Asim Munir is reversing Bajwa’s LOC passivism. Militancy is coming back to Kashmir

The Kashmir Day event in Pakistan was organised to help militant groups popularise themselves among their constituents by signaling that the State had sanctioned a big show.

Outgoing Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa hands over the baton of command over to the newly appointed Army Chief General Asim Munir (L), during a ceremony at the army headquarters in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on 29 November 2022 | ISPR/handout via Reuters

This year Islamabad and Lahore were relatively quiet on Kashmir day as the main event endorsing Pakistan’s policy regarding the territory was held in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir’s Rawalakot on 5 February. This may have been for several reasons. For one, the establishment wants to keep the capital city open for business. 

Since Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf’s (PTI’s) procession at the end of last year, the government is probably still worried about crowds disturbing Islamabad. Not surprisingly, the handful of Indians who landed in Islamabad around the same time to attend the climate conference organised by the news organisation, Dawn , noticed the relative lack of excitement on Pakistan’s Kashmir day. 

However, it certainly made better sense for the government to move the venue of Kashmir-related events to Rawalakot, especially if the militant leadership was being pulled out of the freezer in a territory that, at least in the last couple of years, has been protesting against the Pakistani State and establishment over poor governance. From Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jaishe Muhammad (JeM) to Lashkare Tayyaba (LeT), all the Kashmir-dedicated groups were there.

GHQ sanctioned show

Frankly, these militants have long operated in Kashmir along with Kashmiri nationalists – both protesting for different causes. As my sources in Kashmir told me, the LeT and JeM have been around in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK), each doing different things. While the LeT tried to build a political figure for itself, the JeM has stuck to its jihad narrative. However, both have struggled with nationalist politics, which often pulls in their foot soldiers too. The 5 February event, hence, was meant for these militant groups to popularise themselves among their constituents by sending a signal that the State had sanctioned a bigger show. 

The establishment that had shied away from demonstrating support for militants publicly, especially under the watch of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), seems eager to take off the shroud and send a signal across the border that militancy could start again. As Rawalpindi believes, India has been poking its fingers in Balochistan. One knowledgeable source in Islamabad said that Rawalpindi is getting ready to restart militancy—at a comparatively lower but noticeable scale—after winters to force India to negotiate on Balochistan. This is Pakistan’s Army chief Asim Munir reversing General (retd) Qamar Javed Bajwa’s policy of appeasement with India. 

It’s not just that Munir is more traditionally hawkish toward India, he needs to build his image of being steadfast and become more likable among his soldiers and officers, who are distracted due to the Imran Khan factor. While Munir has the entire country, its judiciary, civil bureaucracy, the media, and the political system firmly under his thumb, none of this has brought him the popularity that he imagined was possible. 

Despite the General Headquarters (GHQ) silencing retired personnel—sending them a rule book warning of severe punishment for supporting the PTI or not supporting the Army chief—while attracting the serving officers with perks and privileges such as civilian jobs and land grants, the situation is still not completely under control. A senior politician, while talking to me, claimed that the legitimate worth of a three-star general, who has served as corps commander, is more than PKR 4 billion.

A colonel or brigadier, on the other hand, is approximately valued at PKR 500 million. Yet, none of this seems to have brought political or physical security to the Army chief. Some talk about a couple of times in the last two years when the situation turned threatening for the chief, the risk emanating from his institution. This might get even worse after he seeks another five-year extension. Interestingly, even military families and personnel in areas traditionally known as recruitment grounds can be heard criticising their own institution, blaming the poor state of politics in the country. 

Pakistan as mediator

Since Kashmir alone no longer attracts political attention, the Pakistan government tied it up with the issues of Gaza and Palestine. The event in Rawalakot was not only about Kashmir but also an Al-Aqsa conference, featuring Hamas’ spokesperson and representative in Iran, Khaled al-Qaddoumi.  This is Rawalpindi being very conscious of public sentiment around the Muslim world, especially in Pakistan, regarding Israel’s treatment of Palestinians in Gaza. 

This should not, however, be considered as some plan to use Hamas militants in Kashmir or bring jihadis from the Middle East or elsewhere to Pakistan. In any case, the Pakistani establishment’s engagement with Hamas seems to be more about helping the US in resolving the ongoing hostage issue. Just last year, Islamabad agreed to let 192 Palestinian medicine and dentistry students complete their education in Pakistan, with support from Jamaat-e-Islami’s Al-Khidmat Foundation. 

The initiative was to bring popularity to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government as someone eager to provide a helping hand to Palestinians. It was also to signal that Pakistan could shoulder some of the burden. 

Additionally, Hamas recently claimed that Pakistan has agreed to take about 15 Palestinians released by Israel as part of the arrangement to swap hostages for prisoners. Pakistan’s Interior Ministry has denied the claim. The denial is logical because the government would not want to appear complicit in the displacement of Palestinians. Significant regional States such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt have rejected the idea of Gazans being evicted from their land. 

Playing such a public role would make the government unpopular in the eyes of the majority of Pakistanis, for whom, like much of the Muslim world, Gaza is an essential fault line. However, if Hamas’ claim is true, as some sources in Islamabad suggest, Pakistan’s establishment is trying to project itself as a peacemaker, seeking a role in mediation. 

Needless to say, none of this would improve the prospects of Pakistan building ties with Israel, which is something that was being gently aimed for before the Gaza crisis.

The problem with these tactical formulas is that they could fuel Pakistan’s own militant issues. While the establishment can always keep a watch over these groups, there is never a guarantee of a foolproof way to prevent them from becoming more dangerous. The 2002 attacks on former President Pervez Musharraf are a case in point. 

Moreover, it may not necessarily convince a neighbour like India to re-engage and sort out differences, particularly on security. 

Ayesha Siddiqa is a senior fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. Views are personal.

(Edited by Ratan Priya)