt and Syria. Without the air cover, the Arab forces were quickly overrun by the much superior Israeli forces, which also had the benefit of air superiority.
The UN Security Council offered a ceasefire on 7 June, barely three days into the war, which was immediately accepted by Jordan, taking one ‘front’ out of the equation. Faced with this situation, Egypt accepted the ceasefire on 8 June, taking yet another ‘front’ out of the equation, with only Syria holding out until the very end. Although Israel had scored a spectacular victory, it too realised the importance of bringing the war to an early end and leveraged its standing with the US and other permanent members of the UNSC to force a ceasefire. Thus, although Israel won a multi-front war, one also has to acknowledge the role of external factors that contributed to this outcome, the DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) paradigm. Had the war dragged on, turning into a war of attrition, as is happening in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the outcome may well have been quite different.
India can draw lessons from both these examples. Faced with a two-front war scenario, India would do well to take one front out of the equation at the outset through diplomatic means, treaties, or alliances, failing which it should deliver a knock-out blow through resolute pre-emptive action against either of the fronts, gaining time to deal with the other. India has the advantage of strategic depth, wherein it can gain time to mobilise its resources and harness the potential of its industry and citizenry.
Independently, on either of the fronts, through skilful stage management of its operational and strategic reserves, it would be possible to manoeuvre own forces in such a manner that they are operating on dynamic Exterior lines at the point(s) of decision, delivering a decisive blow to the enemy. At the operational level, the terrain favours India, be it the Shakargarh Salient (India Exterior-Pakistan Interior) or the Bumla Bowl opposite Tawang, where India is once again on Exterior lines vis-à-vis the Chinese. War is an inexact science, and the soldier manning the weapon a crucial battle-winning factor. In this aspect, India’s armed forces stand head and shoulders above their fractious neighbours.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)