South India’s economic growth is tied to lower fertility rates. It is overhyped

The lazy argument of how the regressive North was different from the progressive South hinges on a falling fertility rate. But this was shaped by a Malthusian worldview.

Southern states have done much better in lowering the TFR and this is still a part of the political discourse. | Representational image | ANI

In the ‘just-a-minute’ political analysis of elections in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh, which saw the virtual ouster of Congress from all the erstwhile BIMARU states, some TV and social media channels resorted to the lazy argument of how the regressive North was different from the progressive South on account of different growth trajectories. Some commentators attributed the voting pattern to differences between the two regions on account of South India’s higher economic growth and falling fertility rates.

However, this argument is rather specious. Madhya Pradesh holds the third spot in the country—above states like Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala in terms of the per capita income growth over the last ten years, from FY13 to FY23. But the fact is that the Southern states have done much better in lowering the TFR (Total Fertility Rate) and this is still a part of the political discourse. Therefore, it is important to ask: is it relevant, or is it an overhyped factor in the development discourse?

Let us begin by asking how the acronym BIMARU—used for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh before the bifurcation of UP and Bihar—got political currency. The term was coined by demographer Ashish Bose in the 1980s. “I coined the term BIMARU to pinpoint India’s demographic malady as far back as 1985 when I was asked to brief the then prime minister on India’s family planning programme,” he said.

It is unfortunate that the BIMARU states continue to be ‘bimar’ (sick) even today. What is worse, they will continue to be BIMARU as per the Registrar General’s projections.

This neo-Malthusian proposition with family planning as the solution was used to buttress and extend the 1976 freeze on delimitation for another 25 years, underscoring the continuance of the 1971 census count of population. This was accepted by a very wide range of public opinion leaders – from agriculture scientist MS Swaminathan to influential journalists like Rami Chhabra—and political parties like the BJP, Congress, DMK and Communist blocs. In fact, even as the 44th Constitutional Amendment reversed many of the policy decisions of the 42nd, taken during the Emergency era, the national population policy of 1976 continued to draw a bipartisan consensus.

It would not be out of place to mention that the dominant debate during the period—from the 1960s to the turn of the century—was dominated by Paul Ehrlich’s book Population Bomb, the doomsday predictions of the Club of Rome, and the Washington consensus on population being the bane of development. Not just India, but all other ‘developing’ countries—including China, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia—followed this strategy. In the decades leading up to this millennia, the efforts of Vietnam and Bangladesh in arresting population growth were showcased as ‘exemplars’.

The argument of freezing the delimitation, or reapportion of parliamentary seats between states, went generally unquestioned—except for Shivraj Patil of the Congress, and Somnath Chatterjee of the CPI (M). But both disputed this in their individual capacities. In fact, Chatterjee has said on record during the deliberations on the 91st Constitutional Amendment that when the freeze was announced in 1976, there was “hardly any discussion on that”. He went on to say, “Let us not try to give an impression that through this Bill, we shall be able to control the population. After all, nobody produces children on the basis of who will be representing his son in the Parliament. I do not know what is the connection of Members and the fertility rate in the country. This is only ad hocism, and this is only to carry on the present state of affairs.”

Participating in the same debate—documented by Ravi Mishra, Deputy Director of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in his upcoming book The South Fears, The North Suffers: Population, Representation And The North South Divide—Shivraj Patil said that “the government is proposing a law on a logic which is not acceptable and also not correct”. Only the RJD objected vehemently. Its leader Raghuvansh Prasad Singh declared, “The Constitution Amendment Bill is not based on a uniform policy. Since you have the majority in the House, you may get this Bill passed, but it is not based on the common principle of justice.” Of course, the TDP and the DMK were vociferous in their support of the 91st Amendment.

Negatives of population policies

By the early 2000s, the distortions and negative externalities of state-driven population policies started coming to the fore,  in several parts of the world, especially in the context of the rising ageing population with fewer people in the working age group to support them.    An extreme example is Japan, which grapples with the issue of hundreds of prefectures becoming unviable in terms of civic amenities, health care, and businesses. In a compelling study, Empty Planet: The Shock of Global Population Decline, Darrell Bricker and John Ibbitson discuss the implications of declining populations on economics, ecology, governance and social structures.  One possible way for these economies to sustain and grow is to encourage, or at least allow immigration which has its own set of political implications.

Are we facing a similar situation in India? True, a majority of the states have a Total Fertility Rate of lower than 2.1 (the ideal number for a stable population) and others are well on their way to achieving demographic stabilisation. But the intra-state variations are quite glaring, leading to different responses. Uttar Pradesh continues to harbour the impression that population growth is one of the pre-eminent reasons that it is not able to catch up on development.

But from 2016, there has been a change in the tide. TDP’s Chandrababu Naidu is now arguing that the two-child rule for panchayat election nominations should be dispensed with.

This contentious issue gained prominence as the Fifteenth Financial Commission shifted the base year for resource devolution from 1971 to 2011. Many argue that this is a precursor to a possible realignment in the number of seats in Parliament as well.

But even 1971 as the base year has its pros and cons. As Mishra, has argued, the demographic growth in the southern states had peaked by 1961, but in the decades before that, the so-called BIMARU states (and West Bengal) had actually seen slower growth because of wars, disease, and famine.

He urges against basing the issue of India’s political representation and fiscal devolution on neo-Malthusian principles, which have long been discarded as gospels in the development discourse. The focus has to be on policies and institutions that spur growth, and the fall in TFR will be a corollary rather than the other way around.

Sanjeev Chopra is a former IAS officer and Festival Director of Valley of Words. Until recently, he was Director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration. He tweets @ChopraSanjeev. Views are personal.

(Edited by Theres Sudeep)