New Delhi: Oman failed to communicate to international aviation authorities that Hamam al-Hammami was barred from flying by Oman Air and put on a deradicalisation programme. Flydubai conducted just standard criminal background checks before hiring him.
Israel failed to properly vet the crew of the flydubai plane Hammami was co-piloting with Indian pilot Captain Smit Machchhar, missing the fact the co-pilot of the Tel Aviv-bound plane was from a nation without diplomatic ties with Israel.
A Wall Street Journal report published Monday has highlighted multiple oversight failures across the three countries linked to the co-pilot’s failed bid to hijack flydubai’s flight FZ1073 on 30 September after stabbing Captain Machchhar inside the cockpit.
The Omani co-pilot was previously enrolled in a deradicalisation programme by Oman Air after authorities flagged his extremist activity, according to the WSJ report.
However, these concerns were never shared externally by Omani authorities. Furthermore, flydubai hired Hammami without verifying his employment history with Oman Air beyond a standard criminal background check.
Meanwhile, Israel’s Ministry of Transport failed to properly vet incoming flight crews, missing the fact that Hammami hailed from a nation without diplomatic ties to Israel.
Investigators across these three countries are also currently probing whether Hammami acted independently, or was he linked to international militant organisations.
Also read: Oman banned FlyDubai co-pilot from flying due to his extremist religious views, WSJ report reveals
Assigned to sensitive Tel Aviv route
The 29-year-old Omani national, born to an Omani father and a Syrian mother, made frequent trips to Syria during his youth amid the civil war. Authorities are examining whether his exposure to the conflict fuelled his extremist leanings.
Additionally, officials in the UAE and Israel are reviewing his university years in Australia for possible early signs of radicalisation, with Victoria’s Joint Counter Terrorism Team actively reviewing his regional connections.
Omani authorities first raised concerns about Hammami in 2024 after discovering he frequented extremist blogs and websites. Oman Air barred him from flying, said by those familiar with the matter to the WSJ, transferred him to an administrative position, and enrolled him in a deradicalisation programme.
Had Oman authorities formally revoked his pilot credentials, the action would have alerted international aviation authorities. Instead, the warnings remained uncommunicated according to the report.
In early 2025, Hammami resigned from Oman Air. He joined flydubai in February 2026. The airline conducted a basic criminal background check but omitted contacting Oman Air directly, inquiring about their experience with him, according to those aware of how flydubai hired Hammami. He was subsequently assigned the sensitive Tel Aviv route, where he piloted multiple flights into Israeli airspace uninterrupted.
UAE authorities are now also investigating flydubai staff responsible for his hiring. The final opportunity to stop him belonged to Israel.
Pilots from nations lacking diplomatic relations with Israel—including Oman—are prohibited from operating flights into the country, and foreign carriers are required to submit crew manifests prior to arrival.
Although flydubai submitted flight 1073’s crew manifest to Israel’s Tax Authority database, the Transport Ministry failed to review it, citing a lack of authority and expertise to vet foreign crews. Notably, the ministry had not requested access to the manifest database since its inception in 2023.
Former counterterrorism director Eytan Ben David emphasised in his interview with the WSJ published on Monday that Israeli authorities should have flagged Hammami immediately based on his nationality.
He recalled a similar incident a decade prior where the ministry identified and blocked an Iranian pilot flying for Turkish Airlines.
While Israeli law permits security entities to access the shared manifest database for vetting, ministry officials claimed they were unaware the system had been activated. Instead, they relied on foreign carriers to perform background checks due to limited intelligence infrastructure.
In response, the ministry noted that its Security Division has overseen international aviation since 1977 by verifying background checks with foreign counterparts. It reiterated that flydubai was obligated to employ pilots from countries with diplomatic ties to Israel and perform thorough internal screenings, clarifying that Israeli authorities had not explicitly approved Hammami.
A May 2024 Israeli comptroller report had warned of deteriorating oversight, citing divided responsibilities, ambiguous boundaries, staffing shortages, and financial constraints. These systemic gaps contributed directly to supervisory lapses, creating a disparity where domestic carriers faced strict evaluations while foreign carriers operated under far lighter scrutiny.
(Edited by Ajeet Tiwari)
Also read: Flydubai co-pilot was planning a similar attack in July. What happened then?