New Delhi: For voters whose names have disappeared from electoral rolls, the Supreme Court has had plenty to say—but few definitive answers. Over the past year and a half, the court has repeatedly questioned the Election Commission of India (ECI), issued interim directions and flagged procedural problems with the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of voter lists. Yet, fundamental questions, about the legality of the exercise, and how excluded voters can get their names back, remain answered.
Court hearings have seen many strong oral observations from judges, but they are not binding. While the court has repeatedly nudged the ECI to make the process simpler and issued several interim directions addressing procedural concerns, it has not yet adjudicated a final decision on some of the central legal challenges.
Several questions arising on the SIR remain open, including the use of the ‘logical discrepancy’ category and the requirement that previously enrolled voters apply afresh through Form 6.
Legal experts who spoke to ThePrint point to a distinction between the Supreme Court’s procedural interventions and its constitutional responsibility to adjudicate the legality of the exercise.
While former Supreme Court judge Justice Abhay S. Oka argues that the 27 May judgment upholding the Bihar SIR has left specific questions around the use of Form 6 open for consideration, Priyamvadha Shivaji of Vidhi’s Justice, Access and Lowering Delays in India (JALDI) team sees the repeated hearings and interim directions as part of a broader pattern of judicial reluctance to decide contentious issues before events on the ground overtake the litigation.
ThePrint revisits the times the Supreme Court actually issued a formal direction to the ECI and how often it made oral observations, declining substantive interim relief sought and the legal questions still open before the court.
Delhi
The latest SIR challenged before the top court is the one held in Delhi. The Supreme Court last week, while hearing pleas against the ECI-conducted SIR of Delhi’s voter rolls, termed the ECI’s insistence on forcing previously registered voters to use Form 6 (meant for new voters) a “structural incongruity”.
The court emphasised that Form 6 requires a declaration that the applicant has never been registered before. Forcing historical voters to sign this exposes them to a dilemma—potential criminal liability for making a false declaration to get their vital voting rights back.
Most importantly, Justice Joymalya Bagchi clarified that the court had not finally adjudicated the legality of the ECI’s use of the ‘logical discrepancy’ category. He cautioned against treating oral observations as conclusive judicial decisions. Essentially, the court questioned the ECI’s approach and sought corrective action without conclusively deciding the underlying legal issue.
The court had orally nudged the ECI to allow excluded or shifted voters to use Form 8 (designed for change of address or corrections) or allow the late collection of the enumeration forms instead of forcing them to register as entirely fresh voters.
On 3 November 2026, the ECI issued a fresh clarification claiming that filling out Form 6 would not technically count as a false declaration or invite prosecution for deleted voters.
On 4 November 2026, advocate Prashant Bhushan urgently mentioned this before the Chief Justice, flagging that the ECI is directly ignoring the Supreme Court’s oral guidelines by continuing to push Form 6. To this, CJI Surya Kant orally said that the citizens “need not be apprehensive” as the top court is actively dealing with the sub-judice matter.
Bihar
The first challenge to the ECI-conducted SIR was laid before the top court of India in July 2025, when activists and petitioners alleged that the exercise risked widespread voter disenfranchisement of vulnerable communities due to overly stringent documentation requirements and a compressed timeline.
The petitions also challenged the commission’s authority and documentation requirements. The petitions targeted the exclusion of common identity proofs like Aadhaar and ration cards from the initial document list, and challenged the ECI’s authority to effectively execute a ‘de novo (fresh)’ collection of voter data that bypassed decades of established electoral rolls.
When the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) and other activists first approached the Supreme Court in July 2025, their principal interim prayer was for an immediate injunction to pause the SIR execution before the new draft electoral rolls could be published.
Instead of granting a stay, the Supreme Court utilised the months leading up to its final judgment to issue interim remedial measures like questioning the ECI’s document constraints and strongly urged the commission to immediately expand its verification options.
It also asked the ECI to accept common identity proofs like Aadhaar, ration cards, and EPIC (voter ID) so that vulnerable voters would not be disenfranchised while the case was being actively litigated. However, the legality of the SIR was not adjudicated then. On 29 January 2026, the Supreme Court reserved judgement in the Bihar SIR matter after 29 days of arguments.
Because the court refused to stay the process, the ECI carried out the SIR uninterrupted and the subsequent Bihar Assembly elections were held using the newly compiled electoral rolls with about 65 lakh names deleted while the court’s judgment was still technically reserved.
After almost a year, on 27 May 2026, the CJI-led bench delivered a substantive judgment unanimously upholding the Bihar SIR, ruling that the exercise was not arbitrary and served the constitutional mandate of ensuring free and fair elections.
West Bengal
The challenge to the Bengal SIR was, by far, the most legally contentious and operationally complex phase of the ECI’s nationwide drive. The challenge reached the Supreme Court through a batch of petitions, including Mostari Banu v Election Commission of India, where the petitioners raised concerns about the manner in which voters were being categorised for verification and the documentation requirements.
They also sought interim relief against the exercise, including applications for a stay on SIR before the Assembly elections.
Their main argument related to the ‘Logical Discrepancy’ tag, under which over 1.36 crore voters were initially flagged for what the ECI’s software deemed “scientifically impossible” or anomalous data. This included database entries showing single parents linked to over 200 children, 50-year parent-child age gaps, or spelling and language variations caused by local dialects.
The Supreme Court last week clarified that while it allowed the ‘Logical Discrepancy’ filter as a temporary “interim arrangement” to facilitate the 2026 Assembly elections, it has yet to formally rule on the structural legality of the ‘Logical Discrepancy’ category itself.
The two-judge bench of the CJI and Justice J. Bagchi had earlier issued a series of interim directions to the ECI, including displaying the names of electors in the ‘Logical Discrepancy’ list at gram panchayat bhavans, block offices and ward offices; allowing affected electors to submit documents and objections through authorised representatives, including booth level agents; permitting additional documents like Aadhar to be accepted and objections even after the original deadline.
Directing the state government to provide adequate manpower to assist the ECI, it required district collectors and police authorities to facilitate the exercise.
These directions addressed the practical difficulties of voters to participate in the verification process. They did not amount to a final ruling on the legality of the logical discrepancy mechanism.
In March this year, the court directed the creation of an appellate mechanism comprising former or sitting high court judges. The Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court was asked to facilitate the arrangement, and the ECI was directed to issue the necessary notification. Other directions included resolving technical problems with the ECI’s portal and ensuring judicial officers received logistical support.
In another order in March, the top court declined further intervention in administrative disputes, directing the parties to approach the Calcutta High Court.
In April, it intervened after the reported ‘gherao’ of judicial officers engaged in the verification exercise in Malda. Although, this is a separate dimension of the court’s intervention, registered as a suo motu case to ensure the judicial machinery overseeing voter claims could function.
The broader legal challenge to the SIR exercise in Bengal, including the validity of the logical discrepancy criteria, remains pending before the Supreme Court, and the issue is therefore still sub judice.
Maharashtra
On 26 October 2026, the Supreme Court heard a petition filed by Arun Anandagiri challenging the SIR exercise in Maharashtra. Issuing a notice to the ECI, the CJI-led three-judge bench refused to halt the exercise—a direction the petitioners sought.
The petitioner also alleged that approximately 3 crore (30 million) of the state’s 9.79 crore voters (roughly one-third of the electorate) have been dropped from the draft rolls.
While the bench declined to pass immediate restraining orders to stall the final voter list publication (originally scheduled by the ECI for 6 November), CJI Surya Kant addressed the re-registration fears, stating verbally that “nobody will be prosecuted” for trying to get their names back on the roll.
The matter is posted for hearing on 5 November.
‘Judicial evasion’
Speaking to ThePrint, Priyamvadha Shivaji, who works with Vidhi’s JALDI team, remarked how the top court’s handling of the SIR challenges needs to be understood within a larger pattern of judicial delay and reluctance to adjudicate contentious constitutional questions. She describes this as “judicial evasion”—a term coined by constitutional expert and advocate Gautam Bhatia—where a court effectively avoids deciding a question by allowing proceedings to drag on until the issue loses its practical relevance.
She points to the electoral bonds case, the adjudication of political party splits in Maharashtra and the challenge to the abrogation of Article 370 as examples of this pattern. In each instance, she argues, judicial intervention came after significant events had already taken place, limiting the practical consequences of adjudication.
Shivaji says the SIR litigation presents a somewhat different manifestation of judicial evasion. Unlike cases that remain unheard for years, the SIR petitions have come before the Supreme Court repeatedly. But has the frequency of hearings translated into meaningful judicial scrutiny, she asks.
“What they should have done in the Bihar SIR judgment ideally is adjudicate upon the validity of the SIR exercise itself. And because they chose not to do that in that instance, they chose only to issue a series of administrative directions throughout. It’s like they sort of assumed, they pre-assumed the validity of the exercise and then they just said we are only going to take an observer role rather than an adjudicator role in this particular instance,” Shivaji said, adding how this design isn’t unique to the SIR-ECI case.
“I feel, if you look at the other recent directions and orders being passed by the court, they are being very deferential in general to the status quo—reluctant to undertake substantive adjudication, with the court increasingly taking on a regulatory role. That is also why we have all of these suggestions and directions that are being given to the parties that come before the ECI as of now,” she said.
On the ECI specifically, Shivaji stressed that while the ECI is an independent institution, it is not above criticism or regulation by the Supreme Court because under the Constitution the Supreme Court’s authority takes precedence and the Supreme Court should be empowered to pass any directions that it deems fit.
Highlighting that while the SC does not interfere in specific poll-related decisions or outcomes because the ECI is an independent institution, under Article 32, she explained, the top court is empowered to scrutinise and pass any direction it deems fit in the interest of justice.
She raised questions on why the court has appeared hesitant to exercise its authority in the SIR cases, adding to the larger design of “judicial deferment”.
Speaking to ThePrint, former Supreme Court judge Abhay S. Oka said the Supreme Court’s 27 May 2026 judgment in the Association for Democratic Reforms v Election Commission of India, which upheld the SIR exercise in Bihar, had settled the broader question of the Election Commission’s power to conduct the revision under the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
However, the judgment, he said, had not specifically dealt with two questions concerning the use of Form 6 for voters whose names were left out of the draft rolls.
Oka explained that the Bihar judgment concerned the Election Commission’s 24 June 2025 order. He said the subsequent SIR exercises in other states were being conducted under the Bihar framework, subject to modifications.
Largely, the former top court judge stressed that the distinction between the two provisions of Section 21 was central to understanding the legal controversy.
Under Section 21(2), electoral rolls are revised in the prescribed manner, which is governed by the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. Section 21(3), by contrast, empowers the Election Commission to direct a special revision for any constituency or part of a constituency, in such a manner as it considers appropriate.
According to Oka, the distinction was important because the latter provision gives the Commission a wider role in determining the procedure.
“Section 21 nowhere uses the word intensive revision, it says revision,” he said, explaining that the term ‘intensive revision’ appears in Rule 25 of the 1960 Rules.
Oka said one of the arguments before the Supreme Court was that Section 21(3) could not be used to conduct a special revision across all constituencies, since Section 21(2) already provided for revision of all constituencies before general elections. He highlighted that the Supreme Court rejected that argument in its 27 May judgment.
Oka added that assuming the SIR can be done under Section 21(3) of all constituencies, the procedure adopted by EC cannot be contrary to the 1950 RP Act and 1960 Rules framed thereunder.
He also pointed to the court’s treatment of the omission of voters from the draft roll when they failed to submit enumeration forms. The judgment held that non-inclusion at the draft stage was provisional and did not amount to final deletion. The court reasoned that the subsequent claims-and-objections process, including notice, hearing and appeal, preserved the safeguards under Rule 21A.
However, Oka argued that the judgment did not specifically examine what happens next to an existing voter whose name is not included in the draft roll for failure to submit an enumeration form. Under the SIR guidelines, he said, such a voter is required to apply through Form 6, which is ordinarily used for the inclusion of new electors.
“The earlier judgment does not decide how you could compel a person to file Form 6 if his name is already there,” he said.
He argued that the question of requiring an already-enrolled voter to apply as a fresh voter had not been specifically argued before the Supreme Court in the Bihar proceedings. In his view, this issue, therefore, remained open for consideration in the subsequent cases.
The second question, according to Oka, concerns the Election Commission’s addition of declarations to Form 6. Since Form 6 is prescribed under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, he argued that the commission cannot amend the statutory form by adding requirements through its guidelines.
Oka said a larger three-judge bench now including Justice V, Mohana, hearing the subsequent SIR challenges could reconsider the earlier ruling, but cautioned that the 27 May judgment would remain binding unless modified or overruled in accordance with law.
Asked whether the court’s repeated interim directions and oral observations, without a final decision, risked leaving voters in uncertainty, Oka said a simple interim safeguard could have been considered before the Bihar judgment.
“Actually, in West Bengal, there could have been a simple order that only because the enumeration form is not filed, don’t delete their names from the draft voters list,” he said.
He suggested that voters who did not submit enumeration forms could instead have been issued notices under Rule 21A, with their names retained until the prescribed process was followed.
(Edited by Viny Mishra)
Also read Delhi SIR: SC to hear plea on concerns over EC’s Form 6 clarification on Nov 19