The Great Nicobar Project has become one of the most contested strategic initiatives undertaken by the central government in recent times. At the core of the debate lies an essential national security intervention aimed at securing Indian interests in the evolving geopolitical architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
The project spans across a proposed International Container Transhipment Port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay, the Greenfield International Airport, a 450 MVA (Megavolt Ampere) gas and solar-based power plant and a new township spanning 16,610 hectares.
However, the Great Nicobar Project has also attracted criticism from opposition parties, scientists and civil society groups, particularly over its environmental impact and the potential consequences for indigenous communities, even though the project was cleared by the National Green Tribunal (NGT) in February 2026 by a six-member bench.
The tribunal upheld the Great Nicobar Island infrastructure project, declining to interfere with the environmental clearance granted in 2022. The bench underscored the project’s strategic significance for both national security and economic development while simultaneously emphasising the need for stringent adherence to environmental safeguards.
Importance of the island
The island’s importance begins with its geography. Located near the western approaches of the Strait of Malacca, Great Nicobar sits alongside one of the busiest maritime corridors in the world through which a substantial share of global trade, including critical energy flows from the Middle East to East Asia. However, India currently does not fully benefit from that traffic.
The island offers a chance to change that. For India, this is not just proximity, but it is a strategic opportunity. It offers a rare advantage and ability to observe, monitor and potentially influence key sea lanes without overt confrontation. The project is a deliberate national security intervention aimed at repositioning India in the context of the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Indo-Pacific, particularly in response to China’s expanding maritime strategy.
In the past few decades, Beijing has steadily built a network of ports and logistics nodes across the Indian Ocean from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpyu in Myanmar and an overseas military base in Djibouti. This network represents China’s “String of Pearls” strategy, an effort to protect vital energy sea lines and expand its geopolitical influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
While these projects are formally presented as commercial infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), many carry clear dual-use potential, enabling logistical support for naval deployments when required.
For India, China’s expanding footprint in Myanmar is particularly consequential. Developments along the Rakhine coast, combined with pipelines and overland connectivity linking Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal, have created a strategic corridor that allows Beijing partial access to the Indian Ocean, somewhat solving China’s “Malacca Dilemma”.
Chinese presence on Myanmar’s Great Coco Islands, only about 55 km away from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has also increased. While it is futile to debate whether the “presence” is a permanent base or not, it is clear that there has been airstrip expansion, construction of hangars and installation of communication towers. Considering the proximity to India’s most critical maritime command, even modest infrastructure on these islands can translate into a significant advantage in surveillance, extending strategic reach across the Bay of Bengal.
Also read: Why India needs the Great Nicobar Project—new great games in the Eastern Indian Ocean
Not a binary debate
Against this backdrop, the argument that environmental concerns alone should stall Great Nicobar appears increasingly limited. The NGT’s decision itself observes that the project is permissible not in the absence of safeguards but alongside enforceable ecological conditions, including coral relocation and species protection. This undercuts the absolutist environmental critique advanced by sections of the opposition, which often treats development and conservation as mutually exclusive.
But neither is this the first time, nor is India the only country to have faced opposition and been put in a position where it has had to walk a tightrope between environmental concerns and strategic trade-offs. Over the years, there have been several examples across the world of how states have managed to prioritise strategic objectives.
For instance, the Panama Canal fundamentally reshaped global trade but came at a high ecological and human cost during its construction. Despite early criticism, it became an indispensable artery of maritime commerce. Singapore’s transformation into a global port hub involved extensive land reclamation, which altered coastlines and marine ecosystems. The US military base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean remains controversial due to the displacement of local populations.
More recently, China built artificial islands with a total area of close to 3,000 acres on seven coral reefs it occupies in the Spratly Islands in the southern part of the South China Sea. Additionally, there is a gradual development of the Paracel Islands. These are operational military hubs equipped with 3,000 metre runways, missile systems and advanced radar and surveillance infrastructure.
The result was the creation of a sustained and permanent Chinese presence in contested waters. Beijing’s transformation of these islands and many more are clear examples of how strategic imperatives can override environmental concerns.
Supporting the Great Nicobar Project is not an argument against environmental responsibility, nor does it seek to dismiss legitimate ecological or social concerns. Rather, it is a call to approach the issue with a wider strategic lens that recognises the stakes for India’s long-term security and economic resilience while understanding geopolitical positioning.
The debate should not be reduced to a binary choice between development and conservation. Instead, it must acknowledge that in a rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific, control over sea lanes and maritime infrastructure is increasingly shaping power. Therefore, the debate requires a reset, transforming from environment vs security to responsible development or strategic inertia because the cost of inaction can be permanent, as geopolitical space once ceded can rarely be reclaimed.
Rami Niranjan Desai is a Distinguished Fellow at the India Foundation, New Delhi. She tweets @ramindesai. Views are personal.
(Edited by Saptak Datta)