Sir, the amendment which has finally emerged from the Drafting Committee makes it clear that neither the Central Government nor the provincial Governments will have anything to do with the election. The Chief Election Commissioner, as the House will find, is practically independent. No doubt he is appointed by the President, that is, the Central Government. There can be no other authority, no higher authority in India than the President for appointing this Tribunal. You cannot omit this important thing.
The next argument against the amendment is that this amendment departs from the old amendment No. 103 which was to be moved on behalf of the Drafting Committee, under which the Commissioners other than the Chief Election Commissioner were not removable except in the manner in which a High Court Judge can be removed. Perfectly right. But the change has been made for a very good reason. Between two elections, normally there would be a period of five years. We cannot have an Election Commission sitting all the time during those five years doing nothing. The Chief Election Commissioner will continue to be a whole-time officer performing the duties of his office and looking after the work from day to day, but when major elections take place in the country, either Provincial or Central, the Commission must be enlarged to cope with the work. More members therefore have to be added to the Commission. They are no doubt to be appointed by the President, but as the House will find, they are to be appointed from time to time. Once they are appointed for a particular period, they are not removable at the will of the President. Therefore, to that extent their independence is ensured. So there is no reason to believe that these temporary Election Commissioners will not have the necessary measure of independence. Anyway, the Chief Election Commissioner, an independent officer, will be the Chairman and, being a permanent officer, will have naturally directing and supervising power over the whole Commission. Therefore, it is not correct to say that the independence of the Commission is taken away to any extent.
We must remember one thing, that after all an election department is not like a judiciary, a quasi-independent organ of Government. It is the duty and the function of the Government of the day to hold the elections. The huge electorates which we are putting up now, the voting list which will run into several crores—all these must necessarily require a large army of election officers, of clerks, of persons to control the booths and all the rest of them. Now all this army cannot be set up as a machinery independent of Government. It can only be provided by the Central Government, by the Provincial Government or by the local authorities as now. It is not possible nor advisable to have a kingdom within a kingdom, so that the election matters could be left to an entirely independent organ of the Government. A machinery, so independent, cannot be allowed to sit as a kind of Super-Government to decide which Government shall come into power. There will be great political danger if the Election Tribunal becomes such a political power in the country. Not only should it preserve its independence, but it must retain impartiality. Therefore, the Election Commission must remain to a large extent an ally of the Government; not only that, but it must, to a considerable extent, be subsidiary to Government except in regard to the discharge of the functions allotted to it by law.
Some reference has been made that the powers of the Parliament have not been preserved. I may point out that amendment No. 123, which is also going to be moved by Dr. Ambedkar, gives to the Parliament power to make provisions with respect to elections to legislatures, subject, of course, to the provisions of this Constitution. Similarly, Sir, you find amendment No. 128 which gives to a State Legislature the power to make provisions with respect to elections to such Legislatures. Therefore, the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures are free to make all provisions with regard to elections, subject, of course, to this particular amendment, namely, the superintendence, direction and control of the Election Tribunal. Today, for instance, the elections are controlled by officers appointed either by the Centre or the Provinces as the case may be. What is now intended is that they should not be subjected to the day-to-day influence of the Government nor should they be completely independent of Government, and therefore a sort of compromise has been made between the two positions; but I agree with my honourable Friend, Pandit Kunzru, that for the sake of clarity, at any rate, to allay any doubts, clause (2) requires a little amendment. At the beginning of clause (2), the following words may be added: “Subject to the provisions of law made in this behalf by Parliament.” Similarly in clause (4) also where the conditions of service and tenure of office of the Election Commissioners and Regional Commissioners are prescribed, it will be proper to have words to this effect: “Subject to the provisions made by Parliament in that behalf.” That, of course, would follow from amendment No. 123, but we do not want any doubt to remain on this point, and therefore, it would be better if these words are added to give Parliamentary control over the terms of service and the tenure.
Now I come to the other part of the criticism. And, that is the argument that this provision whittles down or takes away what is called provincial autonomy. This argument has the knack of appearing again and again in respect of almost every article, and I think it is high time that those honourable Members of the House who put it forward reconcile themselves to the position that the House has taken the line more suited to the country rather than the doctrinaire views of theoretical writers on federalism. Dr. Ambedkar in the opening speech has made it clear that the idea of an Election Commission was accepted as far back as January or February 1947, when even the question of the partition of the country had not become a settled fact. The Fundamental Rights Committee put forward this suggestion. It was unanimously accepted by the Advisory Committee and again it was accepted unanimously by the House. Therefore, it must be treated as the opinion of the House, and the country as a whole, that matters of election must be taken out of the purview of the Centre and the provinces with a view to meet the realities of the situation. That being so, the only other question is as to how this should be done.
With regard to the precedent, reference has already been made to section 19 of the Dominion Elections Act of Canada. This Act lays down that for the whole of Canada, a Chief Electoral Officer, not a Commission as we have envisaged, will superintend, control and direct all elections. His tenure of office is exactly the same as we have adopted here for the Chief Election Commissioner.
Another argument put forward in the course of this debate was that this is undemocratic. I fail to understand how democracy is affected by this provision. Let us analyse the position. This Constituent Assembly, if it lays down a Constitution for the country, is nothing else but an instrument of the sovereign people of India, not the different people of the provinces meeting together in a confederation for the purpose of evolving a Constitution. Let us not forget this main fact. It is open to the House to look at the conditions in the country, to look at the realities of the situation and to give some power to the Centre, to give other power to the provinces, to transfer power from one to the other. That does not take away from either the representative character of the Constituent Assembly or the democratic power of the sovereign Indian people. The House cannot be tied down by any theoretical considerations in this matter.
In the debate on article 226 also, I found the same kind of argument advanced. But we must realise once and for all that it is the Constituent Assembly as the instrument of the sovereign people of India which is one unit that is going to decide what is going to be the functions of the Centre and the provinces in view of the actual conditions that exist in this country. Now, Sir, if that is so, the sovereign people, and the Constituent Assembly as their agent, is bound to maintain the purity of elections in a practical manner. That can only be done by the establishment of the machinery envisaged in this amendment. To say that it is undemocratic is entirely baseless. If there is going to be democracy, the sovereign people of India must be in a position to elect their own representatives in a manner which is above suspicion, above partiality. Corrupt practices do not necessarily apply to the candidates. There may be corrupt practices by a government of the day. Therefore, it is necessary that we should not consider this question from the point of view of any theoretical provincial autonomy, a point which is being trotted out again and again in this House.
This is part of ThePrint’s Great Speeches series. It features speeches and debates that shaped modern India.