The Pakistan government has cemented its relationship with the powerful army chief, General Asim Munir, by rewarding him with the title of Field Marshal. While it’s not clear whether the idea originated with the army or the government, Munir’s elevation to a five-star rank signals the Shehbaz Sharif government’s allegiance to the commander of the largest service branch, an act that will have far-reaching political and institutional implications.
Notwithstanding the general sense of jubilation in the country over the popular perception of a tactical victory against India, this particular decision came as a shock and may not serve Asim Munir’s interests in the long run. Many people who were previously silent after the end of the conflict, or who had been generally happy with the Pakistan Air Force’s achievement, suddenly took to their keyboards to mock the decision.
Some pointed out how Munir has been steadily accumulating prefixes, while others drew comparisons to Ugandan dictator and army chief Idi Amin or joked about whether the title of Quaid-e-Azam would be next. There is a growing sense among many that the government should have stopped at celebrating the military achievement, rather than indulging in this kind of overdrive.
As some observers I spoke to suggested, the decision may reflect the political cunning of the government, which could be attempting to shift negative focus back onto the powerful army chief—previously hailed as a hero. Others said the initiative was entirely the government’s way of signalling to Munir that, since the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PMLN) could go so far as to make him Field Marshal, he should remain invested in this partnership and not consider rapprochement with Imran Khan or his party.
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Asim Munir’s elevation isn’t a political stunt
Indisputably, the government prioritised short-term political gains over long-term institutional consequences. With his promotion to five-star general, Munir is now the most senior commander in the country—disrupting the institutional balance within the armed forces. Ironically, he now outranks the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), a four-star general who heads the body created in the 1970s to ensure parity among the three services and coordinate joint planning.
A five-star army chief attending CJCSC meetings renders the proceedings practically ceremonial. This institutional imbalance echoes a similar issue from the Zia-ul-Haq era when, after declaring martial law and becoming president in 1977, Zia could no longer participate in CJCSC meetings. As a result, the Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) attended instead, undermining the intended balance among the services. This not only weakened joint planning but also sidelined the question of political control over the largest service.
Munir’s elevation is likely to create similar complications. As some of my sources suggested, he may try to resolve the issue by appointing a four-star VCOAS—a move believed to be aimed at calming nerves within the army, where many are now uncertain about their futures. But history suggests that a four-star general in the army often ends up being the army chief’s undoing.
It would be a mistake to dismiss this decision as a mere political stunt, given its institutional implications. Crucially, the promotion is unlikely to make Munir more powerful than he already is. He and the institution he leads are already immensely powerful. No political party worth its salt today has even a notional interest in holding him or the military accountable. The last institution with any capacity to do so—the higher judiciary—backed off at the start of the conflict, when the Supreme Court conceded to the use of military courts to try civilians for treason.
Furthermore, Munir has already outlined his vision for the state: a “hard state” , hellbent on crushing dissent, refusing dialogue with those that appear belligerent, and upholding the national ideology through military means. One is also reminded of his earlier promises to transform Pakistan into a trillion-dollar economy—a goal far more ambitious than convincing people to sacrifice for sustaining the military, especially in the wake of recent conflict.
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No one in Pakistan to ask tough questions
The civilian government’s eagerness to appease the general also suggests that no one will raise questions this November when his current three-year term ends, and it comes time to legally extend it by another two years—taking him to November 2027. After that, another five-year extension seems likely. This is when the road may get bumpy for him. Even the two-year extension is already a problem: many three-star generals, who serve four-year terms, will now retire without a chance at promotion.
Sadly, Pakistan has not seriously considered the implications of these extensions. Another five-year term after 2027 could open up a Pandora’s box, as it has for previous generals during their second extended tenures. This is when all powerful generals tend to make mistakes, including caving in to international pressures, resulting in a push from within the institution.
So far, no general has survived an extended term or managed to end their second term nicely—from Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf to Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and Qamar Javed Bajwa,the ending for all of them was not as rosy as their beginning. Munir will struggle to maintain a balance within his own service, a task fraught with pitfalls. As many within army circles recall, even Musharraf had to negotiate hard with his corps commanders to get decisions accepted during his extended term.
Of course, this is not the only questionable decision by the Shehbaz Sharif government. It also rewarded the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) by giving a third extension to the air chief—this time, without specifying any time limit. This suggests a similar politicisation of the PAF, which until now had been largely limited to the army. Resentment has already surfaced within the service.
Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Babur Sidhu reportedly took punitive action against officers who expressed discontent, with some dismissed and others court-martialled. The extension definitely brought him closer to the PML(N) government, evident from his decision to allow Maryam Nawaz Sharif to use a PAF aircraft for a personal trip to Switzerland. Other connections include his brother, Naseer Abbas Sidhu, a PMLN member of the National Assembly elected in the 2024 elections.
Tragically, these elevations may provide temporary personal benefits, but they come at a high institutional cost. A strong defence requires introspection and accountability, both of which are sorely lacking. These rewards, far from strengthening the system, will only achieve the opposite.
Ayesha Siddiqa is a senior fellow at the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She tweets @iamthedrifter. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)