After the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israelis created a red team to challenge assessments and options made by the intelligence community. This had been necessitated by the fact that in late September or early October 1973, while reports existed of large-scale Arab troop movements, these were discounted as inconsequential, leading to the Israelis being taken by surprise when the Arab forces launched attacks on multiple fronts on 6 October that year.
To prevent a recurrence of such an intelligence failure, an organisation called the Ipcha Mistabra was created. Roughly translated, it means ‘on the contrary, the reality appears otherwise’, referring to the fact that there can be multiple versions of the truth—the truth of how things seem and how they really are. A sort of ‘Devil’s advocate’, so to speak.
In the context of the attacks launched by Hamas on 7 October this year, it appears that, after 50 years, Israel has ignored lessons from the past. While the attack itself is tragic and totally condemnable, the fact is that history repeats itself, more so if the lessons learnt are forgotten.
Technology can’t replace human assets
Nations faced with threats from inimical neighbours prepare strong defensive lines, be it in the form of fences, walls or interconnected strong points like France’s Maginot line built to stave off Nazi Germany in the 1930s. However, as R Prasannan points out in his editorial in The Week’s ‘Eyeless across Gaza’, all such defensive lines have invariably been breached. These defensive lines have always been breached through the millennia because “domes and fences build a false sense of security”. While many studies will be carried out to analyse the causes of Israel’s catastrophic failure, what will stand out starkly is the over-reliance on technology at the cost of human intelligence (HUMINT). The Hamas attack not only breached a physical barrier but also a technological Maginot line that failed to stand up to the test.
Technology has always been at the forefront of warfare, especially when it comes to knowing what lies on the ‘other side of the hill’. From climbing the nearest tall tree or water tower to aerial platforms like balloons and aircraft to eavesdropping on the airwaves, the effort has always been to assess the adversary’s strength, dispositions, and intentions.
While the first two, amounting to capability, are straightforward and comparatively easier to assess, it is not the same when it comes to intention, which can change depending on a variety of factors. For the former, one can rely almost exclusively on technology to collect and analyse the data, but the latter will remain in the jurisdiction of the person or organisation. Technology can assist in providing viable options but can never supplant the human in the loop. HUMINT, eyes and ears in the opponent’s camp are indispensable to gauge intent.
Moreover, technology itself is susceptible to being deceived or manipulated. It is the human mind that has developed these high-tech systems. The same human will also develop the counter-measures to defeat these systems. Therefore, over-reliance on technology is fraught with danger. Sometimes, high-tech solutions can very easily be defeated by low-tech ones. Flooding cyberspace with voluminous amounts of data, for example, will conceal the real intelligence in plain sight.
Putting seemingly unrelated bits and bytes of information to make a coherent intelligence picture will require intuitive thinking. A change in government or even a change in leadership can materially affect the intent. The bottom line is that notwithstanding advances in technology, including Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, the human in the loop will remain paramount.
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Good intelligence is crucial
India has also more or less fenced off its borders with Pakistan — both along the International Boundary (IB) as well as the Line of Control (LC) — and Bangladesh. The fence is a formidable deterrent comprising double rows of fencing with the gap in between filled with coils of concertina wire. The entire stretch of the fence along the IB is illuminated and can even be seen from the air. On the LC, the fence, also known as the Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS), has some additional security features. As with all other obstacles, this, too, serves only as a deterrent. Smugglers and other anti-national elements, actively supported by Pakistan, routinely dig tunnels under the fence in the IB sector, particularly in the plains of Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab. The use of drones to drop contraband, including arms and ammunition, has further reduced the effectiveness and utility of the fence. The fencing, therefore, only acts as a trip wire for a more robust and coordinated physical response.
Fortunately for us, the entire stretch of the fencing is kept under surveillance and physical patrolling is carried out along most stretches. While technology is being leveraged, the aspect of boots on the ground is not being lost sight of. This is particularly true of the LC with Pakistan, where infiltration attempts continue unabated. While most attempts are thwarted at the LC itself through a kinetic response, it would be unrealistic to surmise that there has been no infiltration at all. The terrorists have the element of surprise on their side, being able to strike at a time and place of their own choosing. The security forces, on the other hand, must secure every inch of not only the border but also the hinterland and are, therefore, severely disadvantaged. The key to foiling terrorist attacks, therefore, lies in a good intelligence network based on HUMINT on both sides of the border.
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India needs its own Ipcha Mistabra
A word of caution, though, is necessary. Many times, some information is reported by different agencies to the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC), thereby giving it a sense of credibility. However, that input may have been given to these agencies by the same source. Since intelligence agencies never disclose their sources, it may result in the creation of an incorrect assessment.
Similarly, if some important information that eluded others is reported by one agency, there is a tendency to discount that valuable input on account of rivalry. Therefore, close coordination is required at all levels, from the tactical to the strategic, to ensure that no detail, however insignificant, gets overlooked. Occasionally, it is that insignificant piece of information that holds the key and makes all the other pieces of the puzzle fall into place. Perhaps it is time for us to have our own version of Ipcha Mistabra, ‘AVASTAVIKTA’, as mitigation against groupthink, over and above the existing MAC. The truth is out there.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)