Kashmiri jihadists more resilient than we think. Rebuilding J&K Police is key to counter them

The new jihadists in J&K have harried Indian forces, staged a series of ambushes, and now begun to target Indian civilian infrastructure projects.

File photo of security personnel standing guard during an anti-terrorist operation in Kashmir | ANI

Twenty-four years ago, early on a bright spring morning, Afaq Ahmad Shah carefully shaved his head and body hair. Then, he manoeuvred his Tata Sumo through the narrow lanes of old Srinagar’s Khanyar down the barricaded road. As he drove past the Indian Army’s XV Corps headquarters at Badami Bagh, Afaq pulled the switch that set off more than a hundred kilograms of explosive ammonium nitrate-fuel oil mixture. Two people died, including the young Jaish-e-Mohammad recruit.

Later, Afaq’s family buried Kashmir’s very first suicide bomber at the Mazar-e-Shuhada, or Martyrs’ Graveyard, just a few hundred metres from their home. 

This week, the brother of the suicide bomber was at the centre of a shootout in the heart of Srinagar—the first involving Pakistani jihadists since 2022. Local public works contractor Masood Shah, highly placed police sources told ThePrint, provided his home to a top Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) operative who used the code names Usman and Khalid during multiple visits to Srinagar, some lasting weeks.

From Masood’s home, Usman liaised with terror cells operating across Kashmir, assessing the commitment of new volunteers wishing to join the jihad. He also used the home as a base for planning attacks like the recent murder of six workers and a doctor at the Z-Morh tunnel project. Then, an informer led police to the home, leading to Usman’s killing.

A brother who gave his life; a second who risked it 20 years later for the same cause: Kashmir’s jihadists are demonstrating far greater resilience than India expected, and not for the first time.

Islamabad’s mixed messages

All this summer, politicians in Pakistan have been signalling that their economically battered country seeks peace. Maryam Nawaz Sharif, Punjab chief minister and daughter of former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, has called for cooperation on climate change. Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar has said he’s considering reopening trade. And all summer, Indian intelligence services and police have been watching dozens of jihadists from Pakistan punch through the Line of Control and head into the Pir Panjal mountains. 

There, the new jihadists—many veterans who fought alongside the Taliban against Western forces in Afghanistan—have harried Indian forces, staged a series of ambushes, and now begun to target Indian civilian infrastructure projects. Three infiltrating jihadists were killed near Jammu’s Akhnoor last week—in an operation which, among other things, necessitated the use of armoured vehicles—but many more have got through.

At a recent off-the-record meeting in Thailand with former Indian military commanders, two sources told ThePrint that their interlocutors justified the escalation by claiming India was funding insurgents attacking the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The Pakistani delegation argued that the solution lay in establishing a back-channel negotiation process that would also address their concerns in Kashmir.

However, India shows little interest in initiating such dialogue until terrorism ends—and there are few signs of that happening.

The levels of violence, according to the New Delhi-based South Asia Terrorism Portal, have increased in J&K, with murders of civilians doubling in 2024 compared to last year, and likely to exceed those seen in the three years after Kashmir’s special status was revoked in 2019. The rise might not be catastrophic, but it’s a signal of the dangers that lie ahead.

What Pakistan wants

Formulating hypotheses about Pakistan’s intentions is easy enough. General Asim Munir, the current Army Chief, is seeking to distance himself from his predecessor, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, and his incarcerated spymaster, Lieutenant-General Faiz Hameed. During the Bajwa years, secret diplomatic channels were active even after the Pulwama crisis. The talks gave birth to a renewed ceasefire on the LOC in 2021, making it easier for India to reposition troops to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as tensions rose with China.

General Bajwa didn’t get what he wanted, though—including a political agreement to restore some constitutional privileges in Kashmir, such as restrictions on non-residents buying land. Likely, General Munir doesn’t want to risk his legitimacy within the Army by appearing too soft toward India.

Then again, Pakistan might be genuinely concerned about Indian involvement in Balochistan, where attacks on CPEC projects have led to unprecedented public reprimands from Beijing. Although there is little evidence that India is a significant actor in the violence in Balochistan, very public threats from high officials like National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have given Pakistani Generals all the proof they believe they need.

Even though Pakistan tamped down the visibility of organisations like Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, for fears of international sanctions, much of its social infrastructure for these groups remains intact. The terrorist groups’ rank-and-file find shelter within its political front, the Markazi Muslim League, which is committed to transforming Pakistan into “an Islamic welfare state.” The MML has also been active in protests against so-called blasphemy and has held meetings with Hamas leadership in Doha.

For its part, the Jaish-e-Mohammad has held rallies in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, acknowledging its role in continued attacks across the LOC. And, in defiance of international commitments made by Islamabad, JeM is expanding its seminaries in the town of Bahawalpur, as ThePrint first reported.

The two organisations have embedded themselves inside a wider Islamist milieu that is working to seize greater power in Pakistan, hoping to capitalise on the growing power of the anti-blasphemy movement. The rise of the anti-government insurgency of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Pakistan’s north-west could also help the Jaish and Lashkar market themselves as loyal, jihadist proxies of the state.

The looming fallout

Little of this should surprise us. Ever since 2020—even as politicians repeatedly proclaimed Kashmir was at peace—key jihad commanders worked hard to rebuild their operational capabilities. Abbas Sheikh, a one-time tailor-turned-terrorist who was killed in 2021, recruited cadres and spearheaded a campaign of assassination against migrant workers. His successor, Basit Dar, who was shot dead this summer in south Kashmir’s Kulgam, built networks of couriers, logistics workers, and recruiters who operated largely out of sight of the police and intelligence services.

Even though these networks did not succeed in staging large-scale attacks, Usman’s guidance helped them continue to demonstrate their presence. Last year, for example, J&K police inspector Masroor Ahmad Wani was shot dead in a gang-style point-blank shooting, while he was playing cricket. The officer was survived by his then-pregnant wife. The Pakistani jihadists who arrived in 2023 significantly expanded the targets, to include military targets.

The decision made by General Bajwa to shut down cross-Line of Control operations meant these efforts could never acquire genuine lethality. The injection of numbers of skilled fighters from Pakistan will now give an opportunity for ethnic Kashmiri jihadists to acquire combat skills and weapons.

Even though an economically strained Pakistan does not want to risk another Pulwama-like crisis, it has so far demonstrated that it can rein-in its proxies at levels which, though painful for India, fall well short of those which might make war an attractive option. The Generals in Islamabad likely hope that a prolonged campaign of low-grade warfare will eventually sabotage the newly elected National Conference government and persuade Kashmiris that Indian democracy cannot deliver.

There are, of course, things New Delhi can do to avoid that outcome. Key among them will be rebuilding the Jammu and Kashmir Police, which was critical to intelligence and operational success before 2020. The ill-thought-through decision to dismantle the Jammu and Kashmir cadre has demoralised the police and, over time, will denude it of officers with a long-term career commitment to the state.

Even more importantly, New Delhi needs to move beyond partisanship and support the rapid transition to statehood so that Kashmir’s democratic parties can rebuild legitimacy among a bruised population.

Praveen Swami is contributing editor at ThePrint. He tweets with @praveenswami. Views are personal.

(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)