Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term has become a reality, albeit with a coalition government. However, this is unlikely to cause significant changes in India’s foreign policy. S Jaishankar has retained his position as External Affairs Minister, signalling continuity, particularly in India’s relations with China.
Developments following the swearing-in ceremony suggest that India-China relations may not see much improvement in Modi’s third term, a reality evident from the Chinese side as well.
Conspicuously, Chinese President Xi Jinping did not send a congratulatory message to Modi. Instead, Chinese Premier Li Qiang extended his congratulations, stating “the sound and steady development of China-India relations is not only conducive to the well-being of the people of the two countries but also injects stability and positive energy into the region and the world.”
While Xi refrained from sending a message, Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, who assumed office on 20 May, sent his congratulations to Modi on X (formerly Twitter). Modi responded promptly, marking the second instance of exchanges between the two leaders.
Pessimistic views from China
Chinese social media platforms have been abuzz with discussions surrounding India’s recent Lok Sabha results. The BJP’s failure to achieve a majority on its own, despite campaign claims of crossing 400 seats, has been a focal point of analysis.
Numerous commentaries emphasised how Modi, once perceived as invincible, now faces a more challenging political landscape.
A Xinhua commentary asserted that ‘Modi’s victory is overestimated, but it would be wise for him not to underestimate the challenges ahead.’ Interestingly, speeches by Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, a broader discourse on domestic issues, and the potentially heightened influence of the Opposition during Modi’s third term have captured attention.
Jin Canrong, professor and associate dean at Renmin University’s School of International Studies, stated that Modi strategically utilised the ‘China card’ for domestic political gains. This, according to him, necessitates increased vigilance from China to navigate potential escalations.
Jin predicted that Modi, due to a less decisive victory, might amplify rhetoric on the China threat to solidify his domestic standing. Acknowledging India’s challenges in competing with China economically, Jin also anticipated that Modi’s efforts to bolster India’s manufacturing sector would continue.
Other analysts, such as Lin Minwang, deputy director of the Center for South Asian Studies at Fudan University, have suggested that India will likely maintain its pro-United States and anti-China stance. However, in Lin’s view, India will not blindly favour the US at the expense of its own interests; rather, it will continue to adopt a cautious approach toward China.
Lin stated that as an emerging economy, India follows a heavily utilitarian ‘India First’ policy, arguing that its alignment with the US and its Western pivot are pragmatic decisions driven by calculated interests rather than ideology or sentiment.
By creating friction with China and refusing to concede on the border dispute, India leverages anti-China sentiments to rally support from the US and the West, according to Lin.
In a similar vein, Ning Shengnan, associate researcher at the Institute of Developing Countries Department for Developing Countries Studies at the China Institute of International Studies, predicted that Modi will persist in leveraging the rivalry between China and the US to India’s advantage. He will actively promote the ‘Make in India’ initiative to position India as the next manufacturing hub.
An interesting perspective was offered by Fudan University scholar Zhang Jiadong. Contrary to the prevailing belief that Modi is steering India toward Hindu nationalism, Zhang suggests that Modi is actually catering to various groups.
He cited Modi inaugurating the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya and paying tribute to MK Gandhi on his death anniversary in the same month. This, he claims, illustrates Modi’s attempt to “maintain a balance between the religious and the diverse cultural ethos of the country.” Zhang contends that Modi’s words and actions serve as “a political reflection of the cultural characteristics of India’s pluralistic, fragmented society”.
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Disapproval of Modi-Lai exchange
The Modi-Lai exchange on X was met with widespread disapproval. A commentator noted, “Modi was aware of the sensitivity of the Taiwan issue to us. He understood that his remarks would be hurtful [to the Chinese people], yet he chose to respond anyway, believing it was the right course of action.”
Coordinated efforts have been made to target the English-speaking audience. The Global Times embarked on a tirade against Modi and his exchange with Lai. Hu Xijin, formerly with the tabloid, issued a veiled threat, “He [Modi] will make India pay the price.”
Some hypernationalists have proposed various countermeasures to undermine India’s engagement with Taiwan. A provocative Weibo post suggested that if Modi were to strengthen ties with Taiwan, China could reciprocate by supporting Khalistani separatism. The post incorporated footage of Sikh men in Canada calling for a separate Khalistan and burning the Indian flag, as well as a puppet show depicting the assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Such suggestions are not novel; Chinese officials and ‘wolf warriors’ have frequently discussed sensitive topics to dictate India’s stance on China, Taiwan, and Tibet. For decades, China has pressured India not only through the border dispute but also by suggesting that any crossing of China’s so-called redlines by India would lead to increased Chinese meddling in Kashmir.
Nonetheless, there is a minority segment advocating for improved India-China relations. A commentary highlighted that in April, Modi conveyed a desire to stabilise India-China relations and that China should perceive this as an opportunity to resolve the differences.
It is particularly intriguing to observe the deliberate selection of photos showcasing rural and congested areas in articles and posts about India and its elections on Chinese state-owned media and social media platforms.
Images featuring developed areas with significant infrastructure growth are conspicuously absent. This intentional omission seems geared toward crafting a narrative that portrays India as inferior to China, implying that India’s aspirations to rival China are unrealistic.
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Can India-China relations be improved?
India will continue to maintain its firm commitment to resolving border disputes as a prerequisite for normalised relations. However, the discourse in China surrounding Modi 3.0, coupled with the lack of genuine efforts from the Chinese side, suggests that their calls for India to prioritise stabilising relations lack sincerity.
Instead, these empty calls seek to deflect blame onto India for the deterioration in relations. China’s India policy exemplifies a glaring incongruity between its rhetoric and actions, exposing a stark display of double standards.
China must reassess its stance towards India and adjust its approach accordingly. Its strategy so far has been to periodically activate the border standoffs and exert pressure on New Delhi while simultaneously urging it to return to the pre-2020 status quo. However, this has proved ineffective during Modi 2.0 and is unlikely to succeed during Modi 3.0.
China’s redlines are irrelevant to India if it does not honour India’s redlines. A more pragmatic approach for the country would involve moving beyond mere rhetoric and actively engaging with New Delhi.
Without China assuming genuine responsibility and addressing India’s concerns, India-China relations are likely to remain fragile and could potentially deteriorate further.
Sana Hashmi, Ph.D., is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation and George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations. She tweets @sanahashmi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)