For the Defence Research and Development Organisation and its partner, Larsen and Toubro, 6 July 2024 was a red letter day when their indigenous light tank, Zorawar, was unveiled. Samir V Kamat, chairperson of DRDO, had good reason to be proud. “In a short period of two years to two and a half years, we have not only designed this tank but made a first prototype,” he said during the unveiling at L&T’s heavy engineering plant.
A ‘request for information’ was issued in April 2021, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) approved the acceptance of necessity in December 2022. In principle, a go-ahead was given (by nomination) to the DRDO by the end of 2021 to manufacture 59 out of the requirement of 354 tanks. Contract for the remaining tanks would be given after an open bidding process for which some leading developers are in the fray.
Why do we require light tanks?
Light tanks weigh half that of a medium tank and have a much higher power to weight ratio. Mechanised forces exploit their mobility for reconnaissance in the plains/deserts and in other roles not suitable for medium tanks like air transported/airborne/amphibious operations, operations in riverine/coastal/mountainous/high-altitude terrain, and counter-insurgency/built-up areas.
Since Independence, Stuart, AMX 13, and PT 76 light tanks have been exploited for the above roles. Stuart tanks made history in the battle of the 11,553-feet-high Zozila Pass in 1948. This record was broken when AMX 13 tanks were air landed at 14,270 feet for the battle of Chushul in October-November 1962. PT 76 tanks played a stellar role in the riverine terrain of Bangladesh during the 1971 war. The author participated in four operations with PT 76 tanks in the Jessore-Khulna sector. Once AMX 13 and PT 76 tanks were phased out, our mechanised forces, perforce, had to rely upon medium tanks with inherent limitations for the roles highlighted above.
In Eastern Ladakh, a mechanised task force based on 20 BMP ICVs and 8 BRDM wheeled reconnaissance vehicles was inducted during Operation Trident in December 1986 . The same force also participated in Exercise Chequerboard in 1987. In 1988-90, the author, inducted and commanded the first combat group of a mechanised infantry battalion and two armoured squadrons and pioneered the evolution of the concept for employment of mechanised forces at high altitude. Similar deployment was also done in Sikkim.
Once the Chinese began intrusions in Eastern Ladakh in 2013, the deployment was increased to an armoured brigade of three armoured regiments and one mechanised infantry battalion in 2016. One more mechanised battalion was deployed separately. The mechanised forces deployment in Sikkim were also increased to an armoured brigade. During the crisis in Eastern Ladakh in May 2020 , the deployment was increased by one additional armoured regiment and four mechanised infantry battalions. Mechanised forces played a major role in stalemating the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and are now operating in all sectors from Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and Galwan in the north, Chang Chemo-Pangong Tso-Chushul in the middle, and Indus/Hanle Valleys to the south.
Based on extensive exploitation in Ladakh/Sikkim, it is our experience that medium tanks with a relatively lower power to weight ratio (18.8 and 21 hp/ton for T72 and T90 respectively) and restricted manoeuvrability and main gun elevation/depression, can be exploited in the broader valleys/plateaus. However, in narrow valleys and on ridge lines/passes, they suffer from serious limitations. In these areas, light tanks with power to weight ratio of 1:30 and better manoeuvrability and gun elevation/depression perform much better.
A case in point is our deployment in the vicinity of and on the Kailash Range, Pangong Tso, Galwan and Chang Chenmo sectors. Medium tanks can be used in DBO, Chushul bowel and Indus/Hanle Valleys, and in the valleys across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Light tanks and infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) can also undertake amphibious operations across the Pangong Tso. However, the viability of such an operation is debatable. Due to lower weight, light tanks are easily transportable by aircraft and heavy lift helicopters. With rubberised tracks, they can traverse long distances by road.
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Restructuring/reorganisation of mechanised forces
The above analysis indicates that we need to employ a judicious mix of medium tanks, preferably with upgraded engines and light tanks tailor-made for high altitude. Even the existing fleet of tanks and ICV BMP 2 requires an upgraded engine and other modifications for high-altitude operations. The Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) project also must include a high-altitude variant. Before the light tanks are introduced, it would be prudent to restructure/reorganise the mechanised forces in high altitude areas.
It has been six years since the concept of integrated battle groups (IBGs) was first mooted. However, none have been formally fielded so far. Due to the intimate cooperation required between infantry and mechanised forces in Eastern Ladakh, combined arms IBGs are a compulsion and not a choice.
Mechanised forces with approximately 10-12 armoured regiments and mechanised infantry battalions also need to be restructured into composite units, which can be armour-heavy/mechanised infantry heavy/balanced with a judicious mix of medium and light tanks. Since traditional tank battles are unlikely to take place in high-altitude areas, it will be prudent to reduce the number of tanks in a squadron to 10 from 14 to make it more agile and create more composite units.
Since April-May 2020, the PLA deployed approximately six combined arms brigades, each having four or more composite combined arms battalions (mix of armour and mechanised infantry sub-units at unit level) supported by combat support/services units. The tank subunits are a mix of medium and light tanks. We have deployed a similar force level but based on inefficient traditional organisations.
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Light tank project
The Army’s General Staff Qualitative Requirement is for an amphibious 25 (+/-10 percent) ton tank with a power-to-weight ratio of 1:30, capable of operating in desert/riverine/high-altitude terrain. Its armament must include a 105 mm gun with 20-degree elevation and 10-degree depression, capable of firing all types of tank ammunition; an auto loader and automated fire control system; an ATGM (preferably gun launched) and a remote controlled weapon system (RCWS) with an automatic grenade launcher and 12.7 mm machine gun; and a drone launcher. The protection system should be state of the art with composite armour, add-on explosive reactive armour, and active electronic and kinetic anti-drone and ATGM counter measures. In a nutshell, the Army seeks a light tank that must remain relevant on the battlefield for next 30 years.
As a first impression, Zorawar is a hybrid tank with the prototype made with a Cummins 730 hp engine from United States, a Cockrill 105 mm gun and turret from Belgium, and a hull adapted from the Korean K-9 platform already being manufactured by L&T. It is assumed that all the imported systems would be manufactured in India with absolute transfer of technology. Details of the ATGM, RCWS, and anti-drone/ATGM protection systems are not yet available. Some of these systems may undergo change if better offers come forward and meet the terms and conditions. One more prototype will have to be made before field trials can commence. As per my assessment, if all goes well, it will take minimum five years before production can commence.
On paper, Zorawar seems be at par with the PLA’s light tank, ZTQ 15, except that the latter has a relative higher degree of protection and a more powerful 1000 hp engine. However, it weighs 33-36 tons, making it a “light medium tank” and it does not have amphibious capability. It is pertinent to mention that top attack ATGMs and drones have made the tanks extremely vulnerable. Any tank that is developed now and even the existing fleet has to have the capability to neutralise this threat.
DRDO and L&T have orders for only 59 tanks. Zorawar will have to compete with tanks of other players in the field for the remaining 295 tanks. So far, a commercial request for proposal has not been formally issued for the 295 tanks. It is likely that knowing our bureaucratic delays, most major players may have commenced development in anticipation. Nonetheless, if Zorawar project progresses on schedule, it will have a head start to win the contract.
So far, the development of the Zorawar is a success story. Being hybrid, it may face teething problems, but it will mature by the time it is fielded in five years. This project will give impetus to the design and development of indigenous futuristic infantry combat vehicle and future ready combat vehicles.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Humra Laeeq)
The late Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh wrote in his autobiography that during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Indian army’s tanks were like lunch boxes in comparison to Pakistani tanks which were American. A tank operator went on to say that the Pakistani tanks were like the Mercedes Benz among cars, our tanks were simply of no match to them. Hope Zorawar outshines our enemies’ tanks.