There is a crushing consensus on “lessons” of 1962 China war among Indian strategists.
The 1962 war remains the most evocative parable in discussions of India’s national security. The anniversary of the defeat invariably occasions laments on how the “lessons” of 1962 are yet to be learnt.
This is doubly problematic. For one thing, history offers no “lessons” – only historians do. And their conclusions are always provisional: open to revision based on fresh perspectives and new evidence. In the Indian strategic community, however, there is a crushing consensus on the “lessons” of 1962. For another, this body of received wisdom actually perpetrates institutional pathologies while ostensibly calling for reforms.
The recent changes to our structures of national security management are a good example of this tendency.
Myth of civilian interference
Let’s start with two tenacious myths that left a genetic imprint on our national security arrangements in the years since 1962. The first pertains to civil-military relations in the run up to the war. The standard narrative is that the political leadership, especially Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and defence minister V.K. Krishna Menon, meddled in operational matters to disastrous effect. In particular, their “forward policy” of deploying small posts in disputed areas left the Army incapable of resisting the Chinese attacks of October-November 1962.
Also read: Not China, 1962 war called India’s bluff
This conventional wisdom is seriously misleading. It assumes that the military had a better idea than the civilians on how to deal with the challenge posed by China. This was hardly the case. From late 1959 until the adoption of the forward policy in 1961, the military brass, led by General K.S. Thimayya, advocated a strategy of “defence in depth”. They wanted to hold defensive positions far behind the boundary claimed by India. Given the state of communications in the frontier areas, this was understandable. But it failed to reckon with the possibility that the Chinese could attempt to grab chunks of territory near the frontier without coming up to the main line of the planned Indian defences.
In fact, this was the Chinese pattern of operations in the run up to the war. It was also the issue of utmost concern for the political leadership. After all, this was a boundary dispute. Nor did the military think seriously about a full-fledged war. From mid-1959 onwards, Thimayya maintained that it was up to the political leadership to ensure that such an attack could not occur. At no point did the military apply itself to this strategic problem of countering Chinese military actions across a spectrum, from incursions to full-scale war. The military’s inability to formulate specific proposals to meet such incursions left the initiative in the hands of the civilian advocates of the forward policy. The military leadership’s weaknesses on this score were as significant as its dismal performance –barring some honourable exceptions – during the war.
Instead of reckoning with such issues, we continue to perpetuate the myth of civilian interference. This also legitimises the model of civil-military relations that came into being after 1962, whereby civilians steer clear of operational matters. This flawed system has neither enhanced political control nor operational efficiency.
IB’s inordinate influence
Consider the other myth of 1962: the alleged intelligence failure in anticipating a major Chinese attack.
Between April and October 1962, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), the agency then tasked with external as well as internal intelligence, prepared periodic assessments of Chinese disposition, movements, strength and build-up. The most pointed input came in late May. The IB learnt that the Chinese consulate in Calcutta had indicated to communists and fellow travellers Beijing’s intention to forcefully remove Indian posts in Ladakh. The IB director, B.N. Mullik, passed this on directly to the Prime Minister, the defence minister and the home minister.
Also read: 56 years later, China can still choke Indian troops the way it did in 1962
Why, then, did the Indian government fail to apprehend the coming Chinese attack? Several factors were in play, but two institutional issues are worth underlining. First, the IB was asked not just to collect information but also to assess likely Chinese responses. This violated the fundamental principle that the reporting agency should not be asked to assess its own reports. This task fell under the purview of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which was a sub-council of the chiefs of staff committee. The JIC, however, was defunct. In consequence, the IB’s inputs were not subjected to rigorous analysis and their political and military import was not well understood.
A second, and related, factor was that Indian officials’ views tended to be coloured by the IB’s conclusions. Prior to the decision to adopt the forward policy, the MEA and the army headquarters had asked the IB for an assessment of Chinese capabilities and intent. On 26 September 1961, the IB submitted a comprehensive paper stating that “the Chinese would like to come right up to their claim of 1960 wherever we ourselves were not in occupation. But where even a dozen men of ours are present, the Chinese have kept away”.
This assessment soon became an article of faith among civilian and military officials alike. No one paused to ask whether the IB’s assessment was not coloured by its own policy preferences. Mullik had been a staunch advocate of the forward policy from early 1959 and had direct access to the Prime Minister.
Not learning 1962 lessons
In short, the real problem was not a failure of intelligence collection, but the IB’s inordinate influence over intelligence assessment and policy formulation. The narrative of intelligence failure paved the way for the creation of a separate external intelligence agency, the Research & Analysis Wing. The JIC, however, continued to languish for decades. The Kargil Review Committee pointed out the moribund state of our apex intelligence assessment body. Thereafter, the JIC was subsumed under the new National Security Council Secretariat – only to be revived a few years on. Its current position following the latest round of reorganisation is unclear.
Also read: During 1962 war, Nehru was ‘quieter than usual, often in a reverie and sometimes trembling’
The remarkable dominance of former intelligence officials in the national security establishment has been pointed out by other commentators. The problem, however, is not simply of who is reporting to whom or which service has an edge. Rather, it is that when people with similar institutional backgrounds and worldviews dominate the entire chain of intelligence collection, assessment and policy formulation, group-think and tunnel vision are unavoidable consequences. This “lesson” of 1962 is well worth remembering.
Srinath Raghavan is a Senior Fellow at Centre for Policy Research. Views expressed are personal.
This analysis is coloured with probably the author’s own biases. When the armed forces had been deliberately marginalised and their opinions ignored repeatedly, does the author think that the armed forces could independently formulate strategies? The author has chosen to ignore so many other inputs/facts available and just tried to play with words to prove God knows what.
Many of us are small children or never at that time. It’s easy to blame a fledgling nation struggling to assuage her wounded people during partition, uplifting them from poverty was foremost in any peace loving leadership and not jingoism. Nehru strongly belived that thousands of years of cultural exchange would help. An important trigger for China was admitting Dalai Lama much against their wish.
Throughout long history of several centuries, India never had any issue with China and Tibet. India and China had always been living in harmony largely due to sword like protection of Himalayas, a great shield of protection to us drafted and created by nature and God himself. Chinese in its long history did acquire a feeling of persecution and victimisation due to incessant internal conflicts, opium wars, the two great world wars and Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria or Manchukow. After second world war Chiang Kai Shek called shots in China and had designs on independent Tibet. Defeated by communists led by Mao, Chiang Kai Shek made his escape good to Formosa and Mao inherited dreams of controlling Tibet and then Sinkiang. He did and occupied Tibet in 1950 three years after our own independence. Tibet had been a independent nation since AD 1350 and was under direct rule of Dalai Lama. Had Tibet been an independent nation, there would have been no major border dispute between India and Tibet but certain issues would have certainly persisted which India would have been able to manage. In that event China might have fished in troubled waters in favour of Tibet. But that is merely a proposition.
After British left India in hurry and exhausted in 1947, they left a advice to new independent government of India to detail a military unit in Lhasa to safe guard Tibet and India as well. Nehru disregarded the advice which in future had to be paid heavily in terms of loss of territory, precious lives of our valiant soldiers and above all our national pride and honour. Nehru was an outstanding scholar of world history and a remarkable magnetic personality with immense contribution to world affairs till mid fifties last century. He was not a suitable candidate for premiership of India which required flexibility and strength on the foundations of military and economic strength which he did not deliberately. He chose a communist in the form of VK Krishna Menon as Defence Minister who being a professed communist thought and took it for granted that Chinese would never attack India as long as he was Defence Minister. Nehru kept the nation and top Army brass under a spell which kept Army bereft of ideas and planning to defend Indo-China border. Indian Armed Forces had no vision or plan to defend the country as none of it was ever demanded by Nehru-Menon duo. Generals had no idea of ground reality at all. The tactical deployment too was faulty. It was foolish and crazy of Nehru to order Army to throw the Chinese out in 1962 without planning, without logistic support, without inter service coordination and above all with lack of requisite effective arms and fire power. Nehru never asked Armed Forces to discuss the defence and security matters of nation with him as if he was the only power to defend India. . He woke up to arm the forces only after the Chinese had withdrawn that too on pursuation of Lord Louis Mountbatten . He was fully deceived by BN Mullick his spy master.. Given, even at that stage had our Air Force bombed Chinese positions in Laddakh and West Kameng district, Chinese would have been ousted there and then as at that time Chinese had virtually no Air Force and did not have a single fighter aircraft in Tibet. Had our Air Chief ordered and advised Nehru to use Air Force to bomb Chinese occupied positions and disrupted their communication in Tibet it self, China would have lost the battle. But it could not happen because Nehru played politics of pitting service Chiefs as some kind of autonomous subedars of Mughal empire. A deadly mistake. THERE WAS NOTHING MORE FOOLISH THAN NOT TO HAVE A STRONG COMMANDER IN CHIEF FOR ARMED FORCES FOR INDIA, PRESIDENT BEING THE SUPREME COMMANDER. In 1962 had Indian Air Force and Indian Army been under a Commander in Chief , India would not have lost the 1962 war. Nehru and Co did not and could not ask the Air Chief to bomb Chinese positions because all those fake senile freedom fighters who became cabinet minsters and ruined India by their awkward foolish ways thought use of fighter aircrafts against China might result in retaliation and they might be bombed to death in their cushy Bungalows in sleep. Not one of them kept awake at such a grim period of our history.. Nehru chose an ASC officer Gen BM Kaul to tackle Chinese invasion in North East who directed war from his sick bed from Military Hospital in Delhi. Service Chiefs are not war Lords or heads of their personal serfdom and they must be brought under total control of either a Commander in Chief or a Defence Minister who must always be from Armed Forces rather appropriately he should be from Army. How else Allied powers won all the wars just because of single Command and Control. Our future generations might suffer if our Forces Chiefs are permitted to run on auto for egoistic reasons. Nation first and ego last, however they must be fully free to run their affairs and modernisation of respective services and the adminstrative control but for tactical and strategic reasons, Armed Forces must be placed under a Supreme Commander atonce and immediately for better coordination in war time. Sadaly during OP-MEGHDOOT in Siachen and during OP-VIJAY the desired and expected help and co ordination was lacking as if one service has nothing to do with the other. Of course on vital ops matters and pros and cons must be discussed thouroughly.
Chinese would have cut off entire North East and West Bengal from rest of India and communists of Bengal too were not in a unreceptive mood. Chinese suddenly with derw 20 kms or 12 and a half miles deep into their territory. Yiu know why. Because President John Fitzgerald Kennedy became suddenly free from Cuban missile crisis. He summoned a meeting in White House for appraisal of ongoing situation about India-China war. He was briefed about imminent collapse of India if Chinese do not stop the advance and war kept going. He dispatched three persons to India, Gen Paul Adams of Pacific Command, Averall Harriman and the Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith. The trio asked Nehru to sign a paper which read ” India requests to seek US Umbrella. Entire North Indian airfields were placed under US control. Chinese were given a hint that if Chinese did not stop the war, US President would order air strikes on Chinese positions. Kennedy had given one line order to his staff ” India is a friendly democratic country and must be helped” Their flew in air Nehru’s status as leader of Non aligned nations. US reminded Nehru not Goa of 1960 but Chinese preparedness in Tibet should have been priority. To day if India had to take on two neighbors or four, we can not do it alone. One must have strong muscles to survive if not then have strong nations as your trusted friends. China must be checked besides being friendly to us. But a nation and its people must be honest, hard working,without traitors , not selfish, patriotic, brave and energetic. Salutes to Mother India. one must speak out but unfortunately no one dared to speak to Nehru. Leaders must be advised best and boldly and not timidly for Gubernatorial and Ambassadorial lolly pops are very infrequent. Be bold soldiers with grit and determination. Stand up with honour for the sake of nation.
After the annexation of Tibet by China, Fd Marshal Cariappa had wanted to present the plan of Indian Army’s defence against China. Nehru had flared up and rebuked Cariappa that it was not c-in-c’s place to tell the PM that who was India threatened from. Army was advised to focus on Pakistan and Kashmir and leave China to Nehru for dealing with as seen fit. The additional resources that would have been required to ensure the defence against China were not even discussed let alone arranged. The rest off course is history.
Had Nehru listened to the plan the story in 1962 could have been vastly different. Defensive posture in a particular sector can’t be created overnight, it takes years. Yet the India army had to do in a matter of months that too in far flung, remote area where the communications were literally nil.
Before the blame of this debacle is thrust upon the Indian army I would encourage author to visit the locations of these battles in NEFA and Ladakh today to really gauge the enormity of the task the army had to undertake. Although well connected now, these areas are still remote.
Now let’s talk about the interference by the political leadership. I wonder if the author has heard the name of Gen Kaul, an Army Service Core officer who had no combat experience but was made a Corp Cdr of the overnight raised 4 corps, by Nehru and Krishna Menon. The normal chain of command was totally bypassed ie the eastern command was out of the loop while Kaul had the ears of the Defence Minister. Such a situation may be considered normal by the author but it military terms it’s a disaster waiting to happen.
The army had its shortcomings but they were not what the author is making them out to be.
I totally disagree with the content and line of thought that this article is trying to propagate
Then , as now and ever, it’s the trigger for war /open hostilities to break out that needs to be analysed in depth. Capabilities for war are built and retained over time, what would bring these to a ‘shooting’ engagement requires constant monitoring by the national security apparatus at the highest politico-intelligence level .In this the actors in decision making process of the adversary are critical.
In contrast the operational planning invariably rests on ‘blundering’ into war either in a proactive or a reactive setting.
How did 62 come about in Oct ? At a particular point in time and space?And why?
An important lesson for future should emerge by focusing on the trigger.
It was the fear of inability to maintain sustained supply lines and their own intelligence agencies assessment of the readiness of USA directly intervening in NEFA that made them withdraw. Pakistan would have been kept in check by USA and East Pakistan would have been made to give access to the fleet vessels of USA. In such a situation India would have gained at least some ground lost in the Western front.
I appreciate the fresh perspective of Sri Srinath Raghavan at these 2-generations old narratives. But he perpetuates yet another myth of Nehru being “misled” by coterie as a dictator would be. Nehru attended Parliament everyday if in town and listened to critics intently and responded responsibly. Nehru discussed anything and everything in press meets. Author attributes Forward Policy entirely to BN Mullick, while (in reality) the only opponents of that policy in the entire country were Communists. Claims of BN Mullick’s closeness with Nehru are overrated. Mullick came from Police who spied for British government on freedom fighters like Nehru. Parliament passed many resolutions demanding Nehru government “throw out China” from Aksai Chin which in effect became the Forward Policy. While Timmayya hoped “political leadership will ensure that China would not attack”, Nehru government was under pressure since 1950 to ATTACK FIRST, starting with Sardar Patel’s much hyped letter. Nation was intoxicated by Nehru’s own success annexing Princely States, Pondicherry and making Sikkim a subsidiary. That euphoria peaked when Krishna Menon ousted Portuguese and liberated Goa in December 1961. Chinese looked small compared to Europeans (Britain, France, Portugal) whom we defeated! Krishna Menon was accused of “betraying India” by “allowing himself photographed” with Gen Chen Yi at Laos Conference. When Zhou Enlai brought peace proposal that accepts status-quo in 1960, Jana Sangh demanded Zhou be arrested upon arrival and war declared on China. If India accepted Zhou’s proposal, there would be no more border dispute. But Minoo Masani claimed Nehru “humiliated India” by inviting Zhou. Rajaji and Kriplani claimed 1 Gandhian Soldier was equal to 10 Chinese. Ram Manohar Lohia accused Nehru government of holding military back which supposedly was ready and eager to teach China a lesson. President Radha Krishnan (spiritual) lectured Zhou on India’s rights over Himalayas. Zhou went back empty handed and Nehru was made helpless by his own commitment to democracy.
This debacle can be analysed from two perspectives: (1) For some reason, India has largely been a passive contender in large scale geopolitical engagements throughout its history. India’s most notable outreach initiative was the propagation of Buddhism (soft). Nehru, with his great belief in the innovative non-aligned movement was a pacifist at heart. Even though he had experience of Pakistani transgressions in Kashmir, he was moulded in Gandhi’s ideology of non-violence. As a prime minister whose focus was making a leap from an old civilisation to a new nation, he was perhaps not willing to acknowledge that China would go all out militarily. So in a way he was a reluctant warrior (unlike his daughter who was much more decisive in such crisis less than a decade later, and rightly so as a strong leader should be). (2) the continuing border issues in South Asia are a result of religious and ethnic heterogeneity in the region. Unlike the West (Western Europe and the largely Anglo-Saxon America) who have matured from their experiences in the Great War and WWII, our South Asia and Asia Pacific regions have not matured in creating and adhereing to agreements. Perhaps a large scale showdown is imminent before settlements take place.
The cover ups will continue. There are many good reasons why the corrupt, incompetent, Indian Neta Babu Raj will not publish the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report. Bandit Jabberlal Neckscrew is one of them. My uncles and their friends were Air and General officers at the time.
Did your uncles and friends abandon posts and run away like rest? Was your Air officer uncle nice enough to drop our food, clothes and ammo in Chinese positions for their use against our army?
Since your relatives were ‘Air and General officers’, you mean to say the army was goodie goodie and it is only the political leadership was the villain.
The nearly two thousand mile long border is still not settled. Fortunately, it has remained largely peaceful for about forty years, barring some aggressive patrolling on both sides and regular intrusions. It also represents the least valuable real estate both sides possess. Not the Pearl River Delta or the NCR / MMR. In the 1950s, when these troubles were building up, both were young nations preoccupied with other, more important tasks. The Chinese wanted Aksai Chin, to link Xinjiang with Tibet. After the brief 1962 conflict, they unilaterally withdrew, when they could have held on to what they call South Tibet. 2.Which makes me wonder if they are really the villains they have become in popular imagination. The flight of the Dalai Lama and his followers, our giving them not only sanctuary but allowing the setting up of a “ government in exile “, playing assiduously the “ Tibet Card “, quite possible these acts look very different from Beijing than they do from Delhi. Perhaps we read some signs wrong. We certainly failed to foresee what a coming together of Pakistan and China would do to our security. 3.China has moved past 1962 in a way that we have been unable to. They have written the world’s most impressive growth and development story, now see themselves in America’s league, even if that sentiment is not reciprocated by the US. Perhaps 1962 could have been avoided and the two countries, while natural competitors and rivals, should not have forged such a hostile dynamic. We should study history to fashion a better future, not remain trapped in its shadows and regrets.
Whether we like it or not, the 1962 war was the result of Nehru’s betrayal of friendship with the Chinese. In the light of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai why did Nehru not act in that spirit? That war was unnecessary and was caused by Nehru’s betrayal of friendship with China and a scheme to extract the wealth of the poor patriotic Indians.
Experts never mention (or gloss over) the fact that by November 1962, China retreated to pre-war positions. The timing of (global) Cuban Missile Crisis is not even understood. When enemy retreats, any other nation would claim victory. Only Indians can INSIST being defeated and humiliated. China does not even acknowledge any war taking place, let alone claim victory. 1962 Conflict is trivial in grand scheme of things. Nehru steered the country through largest mass migration in history of mankind. India went through “Direct Action” in 1946 and Partition in 1947 with 1 million deaths each. One would laugh at India’s obsession with a 56-year old issue which did not change a single inch on the ground and had just 4,000 deaths (including 1,000 Chinese). China lost 23 million in WW2, 3 million to its own Civil War, half million in Korea and more in Vietnam which had nothing to do with China itself – not to mention Great Leap and Cultural Revolution. India itself lost millions in WW2 yet nobody bothers to even think about it. Conflict of 1962 was so insignificant even when it happened that the by-election in West Bengal went per schedule. Jyoti Basu in fact wondered if this whole episode was a hoax by Congress to polarize voters against his party which opposed Forward Policy and friendly with China.
Great points
1. Communists including Jyoti Basu were in cahoots with the Chinese. Nehru himself was in touch with communists.
2.All your figures of millions of dead, and statements about the various wars are all wrong—just political bulshit
3. Indian political leadership was largely composed of ambitious rich lawyers trained in UK.
4. Like any lawyer they understood very well that if required to win a case, smart lying is par. So they had no qualms about how to acquire power.
5 They had zero administrative or military understanding.
They had zero understanding of geopolitical realities.
6. They were in a hurry to come to power. British obliged both Jinnah and Nehru and transferred power to these anglophiles.
7. This happened when the British suddenly decided to leave India after Army and Navy mutinies in 1946 and the huge nationalist fervor aroused by INA trials.
8. Nehru was so immature or maybe suspicious of the Army that he always talked of Ahimsa and world peace and said no Army is required. He promoted Gen Kaul his relative to be incharge of the Indo Chinese border defence. Result was the 62 Debacle.
9. Even after 1971 when a golden opportunity was given to India to sort out all issues with Pakistan, the opposite happened due to the bumbling political bureaucratic leadership.
10. For the 1971 creation of Bangladesh, little credit given to the likes of Gen Manekshaw, Lt Gen Sagat Singh, Lt Gen JFR Jacob but completely hogged by ‘Durga Mata’. You guessed it right.
11. Above is a clue to how India having started earlier in 1947 with better foreign exchange, industrial infrastructure, railways than the Chinese who achieved own rule in 1949 are today several times behind China in all major indices of power and progress.
12. The post 1971 era has seen rise of a political judiciary, petty bureaucracy, irrational intractable discretionary controls all amenable to deal making, massive corruption, even sabotage of projects of strategic national importance, crippling of defence infrastructure and industries to make money from arms imports.
13. The only silver lining for India in these dismal decades has been its diaspora including NRI who kick started the software outsourcing model. The diaspora is respected abroad and has built a good image of Indians in the world.. The diaspora sends the Dollor remittances (3% of India’s GDP) which allow the freeloaders to enjoy imported Chinese goods and other international goodies.