Dice have been found dating to the Bronze Age in various Harappan sites in present-day northwest India and throughout Pakistan. And it’s very possible that some had female owners.
In 2024-25, India exported $387.54 bn worth of services, against imports of $198.14 bn, earning all-time high surplus of $189.40 bn. This offset 2/3rd of goods trade deficit.
This world is being restructured and redrawn by one man, and what’s his power? It’s not his formidable military. It’s trade. With China, it turned on him.
Wonder why the IAF had to innovate to fight in its own territory in conditions that it had already fought 3 wars in and where it should have trained and honed its skills to fight in, over the last 50 years.
As per me a great Strategic and Leadership failure with the day being saved by the gallant young officers and men at the Tactical level.
Extremely well written article. The author says “What followed Nachiketa’s ejection is not well known”. Exactly. I, Wing Commander Utpal Kundu (Retd) was the person who played the main role. Just to give a background- I was the Detachment Commander at Srinagar from 13 May 1999 on the Cheetah heptr Z3188. Within days it was known that we had intruders. I did extensive flying everyday for the preparation of a war literally up to the 25th practising high altitude Forward Air Controlling. The very first Kargil FAC was done by me on the 26 May 99 and I had the proud privilege of recording the same in my log book in red ink. It was the first time when Army and Air Force pilots were flying together in war. My Copilot was Major Dua. I was controlling the fighters firing and he was controlling the Bofors firing. The mission was relatively successful though I realised that the fog of war can lead to fratricide. On 27th I was exiting the Valley after carrying out another FAC mission, in close proximity of our Pakistani counterparts, when I heard on R/T “My number 2 has ejected”. I could recognise the voice to be that of Mandakot, a course junior to me. Immediately I told Srinagar ATC that I am going for Combat SAR and I required CAP. I knew that one of my brother in arms was in danger and required immediate evacuation. Though I was carrying back four badly injured jawans who were to be dropped at the hospital in Srinagar, I headed back to Kargil. I again picked up my Army copilot Capt. Rajagopal from Matayan and headed for Kargil. By that time Sqn. Ldr Ahuja was already in the air and we established R/T contact. But what many don’t know was the level of preparation of our Pakistani counterparts. They had frequency jammers and were able to jam our communications. Sqn Ldr Ahuja was at the crash site of Nachiketa’s aircraft and he was giving me the GPS coordinates. My helicopter didn’t have the GPS equipment. I knew that we need to tie the guns of our Bofors when I go in for picking up Nachiketa. I landed at Kargil helipad and briefed the Brigadier in charge for my plan of action. As I got airborne again I realised that Sqn Ldr Ahuja’ s aircraft had been shot. Then I asked for helicopters with GPS equipment on board. I did extensive search and rescue for the two downed brothers. The terrain was snow covered with the average height of 12000 feet. We ran out of portable oxygen but our concern for others safety was more important. The Devils post of the Army had seen Sqn Ldr Ahuja landing safely from parachute and being taken by the Pakistani’s. But no one had seen Nachiketa. I landed back at Srinagar well after sunset. As I was ushered in to the briefing room where the Air Chief was well in to a briefing. When the Air Chief announced that Nachiketa was a POW and Ahuja was dead, I strongly voiced my objections. The rest is well known. It’s a great feeling to be at the service of your motherland and nothing in the world can match my emotions. The second greatest thing was being in the company of that Armed Forces at junior levels where each one is willing to sacrifice his life for the other at the drop of a hat. But there were many lessons that I learnt. Anyone desirous can contact me to have a look at the red entries of the log book which I treasure or share the feeling of goosebumps when I recollect the experiences. utpalkundu7769@gmail.com. 9811946191.
Though IAF never acknowledged, but is well known, even this article confirms the same. One of helicopters went to war without CMDS, lack of common sense/brains. One IAF person in anonymity write that fateful crashed helicopter pilot was advised not to take the mission, but he went over heroically and lost the men and the machine.
A very well written article. Though emphasis is on use of heptrs as the subject states, however one can always state with confidence that the Kargil battle was an integrated battle of land and air by the Indian Armed Forces.
If any one thinks that ears are nothing but computer games, they are sadly mistaken. To expect the rny to keep quiet and not do any thing is being naive.Improvisation, and quickly at that is the mantra and our people adapted well.
People will get killed and injured in larger Numbers than before and we should all be mentally prepared .Our forces did a great job and let us not belittle them with childish comments
We boast of Kargil as a victory. It was actually a military disaster. First, we were caught with our pants down. Secondly we sent brave soldiers charging up steep slopes with no cover. They were swatted like flies by the enemy troop at the vantage points. When we brought in the Bofors shoot and scoot artillery we found that we didn’t have enough ammunition and had to purchase the same at exorbitant rates. Fourthly, we had no coffins for the deceased bravehearts.
The reality is that it was the air force strafing of the heights and the artillery bombardment that saved the day. Certainly not the infantry that has become all but redundant in modern warfare. Their use should now be restricted to Republic Day Parades.
Finally it was President Bill Clinton who gave Nawaz Sharif a rap on the knuckles and told him to back off.
Indian is the only Country in this World a Military disaster is celebrated as Victory.
Wonder why the IAF had to innovate to fight in its own territory in conditions that it had already fought 3 wars in and where it should have trained and honed its skills to fight in, over the last 50 years.
As per me a great Strategic and Leadership failure with the day being saved by the gallant young officers and men at the Tactical level.
Extremely well written article. The author says “What followed Nachiketa’s ejection is not well known”. Exactly. I, Wing Commander Utpal Kundu (Retd) was the person who played the main role. Just to give a background- I was the Detachment Commander at Srinagar from 13 May 1999 on the Cheetah heptr Z3188. Within days it was known that we had intruders. I did extensive flying everyday for the preparation of a war literally up to the 25th practising high altitude Forward Air Controlling. The very first Kargil FAC was done by me on the 26 May 99 and I had the proud privilege of recording the same in my log book in red ink. It was the first time when Army and Air Force pilots were flying together in war. My Copilot was Major Dua. I was controlling the fighters firing and he was controlling the Bofors firing. The mission was relatively successful though I realised that the fog of war can lead to fratricide. On 27th I was exiting the Valley after carrying out another FAC mission, in close proximity of our Pakistani counterparts, when I heard on R/T “My number 2 has ejected”. I could recognise the voice to be that of Mandakot, a course junior to me. Immediately I told Srinagar ATC that I am going for Combat SAR and I required CAP. I knew that one of my brother in arms was in danger and required immediate evacuation. Though I was carrying back four badly injured jawans who were to be dropped at the hospital in Srinagar, I headed back to Kargil. I again picked up my Army copilot Capt. Rajagopal from Matayan and headed for Kargil. By that time Sqn. Ldr Ahuja was already in the air and we established R/T contact. But what many don’t know was the level of preparation of our Pakistani counterparts. They had frequency jammers and were able to jam our communications. Sqn Ldr Ahuja was at the crash site of Nachiketa’s aircraft and he was giving me the GPS coordinates. My helicopter didn’t have the GPS equipment. I knew that we need to tie the guns of our Bofors when I go in for picking up Nachiketa. I landed at Kargil helipad and briefed the Brigadier in charge for my plan of action. As I got airborne again I realised that Sqn Ldr Ahuja’ s aircraft had been shot. Then I asked for helicopters with GPS equipment on board. I did extensive search and rescue for the two downed brothers. The terrain was snow covered with the average height of 12000 feet. We ran out of portable oxygen but our concern for others safety was more important. The Devils post of the Army had seen Sqn Ldr Ahuja landing safely from parachute and being taken by the Pakistani’s. But no one had seen Nachiketa. I landed back at Srinagar well after sunset. As I was ushered in to the briefing room where the Air Chief was well in to a briefing. When the Air Chief announced that Nachiketa was a POW and Ahuja was dead, I strongly voiced my objections. The rest is well known. It’s a great feeling to be at the service of your motherland and nothing in the world can match my emotions. The second greatest thing was being in the company of that Armed Forces at junior levels where each one is willing to sacrifice his life for the other at the drop of a hat. But there were many lessons that I learnt. Anyone desirous can contact me to have a look at the red entries of the log book which I treasure or share the feeling of goosebumps when I recollect the experiences. utpalkundu7769@gmail.com. 9811946191.
First, how come Pak could occupy Kargil hills. Why there was no vigilance retained at such critical points.
Why is Pak air power not matched by Indian sophisticated equipment & fighter planes.
Though IAF never acknowledged, but is well known, even this article confirms the same. One of helicopters went to war without CMDS, lack of common sense/brains. One IAF person in anonymity write that fateful crashed helicopter pilot was advised not to take the mission, but he went over heroically and lost the men and the machine.
A very well written article. Though emphasis is on use of heptrs as the subject states, however one can always state with confidence that the Kargil battle was an integrated battle of land and air by the Indian Armed Forces.
If any one thinks that ears are nothing but computer games, they are sadly mistaken. To expect the rny to keep quiet and not do any thing is being naive.Improvisation, and quickly at that is the mantra and our people adapted well.
People will get killed and injured in larger Numbers than before and we should all be mentally prepared .Our forces did a great job and let us not belittle them with childish comments
We boast of Kargil as a victory. It was actually a military disaster. First, we were caught with our pants down. Secondly we sent brave soldiers charging up steep slopes with no cover. They were swatted like flies by the enemy troop at the vantage points. When we brought in the Bofors shoot and scoot artillery we found that we didn’t have enough ammunition and had to purchase the same at exorbitant rates. Fourthly, we had no coffins for the deceased bravehearts.
The reality is that it was the air force strafing of the heights and the artillery bombardment that saved the day. Certainly not the infantry that has become all but redundant in modern warfare. Their use should now be restricted to Republic Day Parades.
Finally it was President Bill Clinton who gave Nawaz Sharif a rap on the knuckles and told him to back off.