What Hindu Succession Act says about women’s property rights & why a larger SC bench will look into it

A 2-judge Supreme Court bench noted that larger benches have differently interpreted Section 14 of 1956 Hindu Succession Act while emphasising the need for settling the question of law.

Supreme Court | Manisha Mondal | ThePrint

New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Monday referred the questions over Hindu women’s property rights under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, to a larger bench, underlining the issue as one of utmost importance.

While doing so, a division bench of the court noted that the question affects the rights of every Hindu woman and her family along with claims that may be pending consideration before courts across the country.

“It is absolutely necessary that there must be clarity and certainty in the position of law that would govern proprietary interests of parties involving interpretation of Section 14,” the court said.

Taking note of the conflicting interpretations of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the 1956 Act, a bench of Justices P.S. Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta ruled: “We direct the registry to place our order along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.”

What Section 14 says

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 relates to the absolute property of a Hindu woman.

“Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner,” the first subsection of the provision states.

Absolute property is that property over which one has complete rights — same as any other property owner — including the right to keep and use such property, free from restrictions.

The term “property” here includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a Hindu woman “by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by a gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.” Simply put, all of these come under the absolute property of a Hindu woman.

The second part of the provision — subsection (2) of Section 14 — exempts specific properties from being considered a woman’s absolute property. That includes any property acquired through a gift or will, or any other instrument, decree, or civil court order, or under an award “where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument” prescribe “a restricted estate in such property”. Essentially, this indicates that property, which is either willed, gifted or given through other ways but with specific conditions attached, falls under property that, in its nature, is not absolute.

In the landmark case of V. Tulasamma & Ors vs V. Sesha Reddi (1977), a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the interpretation of Section 14, said, “This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers”.

The court also said that there was a need for the government to set up a body that constantly keeps in touch with the adjudicatory authorities and the legal profession by expeditiously making amendments if a particular provision is found inadequate, defective, or ill-conceived and, resultantly, counterproductive because of “inapt language” or “unhappy draftsmanship,” among other things.

Questions over Section 14

Since as far back as 1977, the top court raised concerns about the legislative indifference and interpretative difficulties presented by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14, leading to “judicial divergence”, which Justice Bhagwati described as “chaotic” and “robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess”.

The inherent contradiction in the provision stemmed from the fact that, on the one hand, Section 14(1) was a progressive law intended to expand the rights of Hindu women, and on the other, Section 14(2), in effect, restricted their rights, by delineating exceptions, where property would not be considered “absolute”.

In the 1977 Tulasamma case, the court pointed out that before the enactment of Section 14, Hindu law “restricted the nature of the interest of a Hindu female in property acquired by her” and that there was “great diversity of doctrine” on the nature of this restricted interest.

By enacting Section 14(1), the legislature intended “to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in property — however, restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be — into absolute estate”, the court said in the 1962 case S.S. Munna Lal vs. S.S. Rajkumar.

In the present case, the court noted that at least 18 SC judgments exist, where two-judge or three-judge benches have delivered decisions “varying and sometimes inconsistent” with the ruling in Tulsamma’s case.

“..These judgments sought to explain, distinguish, negotiate or ignore the principles in Tulsamma, and, in the process, they have either contradicted Tulsamma or implicitly departed from its principles,” the court noted in its recent ruling.

Nearly four decades after the Tulsamma judgment, the court observed that two streams of thought currently prevail.

The first applies the Tulsamma principles and maintains that property possessed by a Hindu woman — before or after the passage of the Act — will be held by her as a “full owner”.

The other school of thought has been evolving on a case-to-case basis and has been influenced by factors such as the method and manner by which the woman came to possess the property, the instrument by which she acquired possession rights, and the time of such possession, among others.

Present case & contradictory precedents

In March 1965, one Kanwar Bhan willed his property to his wife, with the condition that after her death, the property would pass down to his heirs.

In 1981, the wife sold the property after Kanwar Bhan’s death, leading to the deceased’s heirs filing a suit to stake claim to the property and its possession.

The question that arose then was whether the wife had full ownership rights to the property or the restrictions given in her late husband’s will still held ground.

Five years later, the trial court and, later, the High Court ruled in favour of the wife while holding that the property amounts to maintenance, relying on the Tulsamma judgment.

On the other hand, the respondents relied on a three-judge bench ruling in Karmi vs. Amru (1972) to say that the disposition of property by the wife of the testator (willmaker) falls under subsection (2) of Section 14. Although the wife, in that case, had the property in her possession, the court held that the life estate given to her could not become an absolute estate, given the Act’s provision, indicating that a widow has no pre-existing right in the husband’s self-acquired property.

In 1991, however, a two-judge SC bench in Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota Manikyamma noted that the Tulsamma ruling did not take notice of the three-judge bench decision in Karmi vs. Amru.

In the present case, the bench also noted that while the decision in Karmi did not consider the purpose or object of Section 14 and the precedents on the subject, the principle that shaped that decision resonated in many subsequent decisions.

After analysing the past rulings, the court said it aimed to “reconcile the judgments and restate the principles with clarity and certainty”.

However, owing to the limitation of the bench consisting of only two judges, it said that “such an exercise will not be fruitful” as benches of up to three judges have previously dealt with the issue. That line of thinking made the bench refer the case to an “appropriate larger bench”.

(Edited by Madhurita Goswami)