Why Siliguri Corridor is strategically important for India & how it is being secured | Cut The Clutter

This special edition of Cut The Clutter, straight from the Siliguri corridor, details the strategic importance of the narrow strip of land in West Bengal, and how it’s a vital link connecting the Northeast to the rest of India.

In this special edition of Cut The Clutter straight from the Siliguri corridor, ThePrint Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta explains the strategic importance of the narrow strip of land in West Bengal, and how for India, it is a very vital link to at least five crore fellow Indians in eight states—all the seven states in the original definition of Northeast and also Sikkim. He also explains how the four countries that border it, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh & China, add to the sensitivity of the zone, and make it more militarised than even Kashmir. 

Here is the full transcript edited for clarity:

I know an election campaign is going on in Bengal. And that right now we are in North Bengal, which goes for polling in the first phase. But we are not talking about elections today. We are talking about a very important strategic issue for India which has also become a hot button issue in this election because the Prime Minister is speaking repeatedly about the Siliguri corridor. 

I stand at one edge of the Siliguri corridor, that edge of the part of the corridor where it’s the narrowest. This is called the chicken’s neck. So as far as I’m concerned, I try to avoid saying ‘chicken’s neck’ because that is not the right expression. The right expression is it’s an isthmus kind of territory. Maybe it’s a choke point for India’s adversaries. But, for India it’s a very vital link to at least five crore fellow Indians in eight states. That is all the seven states in the original definition of northeast and also Sikkim. And then, of course, to Dooars, which is the easternmost part of West Bengal and Darjeeling as well. 

You cannot go anywhere there without passing what is called as Siliguri neck. On the map of West Bengal and the map of India, in this Saras crane kind of territory, is where West Bengal and India are at their narrowest. 

The narrowest part of it is about 21-22 km. On one side there is Bangladesh, on the other there is Nepal. Where I stand, at the edge of the village of Phansidewa, there is a border fencing behind me. From there, as a crow flies or even if you drive to the other end, it’s not more than 21-22 km. When you go to the other end you will come to the Nepal border. That will not be very far from where Naxalbari is.

If you see the entire Siligury neck, where does it begin and end? Roughly, you would say about 170 km is when the channel starts to narrow and the narrowest it gets is 21-22 km. As from this point to the other side, the widest it gets is about 60 km. 

Now try and understand the sensitivity of this place. This place where I stand, Bangladesh right behind me, 20 odd km. About 21-22 km on the other side, exactly opposite, is Nepal. Right up north is China, about 130 km away as you go driving or maybe 30-35 km as a crow flies. Then you have Bhutan, a little bit to the southeast. 

Bhutan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh. Four international borders are within a 100 km of this place. As you are driving, it’s much less. The most important factors for us, however, at this moment are Bangladesh and Nepal between which we are stuck with this narrow territory of land through which so much of our logistics and communications pass. Our railway lines, which serve the Northeast, civilians as well as a lot of the armed forces there in Arunachal Pradesh, in Mizoram, in Nagaland, in Manipur, every place. Also, this logistics channel serves the people there. About 5 crore people depend on it. 

It is through this narrow piece of territory that India has at least two trunk railway lines and lots of other railway lines. These are being expanded and strengthened and fortified. It also has two major highways and some crisscrossing highways as well. It is through somewhere here that Asian Highway 2 also passes, which goes into Nepal and into Bangladesh. 

So you might ask me, ‘If this is only 21-22 km, it’s a very narrow strip of land, in case of hostilities breaking out it’ll be very difficult to hold on to it?’ It’s never easy to hold on to territory when a determined adversary pushes and you have very little area to fall back on because in military science, in the first attacks, usually, if the aggressor is determined and large enough, the defender does fall back a little bit. 

So does India have a place to fall back? Now this is something that the armed forces and the leaders have been thinking about since 1960. It’s about thereabouts that the new corps in Siliguri was set up. That is the XXXIII corps. Over time, this corps has expanded in size, scope and formations under it. One more Mountain Strike Corps has come up in Panagarh, way south in West Bengal. But it’s there, its formations are there. And then, not far from here, where Hasimara air base has come up to the east of Siliguri, that is where one of the squadrons of Rafale is based. Once again, no secrecy about it, publicly known fact, that’s also where at least one large unit of S400 missiles operates. India takes this very seriously. 

Now there are two aspects of it. One, what is the solution, because this is the territory we have got. That’s how the British divided up the Subcontinent, how they drew lines on the map. This is what we have got and it’s not possible to take territory from here or territory from there. Their might be, in the best of all worlds, situations where countries come together, form common markets or maybe even exchange land. That moment, unfortunately, in the Subcontinent has not yet arrived. And, by the looks of it, it doesn’t seem plausible that such a thing will happen. 

However, creative solutions have been looked at. India and Bangladesh, for example, have an agreement. Article 8 of the Trade Agreement of 1980 signed between the two nations says both countries, and I quote, agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country through the territory of the other. That’s the important thing.

Go 60 km south on the same highway, National Highway 27, you reach a place called Chopra, a village which has now grown into a small town. Right next to that is the Bangladesh territory. Just as our territory, Bangladesh territory also has a kind of a crown, the Rangpur district. That is what juts into Indian territory. And what juts into Indian territory there is called the Tetulia corridor. National highway 27 and our transport, our logistics, go into the rest of India from there, from Chopra which is in North Dinajpur district of West Bengal, not even in Siliguri. 

About 60 km to the south, towards the mainland from here and from there, any transport, railways, everything, have to go around this Bangladeshi territory of Tetulia and then reach New Jalpaiguri. It takes them nearly 90 km. There’s been a proposal for a long time that’s been discussed often enough between India and Bangladesh. It’s just waiting for the perfect moment. Its been proposed that from Chopra, you can build a corridor across the Tetulia territory which will be just about 4-5 km and will take you straight to Jalpaiguri district, to Maynaguri. 

What that means is that what is today 90 km of driving, and most of it through this narrowing corridor, actually bypasses all of that and you get to Jalpaiguri in 4-5 km. So this cuts 84 km from a 90-km route.

Now this agreement, signed between India and Bangladesh in 1980, was a gesture following this agreement that in 2011 India formally leased, despite there always being a controversy, the Teen Bigha corridor so Bangladesh could get easy access to their large conclave on our side. 

This is a very tiny corridor, which is why it’s called just ‘Teen Bigha’. The name indicates how small this is. And this tiny corridor that India gave to Bangladesh on lease as part of this goodwill gesture, or in pursuance of Article 8 of the 1980 agreement, gives Bangladesh easy access to the conclave of Dahagram-Angarpota. 

Just next door, to their borders, and they have more than one lakh people living there. But this is a big convenience for Bangladesh. It is not far from this territory. It is not in some other distant part of West Bengal. This is very much part of North Bengal. Not very far from where I stand. 

In fact, if I go up north the same route and then turn east towards Assam, go towards the Dooars, that is where we will find Teen Bigha. If in our travels we have the time, we will even show up there and show you some pictures from there. 

Meanwhile, what is India doing? India is strengthening its current communication and transport network. Now the expectation was that, in reciprocity, Bangladesh will let India build this Tetulia corridor. So that will resolve India’s problem. But then the balloon goes up, a war breaks out, China is involved at the other end. Any country will hesitate to let you have that easy access to your own vital areas. But there will be treaties, there will be agreements and there will be some solemn commitments. It will be enormously better than not having that solution. 

When will that happen, I don’t know. In fact, there have been ideas that India should build it and let Bangladesh benefit from it. With this, India-Bangladesh trade will go up. India can also compensate Bangladesh in many other ways, but those things will happen when India-Bangladesh relations are at their peak at some point. Those peaks come and then the troughs arise, so you have to wait for the right moment.

Dahagram-Angarpota’s population in 2014 was approximately about 17,000. We don’t know how much it is right now but it’s obviously much more. It is through this narrow territory that we have multiple highways, an expressway, trunk railways and also, most importantly, your petroleum, oil, lubricant pipelines. It is through this territory that crude produced in Assam is brought to say Barauni refinery in Bihar and finished goods are sent all over the Northeast. Broadband cables and communication networks also go through it.

Now what is it that India worries about? India doesn’t worry so much about another country coming and invading it and trying to cut this off because for that the Chinese (they are the only likely suspects) have to come down the Himalayas from the Sikkim side. That’ll be very tough— climbing that high up and coming down. They are going to be exposed to a lot of fire from the Indian side.

You might say that warfare has changed right now, things can be done long distance. But human beings can’t be sent long distance as long as there are human beings on the other side willing to defend. So that’s not going to be easy. What India worries about more right now is something that becomes very politically polarising here. And that is something that BJP people keep talking about. You can have different views on it but they say the demographics of this region, not Siliguri but say until about Chopra and a little bit beyond, coming in from Bihar, from Kishan Gunj, those are inhabited very heavily by Bengali-speaking Muslims who have immigrated into India—or if you are from the BJP because that is their preferred usage, ‘infiltrated into India’. 

So they would say that the Bangladeshi territories, obviously, are Bengali Muslim but also Indian territories in the middle where this narrow passage begins and the Nepalese territory bordering it, they are all the same, they all have the same ethno-religious mix. So what will they do? I would like to believe that all Indian Muslims, no matter what language they speak, are as nationalist as any of us.

But at the same time, those who worry, they worry about the fact that just a few tens of thousands of agitating farmers had been able to lay siege to all the approaches to Delhi and those are big highways. And for a long time, nothing could move.

They say that suppose in some situation a similar kind of action is carried out, it can be an instigation. It can be a subversion. Then what will we do? Particularly if a war is about to break out or if we are under pressure either in Arunachal Pradesh or in Sikkim. It will only happen from the Chinese. It’s most unlikely that the Bangladeshis will use their military. It’s nearly impossible that Nepal would use their military. Both will say we will not let our territory be used against India’s interests. All that will be said. 

At the at the same time, the fear of being blocked out—and a recent example that is quoted is of Sujapur where just a few days back, during this campaign, the judicial officers who were part of SIR process were surrounded and were gheraoed and that led to a blocking of National Highway-12 for two full days. So the point is, if NH-12 could be blocked for two full days then this could also be blocked for a few days and that is a challenge. It may be most unlikely but that is something to think about. 

So many new some expensive ideas are coming up. One of which also is to build right across this corridor underground rail lines and maybe an underground highway as well. That is by way of strengthening this node. However, it still doesn’t resolve the geographical problem or the problem of the narrow geographical space in the middle. 

How does NH-27 run? It comes from Purnea in Bihar, runs right along Bihar-Bengal border, then comes into Bengal and has to go around this Tetulia territory of Bangladesh before reaching Jalpaiguri. Now there are innovative ideas but, once again, they will involve Bangladeshi territory. There is an idea, for example, of the Hili-Mahendraganj corridor. Hili, if you read military history, is something that features a lot in the 1971 war. The sector is one across Balurghat from the Indian side that is further south from Chopra. 

Ultimately, the cause of concern about this territory comes not from Bangladesh or Nepal, it comes from China sitting up there. The Sikkim-Bhutan trijunction is where the Chinese had tried to come when the Doklam crisis took place. What happens if they come up to what they now claim to be their claim line. 

And if they come up there, they come to a place called Jampheri Ridge. That is then the crest of the Himalayas, which means they are on the top of the Himalayas. Then the distance from here is maybe 130 km. But they can see the planes of Siliguri, they can even monitor your troop movements, your formation movements, your equipment movements. Now you can watch a long distance particularly from a high altitude. That is what India has been trying to prevent, but the concern that the Chinese someday, maybe 20-25 years down the line, they might get the idea of cutting you off or choking you. That is what India is preparing for. And there’s no time to prepare for what might happen 50 years later now because the defence of a country, particularly a country of as much substance and as much consequence as India, has to be thought of for the many future generations.

And that’s why you find, as you drive in this region, cantonments everywhere. 

It is the most spoken untruth that Kashmir is the most militarised zone in the world, or at least in the Subcontinent. No, Kashmir is not. Just drive around Siliguri. Just drive around the highways there. Don’t even go sideways and you will cantonments on both sides of the highways. If there is any place that deserves the title of the most militarised zone in the world, it is this corridor. So, India is not complacent here. 

If anything, just recently, India has set up three more military stations. One is at Kishanganj, which is in Bihar but not far from the borders. Again, a big migrant territory not far from Bangladesh border and also very close to sensitive zones abutting Bangladesh and our West Bengal border. The second garrison is coming up at Chopra, and the third one, somewhere along the north bank of Brahmaputra river in Dhubri-Goalpara area, at Bamuni. So these three new military stations are now coming up as India looks to protect itself or to ensure its most sensitive communication zones.